

LIFE AFTER DEATH

Problems of the Future Life
And Its Nature

JAMES H. HYSLOP



UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA
AT
LOS ANGELES
LIBRARY

University of California
At Los Angeles
The Library

Form L 1

BF

1031

H99 2

1907 13 1928

21 1930

DEC 8 1940

JUN 12 1947

AUG 30



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2008 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

LIFE AFTER DEATH

*Problems of the Future Life
and its Nature*

BY

JAMES H. HYSLOP, Ph.D., LL.D.

Secretary of the American Society for Psychical Research
and formerly Professor of Logic and Ethics in Columbia University



NEW YORK

E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY

681 FIFTH AVENUE

9578x

Copyright 1918,
By E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY

All Rights Reserved

Printed in the United States of America

... 1919 ...
... 1919 ...
Research (Published in first paper)
(see page 300 for the book)

PREFACE

1927
u of c Dub

MOST of the material in this book is new. Two chapters and a part of a third are reproductions of previously published matter, and they are incorporated because they are so relevant to the main object of the work. But the rest of it has been suggested by the need of discussing some problems which are sequels of the scientific collection of facts with which psychic research has so long occupied itself in the effort to ascertain whether man survived bodily death or not. I have not taken the pains in this work to quote the facts which tend to prove such a claim. The material is too plentiful and voluminous, as well as complex, to take the space for it. The publications of the various Societies for Psychical Research supply the evidence in such quantity and quality that it would require a volume by itself to quote and explain its import. I assume here sufficient intelligence on the part of most people who have done critical reading to see the cogency of it and to accept the proof of survival in it, though there are associated problems not so well secured against difficulty. The trouble with most people is that, in estimating the evidence, they take with them certain preconceived ideas of what a spirit is and so adjudge the evidence accordingly.

The scientific man, however, assumes nothing about a spirit except that it is a stream of consciousness existing apart from the physical body. How it may exist, he does not inquire, until he is convinced that there is evidence of the fact of it, and then a large number of associated problems arise. I have under-

taken here to discuss these connected problems and so I assume that survival has sufficient evidence for its acceptance to make a tentative effort to satisfy some curiosity about the further questions that have more interest than the purely scientific problem of the continuity of life.

At the present day there is the usual, perhaps more than the usual, passion to know whether, if a man die, he shall live again, and it takes the form of an intenser interest in the nature of the life after death than in the scientific question of the fact. This problem is discussed at some length in this work. It is not easy to satisfy inquirers on this point. Most of them suppose that, if we can communicate with the discarnate, they can easily tell us all about the transcendental world. But this is an illusion and the sooner that we learn that there is a very large problem before us in that matter the better for our intellectual sanity. It is comparatively easy to prove survival, when you have once eliminated fraud and subconscious fabrications. But it is a very different matter to determine just what we shall believe or how we shall conceive the nature of the existence beyond the grave. It will be a matter of long investigation and all that I can hope to do in this work is to suggest the considerations that must be taken into account when discussing the problem.

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

PRIMITIVE CONCEPTIONS OF A FUTURE LIFE

Herbert Spencer's theory, 1. Savage ideas, 3. Illustrations of savage beliefs, 4. Relation to spiritualism, 10. Nature of the next life, 14. Modern views, 17.

CHAPTER II

THE IDEAS OF CIVILIZED NATIONS

Culture and religion, 20. Chinese religion, 21. Taoism, 23. Buddhism, 24. Hindu beliefs, 25. Brahmanism, 27. Reincarnation, 28. Japanese doctrines, 31. Philosophy, 33. Egyptian ideas, 35. Hebrew beliefs, 37. Zoroastrianism, 39.

CHAPTER III

GRECO-ROMAN IDEAS

Early Greek conceptions, 42. Pliosophic period, 46. Ionian thinkers, 48. Heraclitus, 49. Empedocles and Democritus, 50. Pythagoras, 52. Plato, 53. Transmigration, 57. Aristotle, 58. Stoics, 60. Epicureans, 61. The Romans, 62. Cicero and Seneca, 63. Marcus Aurelius, 63. Christian view, 64.

CHAPTER IV

CHRISTIANITY AND PSYCHIC RESEARCH

General observations, 65. The resurrection, 68. New Testament incidents, 71. Miracles of healing, 75. Further incidents, 76. Meaning of "Angel," 78. The Temptation, 80. St. Paul, 81. Relation to psychic research, 85. Healing, 87. Science, 89.

viii ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER V

MODERN AND SCIENTIFIC DOCTRINES

General characteristics, 92. Resurrection, 94. Materialism, 96. Greek philosophy, 98. Christian philosophy, 99. Revival of science, 101. Types of materialism, 104. Philosophic materialism, 108. Method of disproof, 110. Conception of spirit, 115. Mental pictures and the problem, 120. Professor James' reservoir theory, 121. Spinoza and pantheism, 125. Telepathy, 129. Spiritistic theory, 134. Instances against telepathy, 137. Argument and explanation, 140.

CHAPTER VI

THE POSSIBILITY OF A FUTURE LIFE

Introduction, 143. Epicureans, 145. Indestructibility of substance, 147. Nature of survival, 150. Metchnikoff and survival, 152. Physical resurrection, 153. Pauline doctrine, 154. Cartesian view, 155. Professor James' transmission theory, 156. Nature of consciousness, 159. Metaphysical theories, 160. Scientific problem, 165. Atomic doctrines, 167. Ether theory, 170. Conservation of energy, 171. Mechanical and teleological views, 174. Idealism, 176. Physical science, 178. Psychology, 182.

CHAPTER VII

DIFFICULTIES OF THE PROBLEM

The two problems, 189. Difficulties in the proof, 192. Hypotheses, 195. Mental pictures, 200. Differences in narratives, 202. Confusions in the communications, 204.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PROCESS OF COMMUNICATING

Illusions about the process, 206. Normal intercourse, 209. Mediumistic trance, 211. Number of minds involved, 213. Double control, 216. Interfusion, 218. Modus operandi, 221. Pictographic process, 223. Telephonic analogies, 225. Rapport, 227. Liabilities of pictographic process, 229. Summary, 231.

CHAPTER IX

NATURE OF THE FUTURE LIFE

Introduction, 233. Normal assumptions, 235. Two types of mind, 237. Conceptions of future life, 243. Idealistic or subjective view, 246. Objection, 249. Pictographic process again, 251. Creative functions, 254. Conception of physical science, 255. Matter and spirit, 257. Spirit houses, etc., 260. Communication, 264. Nature of the evidence, 267. A mental world, 269. Application to concrete cases, 271. Sir Oliver Lodge, 275. Explanation, 281. Idealistic suggestion, 287.

CHAPTER X

SEQUELS OF PSYCHIC RESEARCH

Secondary personality, 289. Doris case, 291. Similar cases, 296. Cross reference, 297. Cagliostro, 303. Obsession, 305. Relation to medicine, 308.

CHAPTER XI

GENERAL QUESTIONS AND VALUES

Emotional aspects, 309. Natural and supernatural, 310. Conflicts with Spiritualism, 313. The church, 315. Spiritualism, 317. Trivialities, 319. Pivotal beliefs and personality, 321. Ethics and the future, 323. Social influence, 325. Problem of Theism, 327. Ethical tendencies, 329. Materialism, 334. Conclusion, 336.

LIFE AFTER DEATH

LIFE AFTER DEATH

CHAPTER I

PRIMITIVE CONCEPTIONS OF THE SOUL AND A FUTURE LIFE

1. *The Soul and its Discovery*

IT is impossible in the compass of a chapter to present the various conceptions of an after life which have existed in the history of the human race. This would require several volumes by itself and hence I can but refer to them in the most general way. Even then I shall have in mind only the relation of these beliefs to their unity in psychic phenomena. It is probable that the differences of all the world religions can be unified in psychic phenomena. If that be true we are on the track of their origin, in spite of an evolution that has taken some of them so far away from the original as to have destroyed the traces of it, at least for any superficial observation. It is also true that the traces might actually be there, were we in possession of the knowledge that would enable us to see them.

I do not know any better proof of this last remark than Herbert Spencer's discussion of Ghosts and another life. One who is familiar with the phenomena that have come under the observation of psychic re-

searchers will discover in the facts reported from savages of all types, widely separated in the world and without any connection either racially or geographically, distinct indications of characteristics that are quite intelligible to us but were not so to Mr. Spencer. He had supposed that it was so necessary to conceive the statements of savages in purely sensory forms that he made no allowance for their idealization and as he repudiated psychic research he was without a standard for estimating the possibilities in the reported ideas of savages. The traces of the real experiences of savages are actually present, but neither he nor any one else, who was not familiar with actual human experience to-day, could see those traces.

Mr. Spencer's thesis is that religion originated in the phenomena of dreams and ghosts, but as he treated dreams and ghosts as hallucinations, he invalidated religion with them. Many critics do not accept his view of its origin and it is probable that other facts went with them among savages to originate the full content of what is meant by religion. But it is more than probable that the idea of immortality arose from dreams and ghosts in which the dead purported to appear. This is no place to examine his views, however, at any length. I wish only to call attention to his chapters for readers who may be interested in seeing for themselves the relation which he never saw nor admitted, if he did see it.

There is no doubt that the highly developed ideas of religion in the present day have no identity of a definite kind with this remote origin, but that would make no difference for the evolutionist who knew his problem. The method of thinking which is involved in setting up a transcendental world from ghost experiences and dreams, even supposing they were purely subjective phenomena, is the same as that which endeavors to etherealize nature by the methods of modern

science, and all that religion has ever done, when setting up the spiritual, has been to suppose some sort of "double" necessary to explain things. It may be wrong, if you like, but the *method* of wrong thinking is the same as right thinking, and it will only be a question of evidence to distinguish the one from the other.

But I am not concerned especially with the views of Mr. Spencer. They are wholly secondary to the ideas recorded of savages which he quotes. The facts are that dreams and ghosts, whether subjective hallucinations or veridical ones, seem to have been a source, among primitive peoples, of their ideas of another life, and with savages it would be natural to conceive it in purely materialistic terms, made so, perhaps, by the absence in our own language of the abstract and spiritualized meaning of the terms by which savage ideas have been translated. It is a psychological problem to determine exactly what savages thought.

The limitations of their language were probably greater than their ideas, as is the case in all language whatsoever, and no doubt the limitations of their ideas were greater than those of highly civilized people. Translations of savage ideas into the language of civilized people must inevitably be exposed to illusions. This is true even in the translations of civilized ideas. The ideas of two separate nations, however identical their habits and knowledge generally, are not coterminous so to speak, so that translations may carry less or more than the original. It is this that has led to so many misunderstandings of foreign philosophies.

Hence, to return to the conceptions of primitive people, we might easily mistake their real ideas by the extremely simple nature of their language. They do not develop manifest evidences of abstract thinking as in the more cultured races. Hence when translated into their literal equivalents in civilized languages, they

seem exceedingly materialistic and concrete, when a careful and critical examination of their psychology, far more critical than has ever been made, might reveal idealizations of terms and concepts that do not appear on the surface. That abstraction of concrete sense meaning is not apparent because of the low degree of intelligence shown generally and the necessity of remaining by the literal meaning of their terms, or the common use of them. It is the light of later knowledge and critical study that brings out what was probably there.

Let me take a few examples which will make the case clearer. Spencer and Tylor mention Bobadilla's examination of the Indians of Nicaragua, Tylor making the incident much clearer. Bobadilla asked: "Do those who go upwards live there as they do here, with the same body and head and the rest?" The reply was: "Only the heart goes there." Further questioning brought out the belief that there were two hearts in man, and "that the heart which goes is what makes them live." Among the Chancas of Peru the word for "soul" was also "heart."

Now for one not familiar with the habits of man's mind when using language the word "heart" would be taken in the natural sense of the language in which a translation made it a substitute for "soul," and civilization has specialized the term so that it means a physical organ. But it is noticeable here that when the savage had it intimated that there was something really or apparently contradictory in his belief he made the distinction of two hearts just as we should make the distinction between the two meanings of the same word. One "heart" was "spiritual," the other physical. The distinction here made by the savage was the same that the spiritualists make between the physical and the astral body, or that even modern physics now makes between matter and its ethereal supporter or "double."

We are not concerned with the question whether the savage is right or not, either in his own sense or in any refined sense which science might admit as applicable in remote analogies. The primary point is to illustrate the habit of the human mind which makes it impossible always to take it in a literal and materialistic sense, even among savages where there is reason to believe that it is more usually literal than elsewhere. There can, perhaps, be no doubt that savages, like children, will believe easily enough what the more intelligent person cannot believe and hence there was often a greater literalness in primitive beliefs, or conduct that seemed to imply it, than in those of maturer civilizations. But what they have preserved is distinct traces of what may have been suggested and then their conceptions became distorted, as all ideas may do in the hands of savages. They are less literal than they seem, but more literal than efforts to give them an intelligible meaning would imply.

A few illustrations of the way savages get ideas of the future life will suffice and then a few of what it is like. This is no place to examine them exhaustively. I want to choose those illustrations which bring out indications of the same kind of phenomena of which even civilized races still show the traces in their language.

Spencer quotes Bobadilla's question and the Indian's answer to it. "When they are dying, something like the person called *yulio*, goes off their mouth, and goes there, where that man and woman stay, and there it stays like a person and does not die, and the body remains here." "Going where that man and woman stay" is the idea of a "haunted house." The reference to something coming "off the mouth" recalls the Latin *anima* and *spiritus*, both traceable to the idea of breath, the Greek *pneuma* meaning the same and also the Hebrew *nephesh*.

Now it is not probable that these ideas of the savages originated solely from observing the issuance of the breath from the mouth in cold weather, but that they had compared this with the appearance of ghosts and the clouds sometimes noticeable at the time of death rising from the body. Their general character is the same in appearance. And it matters not whether ghosts are mere hallucinations, because savages do not distinguish between reality and dreams or hallucinations. Even the civilized man, if insane, takes hallucinations for reality. So the Indian would have but to remark the appearance to make his philosophy. The reason for thinking that he has not been governed solely by watching the steamy breath issue from the body is that he says the *yulio* is "something like a person" and stays like a person, evidently having the idea of a ghost in both cases. One author quoted by Spencer remarks that the Greenlanders think there are two souls, one the shadow and the other the breath. Among the Tasmanians the general name for soul is shade, shadow, ghost or apparition. In the Aztec language the soul is called a wind and a shadow. Among the Mohawk Indians the word for soul means to breathe. In psychic experiences people often feel a cool breeze and interpret it as implying something spiritual.

The truth of Tylor's remark will be seen in the following summary by him covering the ideas of many separated types of people who have had no knowledge of each other. The conception of the *soul* as a "shadow" recalls the "astral body" of the theosophists, the "ethereal organism" of the Epicureans, and the "spiritual body" of St. Paul.

"To understand the popular conceptions of the human soul or spirit," says Tylor, "it is instructive to notice the words which have been found suitable to express it. The ghost or phantom seen by the dreamer

or the visionary is like a shadow, and thus the familiar term of the *shade* comes in to express the soul. Thus the Tasmanian word for the shadow is also that for the spirit; the Algonquin Indians describe a man's soul as *otachuk*, 'his shadow'; Quiché language uses *natub* for 'shadow, soul'; the Arawac *ueja* means 'shadow, soul, image'; the Abipones made the one word *loákal* serve for 'shadow, soul, echo, image.' The Zulus not only use the word *tunzi* for 'shadow spirit, ghost,' but they consider that at death the shadow of a man will in some way depart from the corpse, to become an ancestral spirit. The Basutos not only call the spirit remaining after death the *sereti* or 'shadow,' but they think that if a man walks on the river bank, a crocodile may seize his shadow in the water and draw him in; while in Old Calabar there is found the same identification of the spirit with the *ukpon* or 'shadow,' for a man to lose which is fatal. There are thus found among the lower races not only the types of those familiar classic terms, the *skia* or *umbra*, but what also seems the fundamental thought of the stories of shadowless men still current in the folklore of Europe, and familiar to modern readers in Chamisso's tale of Peter Schlemihl."

"*Skia*" and "*umbra*" in the classical languages are no doubt carried over from more primitive times and so had no independent origin in their spiritual significance. But the universal tendency to conceive the soul as a *form* is apparent in all these instances, and if Kilner's experiments in the detection of the aura be finally verified, as they seem strongly supported, we should have experimental justification of the ideas of earlier people.

One wonders whether the Arawac word "*ueja*" above mentioned might have a remote connection without our "*Ouija*," denoting a means of communication with spirits, though the Century Dictionary refers it to

“Oui” and “Ja,” French and German for “Yes.” Phonetically “Ouija” and “ueja” are the same.

Tylor says: “Among the Seminoles of Florida, when a woman died in childbirth, the infant was held over her face to receive her parting spirit, and thus acquire strength and knowledge for future use. These Indians could have well understood why at the death of an ancient Roman, the nearest kinsman leaned over to inhale the last breath of the departing (*excipies hanc animam ore pio*). Their state of mind is kept up to this day among Tyrolese peasants, who can still fancy a good man’s soul to issue from his mouth at death like a little white cloud.”

In another connection, Tylor, speaking of the widespread theory among savages that the soul may leave the body, says: “The South Australians express it when they say of one insensible or unconscious, that he is ‘wilyamarraba,’ i. e. ‘without a soul.’ Among the Algonquin Indians of North America, we hear of sickness being accounted for by the patient’s ‘shadow’ being unsettled or detached from the body, and of the convalescent being reproached for exposing himself before his shadow was safely settled down in him; where we should say that a man was ill and recovered, they would consider that he died, but came again. Another account from among the same race explains the condition of men lying in lethargy or trance; their souls have traveled forth to the banks of the River of Death, but have been driven back and return to re-animate their bodies.

“To the Negroes of North Guiana, derangement or dotage is caused by the patient being prematurely deserted by his soul, sleep being a more temporary withdrawal.” Our “losing consciousness,” when we think of the literal imagery of “losing” is not any more accurate than the language of these Indians. The only difference between the primitive man and ourselves is

that the scientific stage tries merely to describe the facts without any metaphysics whether of the sensory or supersensory sort. The savage, however, imports metaphysics into the case and that of a very naive kind, at least if we are to interpret their language as it appears to represent the case. But as all language is symbolical and our own highly refined abstractions originated in similar imagery it is only our familiarity with abstract ideas that makes us notice the real or apparent absurdity of the primitive man's conceptions. "The Salish Indians of Oregon," continues Tylor, "regard the spirit as distinct from the vital principle and capable of quitting the body for a short time without the patient being conscious of its absence; but to avoid fatal consequences it must be restored as soon as possible, and accordingly the medicine man in solemn form replaces it down through the patient's head."

Tylor summarizes many of these phenomena in the following manner: "Such temporary exit of the soul has a world-wide application to the proceedings of the sorcerer, priest, or seer himself. He professes to send forth his spirit on distant journeys, and probably often believes his soul released for a time from its bodily prison, as in the case of that remarkable dreamer and visionary, Jerome Cardan, who describes himself as having the faculty of passing out of his senses as into ecstasy whenever he will, feeling when he goes into this state a sort of separation near the heart as if his soul were departing, this state beginning from his brain and passing down his spine, and he then feeling only that he is out of himself. Thus the Australian native doctor is alleged to obtain his information by visiting the world of spirits in a trance of two or three days' duration; the Khond priest authenticates his claim to office by remaining from one to fourteen days in a languid dreamy state, caused by one of his souls being away in the divine presence; the Greenland *angekok's*

soul goes forth from his body to fetch his familiar demon; the Turanian shaman lies in lethargy while his soul departs to bring hidden wisdom from the land of spirits."

Any one familiar with the modern phenomena of spiritualism can recognize very accurate resemblances to phenomena all about us. In this narrative are the phenomena of trance, of clairvoyant diagnosis and the "feeling of being out of the body." The separation of the soul from the body to communicate is one of the claims made in nearly all mediumistic phenomena, and that too when the medium has had no familiarity with the idea in his or her normal life. No wonder Tylor adds: "Modern Europe has kept closely enough to the lines of early philosophy, for such ideas to have little strangeness to our own time. Language preserves record of them in such expressions as 'out of oneself,' 'beside oneself,' 'in an ecstasy,' and he who says that his spirit goes forth to meet a friend can still realize in the phrase a meaning deeper than metaphor."

"This same doctrine," continues Tylor, "forms one side of the theory of dreams prevalent among the lower races. Certain of the Greenlanders, Cranz remarks, consider that the soul quits the body in the night and goes out hunting, dancing, and visiting; their dreams which are frequent and lively, having brought them to this opinion. Among the Indians of North America, we hear of the dreamer's soul leaving his body and wandering in quest of things attractive to it. These things the waking man must endeavor to obtain, lest his soul be troubled, and quit the body altogether.

The New Zealanders considered the dreaming soul to leave the body and return, even traveling to the region of the dead to hold converse with its friends. The Tagals of Luzon object to waking a sleeper on account of the absence of his soul. The Karens, whose theory of the wandering soul has just been noticed

(in a previous paragraph), explains dreams to be what this *lá* (soul) sees and experiences in its journeys when it has left the body in sleep. They even account with much acuteness for the fact that we are apt to dream of people and places which we knew before; the *leip-pya* ("butterfly"; another word for spirit or soul), they say, can only visit the regions where the body it belongs to has been already. Onward from the savage state, the idea of the spirit's departure in sleep may be traced into the speculative philosophy of higher nations, as in the Vedanta system, and the Kabbala.

St. Augustine tells one of the double narratives which so well illustrate theories of this kind. The man who tells Augustine the story relates that, at home one night before going to sleep, he saw coming to him a certain philosopher, most well known to him, who then expounded to him certain Platonic passages, which, when asked previously, he had refused to explain. And when he (afterwards) inquired of this philosopher why he did at his house what he had refused to do when asked at his own: 'I did not do it,' said the philosopher, 'but I dreamt that I did.' And thus, says Augustine, that was exhibited to one by phantastic image while waking, which the other saw in dream."

There is in this last incident an illustration of coincidental dreams with which psychic research has had so much to do and the verification of veridical forms of them goes far to make credible the story of St. Augustine, though it has in itself no evidential value. The main thing, however, is the resemblance of primitive ideas to this and the probable source of them.

A savage has not reached the stage of culture in which he can appreciate the difference between the subjective and the objective, the distinction between external objects and the creations of his own imagination. Even we in our sleep do not imagine that what we see is not real. We interpret it in accordance with

all the categories of reality and discover our illusion only when we awake and remember the dream. Savages are no better than civilized sleepers and most naturally take dream images and hallucinations as real. It requires a theory of idealism to bring out the liabilities of illusion. But given the tendencies to make dreams realistic, their logical development would know no limits, and the curious stories about primitive peoples are quite rational on that basis, though not true.

The "voices" of which modern spiritualists speak find their equivalent among savages. The spirit voice was a "low murmur, chirp, or whistle, as it were the ghost of a voice." This reminds us of Isaiah's "wizards that peep and mutter" and Shakespeare's ghosts that squeak and gibber. It is the same with visions. Tylor remarks of these: "There is no doubt that honest visionaries describe ghosts as they really appear to their perception, while even the impostors who pretend to see them conform to the descriptions thus established; thus, in West Africa, a man's *kla* or soul, becoming at his death a *sis*a or ghost, can remain in the house with the corpse, but is visible only to the wong-man, the spirit doctor. Sometimes the phantom has the characteristic quality of not being visible to all of an assembled company. Thus the natives of the Antilles believed that the dead appeared on the roads when one went alone, but not when many went together; thus among the Finns the ghosts of the dead were to be seen by the shamans, but not by men generally unless in dreams. Such is perhaps the meaning of Samuel's ghost, visible to the witch of Endor, while Saul yet has to ask her what it is she sees."

How like modern seances these incidents are, and this whether we regard the modern phenomena as genuine or fraudulent, as we may apply suspicion to the ancient as well. But there is the same distinction here as we observe in modern life, even though we treat

them as hallucinations. It is no wonder that some men whose reading in psychic phenomena has not gone beyond that of primitive peoples should call the work in it "troglodyte psychology," and for our purposes it matters not whether it is so or not. We are examining ideas, not their validity. The unity between the past and the present does not guarantee the truth of either of them, but if we can obtain credentials for the occurrence of similar phenomena to-day, we may well ask whether the ancient superstitions did not have a basis of truth in them distorted by the ignorance of those who received the facts.

As suggesting a possible origin of Greek ideas about the soul as fine matter, possibly in the conceptions of the less civilized people from whom they had themselves come, we may quote another passage from Tylor: "Explicit statements as to the substance of the soul are to be found both among low and high races, in an instructive series of definitions. The Tongans imagined the human soul to be the finer or more aeriform part of the body, which leaves it suddenly at death; something comparable to the perfume and essence of a flower as related to the more solid vegetable fibre.

"The Greenland seers described the soul as they perpetually perceived it in their visions; it is pale and soft, they said, and he who tries to seize it feels nothing for it has no flesh nor bone nor sinew. The Caribs did not think the soul so immaterial as to be invisible, but said it was subtle and thin like a purified body. Turning to higher races, we may take the Siamese as an example of a people who conceive of souls as consisting of subtle matter escaping sight and touch, or as united to a swiftly moving aerial body."

This last instance is only another among the semi-barbarous races of a conception that reminds us of the Pauline "spiritual body" the theosophic "astral body" and the Epicurean "ethereal organism," a view

which is repeated in the work of psychic research, whether it have any more validity or not than savage ideas.

Many primitive peoples extended their doctrine of the soul to plants or even inanimate objects, such as stones and domestic utensils. This is evidenced in the burial of such objects with their owners at death. It was assumed or believed that the dead carried on the same occupations as when living on the earth. They required the same implements and objects. It was not supposed, however, that it was the same physical object, but its soul that was taken by the dead. This opens up the nature of the after life and to that we turn.

2. The Nature of the Future Life

One cannot read the stories of primitive peoples and of their habits without seeing that their conception of the next life is the same, essentially the same, as that of the present life, the only difference being in the perceptible nature of the one and the imperceptible nature of the other. The dead carried on the same occupations as they had in life, a view which is clearly represented again in the ideas of the Book of Revelation in the Bible. This is a description of a purely sensory life with all the habits of monarchical institutions portrayed in it.

When we examine psychic phenomena we can well understand how such ideas took their rise. Apparitions, for instance, show the dress and manners of the person they represent, whether the apparition be of the living or of the dead. "And thus," says Tylor, "it is the habitual feature of the ghost stories of the civilized, as of the savage world, that the ghost comes dressed, and even dressed in well-known clothing worn in life. Hearing as well as sight testifies to the phantom objects;

the clanking of ghostly chains and the rustling of ghostly dresses are described in the literature of apparitions." He then quotes an interesting statement from the account of Rev. E. B. Cross which shows the theory of the Karens about the future life.

"Every object is supposed to have its *kelah*. Axes and knives, as well as trees and plants, are supposed to have their separate *kelahs*. The Karen, with his ax and cleaver, may build his house, cut his rice and conduct his affairs, after death as before."

The whole ghastly custom of human sacrifices, as well as animals, to go with the dead to continue the same life beyond the grave as had been led here, indicates how exactly like the present life the savage conceived the next one. The lives of animals were given up to enable their souls still to serve their masters in the same way as in life. Armor and various implements necessary to the earthly life were buried with the dead or put on the funeral pyre.

"The whole idea," says Tylor, "is graphically illustrated in the following Ojibwa tradition or myth. Gitchi Gauzini was a chief who lived on the shores of Lake Superior, and once, after a few days illness, he seemed to die. He had been a skilful hunter, and had desired that a fine gun which he possessed should be buried with him when he died. But some of his friends, not thinking him really dead, his body was not buried; his widow watched him for four days, he came back to life, and told his story. After death, he said, his ghost traveled on the broad road of the dead toward the happy land, passing over great plains of luxuriant herbage, seeing beautiful groves and hearing the songs of innumerable birds, till at last, from the summit of a hill, he caught sight of the distant city of the dead, far across an intermediate space, partly veiled in mist, and spangled with glittering lakes and streams. He came in view of herds of stately deer, and moose, and

other game, which with little fear walked near his path. But he had no gun, and remembering how he had requested his friends to put his gun in his grave, he turned back to go and fetch it. Then he met face to face the train of men, women, and children who were traveling toward the city of the dead. They were heavily laden with guns, pipes, kettles, meats, and other articles; women were carrying basket-work and painted paddles, and little boys had their ornamented clubs and their bows and arrows, the presents of their friends. Refusing a gun which an overburdened traveler offered him, the ghost of Gitchi Gauzini traveled back in quest of his own, and at last reached the place where he had died. There he could see only a great fire before and around him, and finding the flames barring his passage on every side, he made a desperate leap through, and awoke from his trance. Having concluded his story, he gave his auditors this counsel, that they should no longer deposit so many burdensome things with the dead, delaying them on their journey to the place of repose, so that almost every one he met complained bitterly. It would be wiser, he said, only to put such things in the grave as the deceased was particularly attached to, or made a formal request to have deposited with him."

We could not have a better picture of what was thought about the nature of the after life. The fact that it may be treated as a myth makes no difference in regard to its meaning for indicating that belief and it is probable that some such vision actually took place often in the abnormal conditions of primitive life, and it would make no difference to its meaning for the savage to explain it as a delirium, since he knew no distinction between normal sensation and visions in a trance, except the distinction between the physical and a spiritual world and that distinction subject to qualifications. It is interesting that the story is of the

time when the Indians had come into contact with the white man and his gun and perhaps symbolizes a change of custom or the desire to institute it.

But assuming it fabricated, it was on the basis of similar experiences which marked the savage life. Even fiction is not wholly fiction. The wildest imagination runs along the lines of experience and the only thing that makes its creations grotesque is the exaggeration of its actual experiences in sense, or the combination of exaggerated memories. Hence the most absurd allegations of savages are based on actual experiences and only reflect, when translated, oddities that are made worse by the imperfect translation itself, or the imperfect understanding of his mental operations. The imagination of the savage, however, is untrained and so not subject in any way to critical habits or scientific interest and classification. The remotest analogy has as much significance to him as the most essential resemblances or attributes. Hence what seems to us so grotesque will appear to him perfectly rational.

However, if we take this Ojibwa legend in terms of conceptions at the basis of our ideas of veridical hallucinations and what is involved in the pictographic process of communication between the spiritual and the physical world, we may find that the theory of idealism and of Swedenborg explains very clearly the nature of this savage's experience, and it might even reflect a suggestion from the discarnate to have higher interests, in order to escape the penalties of Sisyphus and Ixion.

With primitive races, the failure to see or appreciate the idealistic point of view forces them to interpret what the civilized man thinks are subjective creations as solid as the objects of normal sense perception. The savage knows nothing of illusions or those subjective creations which men have observed ever since the early Greek philosophers first noted some of them. Since Kant and Leibnitz, who magnified the subjective side

of the mind, it is easy to discredit a transcendental world that claims to be so like sense reality, as appears in savage psychology. What does not stand the test of sense perception is presumably imaginative. Modern psychology, however much it relies upon the phenomena of sense for its data and starting point, regards even these data as having their subjective aspect. This turning of the mind on itself for at least a partial explanation of experience establishes for us a new and more or less independent point of view for determining the nature of things, if we can say anything at all about them apart from the way they appear to us in these data.

The position is anthropocentric as opposed to the point of view of primitive races which is cosmocentric. The savage had and has the most clear sense of dependence; the civilized man the clearest sense of freedom and independence.

Hence the savage sees nature and orders his life most distinctly from the point of view of external reality. He himself came out of it or is the product of the external world. He does not think that he himself has any independent existence. Consciousness is not a factor in what he sees, but merely a dependent spectator. His life is a perpetual struggle with external forces. Hence with so strong a sense of dependence, he will not easily see or adopt the position of the civilized man in which his own free action may count for as much or more in his development than the power of the external world. As the primitive mind does not distinguish one mental state from another and assumes the point of view of external reality, it will not easily discover the subjective factor in any of its life. Hence it is easy for the savage to believe in the supernatural. He discovers a difference between his normal and other life, but that difference is not supposedly due to the difference between normal and abnormal conditions, but

is either placed on the shoulders of differences in capacity between men or is denied altogether. A spiritual world would be just like the material world of sense, whether perceptible by sense or not, and it took later development to draw the distinction.

Veridical hallucinations, which represent a distinction of modern psychic research, are the first step in making clear the difference between purely subjective creations and those experiences which are objectively caused and yet do not represent the nature of the reality in sense terms. They enable us to recognize a transcendental world without necessarily making it like the sense world, any more than we make the cause of ordinary hallucinations like that of normal sensations. In veridical hallucinations we approach or make another step toward the idealistic view, extending it to the nature of a spiritual world and keeping up the non-representative nature of our ideas.

Primitive ideas still linger in those strata of minds which are not educated to the subjective or idealistic psychology. Even when they distinguish or try to distinguish between the internal and the external world, they still employ language that does not imply this distinction. Hence with the differences of culture we find the differences of ideas in modern times, differences that cause much friction because of the importance which the religious mind attaches to the object of its interest. Savages were unanimous in their beliefs and had not the distinction between the educated and the uneducated mind. They were all uneducated. This condition guaranteed both a uniform sense of dependence and the identity between the physical and the spiritual world, though the manifestation of the latter was not so constant as the former.

CHAPTER II

THE IDEAS OF CIVILIZED NATIONS

IT is perhaps not too much to say that the period of culture was initiated by the discovery of illusions. That discovery certainly marked the rise of skepticism in both philosophy and religion. It indicated the distinction between what we could accept and what we could not accept in sense perception. Primitive psychology did not distinguish between sense perception and the work of the explanatory functions of the mind, the understanding. For it, knowledge was neither sensation nor judgment. The difference between these was not known to them. Whatever state of mind it had was trusted. But the discovery of illusions forced on the human mind a distinction between sensations and judgments, and between what was unreal and what was real.

At first this distinction was not carried very far, but it did not take long for skepticism, when once suggested, to destroy much that had been previously accepted without question. This very quickly carried the primitive religious ideas away. They would not stand the test of knowledge which skepticism placed in the senses, or in the judgment applied to sensation which was a subjective reaction against we knew not what, though it was constant. The religious ideas of the soul and a world beyond death, not subscribing to this standard, had to fall away before the onslaught of this all devouring influence.

But the strength of religious ideas was great enough

to revive their power, as the Phoenix arose from its own ashes. The passion for another life was strong enough to construct a philosophy on the basis of the supersensible after skepticism had limited knowledge to the sensible. This reconstructive tendency always based itself upon a modification of previous conceptions which the untutored mind had maintained. Hence when the more civilized races emerged from their savagery they carried with them religious ideas tempered by their more primitive times, while they diverged from them. It is a few of those systems which we notice here. This, however, must be very briefly done, since any adequate conception of them would run into a volume. I take up that of the Chinese first.

1. *Chinese Religion*

The chief characteristic of the Chinese religion is ancestor worship. It is that feature of its ideas that primarily interests the psychic researcher, as it was evidently inherited from the earlier time of which we have no definite history. Perhaps we should not know anything about it were it not for our knowledge of ancestor worship among savages among whom can be found the main incidents of what has remained of it with the Chinese, modified by various forms of progress. Possibly ancestor worship would have totally disappeared among the Chinese but for their conservatism which has preserved it. But it was evidently the early form of belief and shows that it was definitely related to spiritualism. In fact, it was only a form of that belief. It is found, however, most distinctly among the common people, and though the philosophers modified it and often took rationalistic views regarding the doctrine, they never displaced it. Indeed Confucius accepted and conformed to the rites which it imposed.

Ancestor worship was a belief or confession that the spirits of the dead were in communication with the living and had some influence upon the living, an influence that required their propitiation by sacrifices. "No more solemn duty," says Conybeare in the 11th Edition of the *Britannica*, "weighs upon the Chinaman than that of tending the spirits of his dead forefathers. Confucius, it is recorded, sacrificed to the dead, as if they were present, and to the spirits as if they were there. In view of such Chinese sacrifices the names of the dead are inscribed on wooden plaques called spirit tablets, into which the spirits are during the ceremony supposed to enter, having quitted the very heaven and presence of God in order to commune with posterity. Twice a year, in spring and autumn, a Chinese ruler goes in state to the imperial college in Peking, and presents the appointed offerings before the spirit tablets of Confucius and of the worthies who have been associated with him in his temples." This, of course, represents the present status of custom as well as the past, though there has developed along with it definite ethical and philosophical views that did not supplant these ancient doctrines and customs.

The more philosophical view of things apparently begins with Taoism and was followed by Buddhism. Primitive religions and ancestor worship did not base themselves on a reasoned theory of the world. God and immortality were not associated in the same way that they were in later Christianity. In later Christianity God was the ground of immortality and of the belief in it. The reason for this was, no doubt, the decline of the age of miracles. Skepticism about the evidence of immortality by miracles was replaced by a theistic philosophy in which survival after death obtained its defense. But among savages the evidence for the existence of God and that for immortality were independent of each other and God was not necessary

to a belief in survival, and hence performed different functions in the ethical and religious life. Theistic philosophy is the result of an interest in the cosmos rather than in self, though it quickly obtains a human interest. It is first an explanation and unification of nature, and the evidence for immortality is in communication with the dead, until the two beliefs become connected as they did especially in the history of Christianity.

Taoism seems to have been the earliest philosophic theism of China. It was superposed on ancestor worship and did not supplant it. This is to say that it was not conceived in antagonism to it. But it evidently intended to reform its harsher features and perhaps did to the extent of preventing the continuance of many customs which make that practise so hideous among savages. Its insistence on an ethical life as the price of salvation and immortality is probably evidence of its rise about the lower forms of ancestor worship. But it was a monotheistic belief in its theology and a modified ancestor worship in its religion. Its founder was Lao-tsze, who existed long before the Christian era but late enough to escape the transitional period which he evidently terminated. His peculiar doctrines are not of interest here beyond their evident ethical character, which rather clearly indicates the attempt to remove cruelty and superstition from the people of his time. Confucius and he were probably contemporaries and legend makes them sympathetic in their doctrines, with important differences. Neither their agreement nor their differences are of importance here. The chief matter of interest is the relation of Taoism to ancestor worship which was older and which was never more than modified by Taoism.

Buddhism followed Taoism and rivaled it and finally conquered China and Japan, though it did not wholly displace Taoism and perhaps other minor creeds. But

Buddhism was not native to China. It came from India where it originated and from which it was finally driven by Mohammedanism and other religions in India. The peculiarity of Buddhism is that it denied the existence of a soul, though it remained by the doctrine of transmigration or metempsychosis. Its primary conception, however, was materialistic in as much as it maintained that all things were compounds destined to dissolution. It was thus a protest alike against the Animism of primitive time, or Jainism and the Pantheism of the Brahman philosophy.

The characteristic which gave it power was its ethics and this was a Stoic system grafted on a materialistic theory resembling that of Epicurus and Lucretius. It was the superiority of its ethics that enabled it to conquer more superstitious beliefs and customs. Why it should have adhered to the doctrine of transmigration after adopting a materialistic point of view does not appear clear to some writers, but I think this can be explained easily enough, though I shall postpone this question till I come to discuss the Hindu religions. It suffices here to indicate its relation to a rival religion and belief in China and its tendency to depart from the Animism and ancestor worship of that country, setting up a system of practical ethics without a theology or a belief in the immortality of the soul. It was evidently one of those systems which always arises in opposition to more naive conceptions and this makes it react against primitive ideas and customs all along the line. Its success was due to the cultivation of an ascetic ethics and the preservation of a priesthood with a literature.

Its doctrine of Nirvana, which was long supposed to be a belief in annihilation has been proved to be a doctrine of asceticism, or the suppression of the sensuous life and of a primary interest in it, the "dying of the sense life." I shall have more to say of this again.

Here it is necessary to say so much in order to show its starting point as disregarding the interest in a future life, which it denied, except as it affirmed transmigration which, after all, does not preserve personality and is thus convertible with materialism. Its ethical instincts would instigate antagonism to the cruelties associated with more primitive religions which based their beliefs and practises on the existence of a soul and its survival. Buddhism might very naturally find it necessary to deny the existence of a soul to eradicate those customs. It thus became associated with culture and ethical refinement. But it never wholly overcame the ancestor worship upon which it grafted its philosophy. It refined it and left it in popular tenancy. To do this it more or less compromised with Taoism in China, adopting portions of that creed while Taoism also adopted portions of Buddhism, the two forming one religion in the end, at least in their main characteristics.

The relation of Mohammedanism to China needs little consideration. It is a modification of Christianity and lays stress on the immortality of the soul. It is probable that its influence in China, correcting the non-human interest of Buddhism in that respect, but more nearly coinciding with what is implied by ancestor worship, was the cause of its growth. This influence, of course, was of a later period, but its chief power lay in its doctrine of immortality and strong government which adapted it readily to the social institutions of the East.

2. *Hindu Beliefs*

In regard to India Col. Grant observes, in his classification of the religions in India that "the oldest of these religions is Animism, which represents the beginnings of religion in India, and is still professed by

the more primitive tribes, such as Santals, Bhils, and Gonds." This remark, placing Animism among the tribes that are less civilized, is a clear indication of what it was that Brahmanism, Buddhism, and Jainism supplanted. Distinct evidence of the same is found in the relation of Jainism to Buddhism. The founder of Jainism was Maha-vira. He was a contemporary of Buddha and opposed alike the Pantheism of the Brahmins and the Materialism of the Buddhists. He remained by the principles of Animism, holding that everything had a soul.

The Brahmins held that there was one all pervading and eternal essence or reality which we should call God. Man's life was to be one of good conduct and final absorption in this Absolute. The Buddhists ignored or denied the single Absolute and made the cosmos and all that was in it composite and subject to change. Man's personality did not survive, but the effect of his life would be found in later incarnations. This was his conception of transmigration. Brahmanism accepted transmigration, but differed from Buddhism in the manner of applying its system of castes in which its ethics varied from that of Buddha. But in respect to man's destiny Brahmanism accepted transmigration and absorption in the Absolute as practically identical.

This outlines the three main systems of religion in India, prior to the introduction of Mohammedanism, as Pantheism, Animism, and Materialism. Buddhism would probably object to that description of its creed, but the fact that its conception of the cosmos was practically the same as the Atomists, the materialists of Greece, except that the Buddhists did not develop it into a theory of atoms, but made all things compounds to be dissolved at some stage of change, shows that we have indicated the essential feature of their doctrine. Indeed they were more materialistic than the Greek materialists; for the latter admitted there was a soul.

The Buddhists denied that there was a soul. The Greek materialists denied immortality, though admitting a soul. The Buddhists denied both, and it was later materialism in the west that came independently to the same position. But in spite of this it had to be grafted on the Animism of the time and to some extent compromised its philosophy.

It was Brahmanism that was the older religion of India. But it was a reform of the early Vedic religion and the common Animism. The early Vedic religion traces its origin to the 14th century B. C. But this history is probably legendary. But it seems to be agreed that Brahmanism is the first historical reform of that primitive view and grafted itself on the previous Animism, modifying it by Brahmanic Pantheism. Animism is either what we should call pluralistic, or so near it as not to reach the conception of the unity of the Absolute and its creatures. Brahmanism is based upon that unity and adjusted Animism to its theory of transmigration. Buddhism arose to oppose Pantheism, or monism by a pluralistic scheme whatever the ultimate unity of things might be. Hence philosophically it was opposed to Brahmanism. Jainism was simply a philosophic effort to defend the Animism against which both Brahmanism and Buddhism were protests.

These systems prevailed among the intellectual classes, while Animism never wholly lost its force with the popular mind and availed to modify the philosophical system to the extent of admitting transmigration which was a concession to the doctrine of a future life which prevailed in Animism, though it eradicated what was of personal interest in that theory.

For the psychical researcher, Brahmanism has very little interest. Its philosophy, that is, its Pantheism, which is consistent with either a personal survival or personal annihilation, makes the question of immor-

talities depend on facts, not upon a deduction from its premises. Hence there is no importance in the discussion of that. It is the doctrine of transmigration alone that brings it into relation with the problem of survival. Here it is not as clear as Buddhism. The latter makes it specific that personality does not survive and only the influence of a past life upon later generations can be found in the similar qualities displayed by the later individuals. This was in reality the same as the doctrine of Plato, whose view will come up for notice again. Brahmanism associated this reincarnation with absorption in God, so that it is difficult to form a clear conception of what it meant.

Like Buddhism, Brahmanism was primarily an ethical system and was chiefly distinguished for its caste system which regulated the relations between fellow men. Its religion was an attempt to unite the ideas of a monistic and a pluralistic conception of things, so that its relation to immortality is not so clear as that of Buddhism. Transmigration, in so far as its logical conception is concerned, is perfectly consistent with either personal or impersonal survival. All depends on the view we take of the soul. It is merely a dogmatic belief which says its personality is lost in the reincarnation, and perhaps the belief arose from the discovered fact that there was no evidence for the retention of personality in the transmigration. The persistence of like attributes, whether physical or mental, in successive individuals might well suggest the permanence of something and not admitting that there was any real destruction, reincarnation would take the form of denying the survival of personality.

The perplexity which most people have with this doctrine is either ethical or philosophical. The ethical perplexity is to make it consist with human ideals. The Pantheist who denies personal survival demands that we calmly sacrifice them to the law of nature and

the opposed school of thought prefers to deny reincarnation and to affirm Theism to save its ideals. The philosophical perplexity is mainly how such widely separated schools of reflection as the Greek in Plato and the Oriental came to an agreement on this point, and one writer says there must be some truth in a doctrine which took such deep root in Hinduism and so profound a philosopher as Plato.

However I think it quite easy to explain the common belief and that too without admitting any truth in it whatever. Both Greek and Hindu thought was impressed with the evidence of the permanent or eternal. That something persistent was at the basis of the transient, something eternal at the basis of the phenomenal, was either apparent in the nature of observed things or taken for granted. The world, according to Heraclitus and the Buddhists was one of perpetual change, and identity and permanence were illusions. But Plato and Brahman observed that, in spite of this apparent change, there was a stream of similarities pervading the world in the successive individuals which it created. With their theory of causality which made it one of material as distinct from efficient causes; that is, the explanation of the content or nature of a thing rather than its origin in time, it was only natural to say that the later individuals simply represented the transferred substance of the earlier. They did not believe in creation and hence had to set up this doctrine of transference because similarity in successive generations was interpreted as evidence of permanence. It did not or could not conceive of things as representing *creatio continua*, a uniform law of action, but as *existentia continua*, the persistence of the same in the midst of apparent change.

The fact that the individual had no memory of a previous existence was taken as evidence that person-

ality did not continue, thought later reincarnationists maintained that ultimately the memory of the past would be restored at some stage of the individual's existence. But the whole doctrine was induced by the evidence of identity in nature and its relation to the soul was a concession to the desire for immortality. The doctrine of reincarnation was thus a natural interpretation of the phenomena of the world to any one who reflected on the problem of apparent change amidst evident permanence, when it did not place its explanatory causes in the supersensible or transcendental. It did what it could to satisfy the idea of immortality and took the superficial indications of personal disappearance as conclusive against it.

No doubt the discrediting of the evidence which had satisfied Animism and the more or less ignorant strata of society was an important factor in it creating both indifference and doubt toward personal survival. There was then no distinction between the conditions for the physical manifestations of consciousness and the existence of consciousness, the ethereal organism of the Epicureans, the spiritual body of St. Paul, or the astral of the theosophists, and hence the philosopher could not easily see his way to the belief in personal survival. He could not get beyond the persistence of similarities in successive individuals.

The Nirvana of the Buddhists, as already remarked, was interpreted as annihilation by philosophers until they learned more about the real nature of the Buddhistic system. The Buddhistic system was primarily ethical and it conceived the sense life as the basis of all evil. The bond from which every man should free himself was sensuality, or a primary interest in sense life, the physical appetites. The eradication of these was compared to death, and as the system denied personal survival it was natural to suppose that Nirvana which expressed the "dying to sense" meant annihila-

tion of the soul or personal consciousness. However true it was that the Buddhist denied personal immortality, his doctrine of Nirvana was not this, but an ethical asceticism.

Whether the Buddhists conceived personality as we do is not determinable. If they meant by it a "spiritual body" or soul, they might deny it without opposing survival in terms of a functional stream of consciousness. But they had too little interest in the question to analyze it in this manner, though their denial of "personality" as a spatial reality is quite consistent with the affirmation of it as a stream of consciousness. But their atomism and their attitude toward the sensory life made them ignore this further problem, perhaps because the popular conception of personality was so closely associated with sensory conceptions. In any case, their philosophic system was quite consistent with the supersensible conception of personality and we only lack evidence that they either held or tolerated it.

In later Hindu thought the several systems of philosophy seem to have more or less interfused until there are many divisions and sects to-day. Some of them advocate personal survival. This is especially true of some of the theosophists. But for many ages the primary distinction was between the intellectual type which remained by reincarnation without personal survival and the plebeian doctrine of Animism. The theosophist reconciled the two by accepting reincarnation with a theory of an astral body and thus could retain personality.

3. Japanese Doctrines

The term for the primitive religion of Japan is Shintoism. This is recognized as a Chinese term and takes us back to the introduction of Buddhism into China. The interpretation of the term as denoting

"the divine way," though admitted to be a late idea reminds us of the fundamental conception of Taoism and the Buddhistic doctrine as presented in China. It, too, was the "way" and we are again reminded of "the way, the truth, the life" of the New Testament, though the latter may not, probably did not, have any direct connection with the more ancient ideas. Though Shintoism, as known after the introduction of Buddhism into Japan, would suggest Buddhism pure and simple, it was not such. It is recognized by students as a mixture of ancestor worship and Buddhistic ideas, showing that the Japanese religion was founded on Animism and ancestor worship. The evidence in present-day ideas makes that clear, as the Japanese nation is saturated with this doctrine. This view of it is perhaps not reflected in the conceptions of the philosophers, but is apparent in the ideas and habits of the common people, another illustration that the real essence of any early doctrine is more likely to be found in the popular beliefs.

Baron Kikuchi in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* describes Shintoism briefly as follows: "Shinto is thus a mixture of ancestor worship and of nature worship without any explicit code of morals. It regards human beings as virtuous by nature; assumes that each man's conscience is his best guide; and while believing in a continued existence beyond the grave, entertains no theory as to its pleasures and pains. Those that pass away become disembodied spirits, inhabiting the world of darkness and possessing power to bring sorrow or joy into the lives of their survivors on which account they are worshipped and propitiated."

Buddhism seems never to have conquered this primitive tendency and in fact, as in China, compromised with the native ideas. But the main point of interest is the foundation of all these oriental beliefs in Animism which obtained its modification evidently from the rise

of more ethical ideas than had described its customs. If the cruelties of ancestor worship had not been associated with Animism among primitive races it is probable that the immortality of the soul would not have been subordinated or destroyed by the religions that supplanted it. But in revolting against the ethics of Animism it was natural to assign the cause to the philosophic ideas on which they were founded, and the belief in a future life would have to bear the burden. Brahmanic and Buddhistic ethics were undoubtedly superior to that of primitive Animism and as the immortality of the soul had no such scientific foundation in experience, or was not recognized as having it, the more intellectual systems of nature with their better code of ethics, in reforming the ethics of Animism would naturally reform or supplant its philosophy.

It is probable that all philosophy in its inception was a protest against beliefs of less cultured times, whether from metaphysical or ethical motives, and literature has not preserved enough of the primitive conceptions to make this as clear as may be desirable. We get only little glimpses of it here and there, and the best information on the matter comes from the survivals of savagery. That is, the peoples that still remain as savages have carried down with them their primitive ideas and we may discover in them the doctrines against which philosophy and ethics were a protest of more cultured minds. This is quite apparent in the systems of China, India, and Japan. In each we have found Animism and ancestor worship the parent idea of religion, and it gave rise to customs which a better ethics could not tolerate.

Besides there can be little doubt that the growth of intelligence would apply skepticism to the facts on which Animism relied and that would be to divert the evidential question to the ordinary course of nature. In that no satisfactory indication was found for sur-

vival and the student of nature would find only his ethical impulses aided by the laws of nature to determine his beliefs. He would have to choose between a speculative theory of the soul to protect his desires and hopes and the persistence of types in the world which would give rise to the philosophic idea of transmigration or reincarnation.

It is possible that a doctrine of reincarnation might arise from the idea of the soul's transmigration from its physical body, a conception which I have found in some minds to-day whose earlier thinking had been dominated by Cartesian assumptions, where the soul and consciousness were supposed to be spaceless or without the property of extension. They could not conceive consciousness without a ground or subject and knowing that the physical basis of consciousness perished, and wishing or believing the mind imperishable, set up a spiritual body for its ground, an organism ready made for it at death.

I do not know any historical belief of this kind, unless early theories of the resurrection may have expressed it. But even if it did exist, as the suggestion of the philosophers' reincarnation, the latter took away the conditions of personal survival. Their conception of it was expressed in something like, perhaps identical, with our conservation of energy. This doctrine established by physical science maintains that the quantity of energy remains the same in all the transformations of it, so that no particle of matter or energy can be either created or destroyed. Though the ancients did not certify this belief by experiment their observation of the permanence of types and the properties constituting them converted the doctrine of immortality into the transformations of the same substance, and in this they obtained their Pantheistic or Atomistic theories, both looking at organic nature as the result of material causation, one as a change of

mode and the other as the combination of elements. In all cases they were efforts to transcend the primitive ideas of nature, though they left these primitive ideas to develop their own course, or compromised with them in their efforts to preserve the social order.

4. *Egyptian Ideas*

Polytheistic doctrines were common to the religions of China, India, and Japan, sometimes originating from nature worship and sometimes from hero worship. This Polytheism was still more characteristic of Egyptian religion as far as history can trace it. It, too, was infected with hero worship. But its doctrine of immortality seems to have been the most distinctive in its kind as compared with the nations we have discussed and in this respect it resembles the early beliefs of Greece. There seems to be no indication of what its special doctrines on immortality succeeded. The primitive forms of Animism are not traceable either directly or indirectly in its religious ideas and customs. Whatever modification its earliest ideas on the soul may have gone through, there is no trace of it in an antagonistic philosophy such as marked the developments of the oriental peoples in correcting Animism. We may suppose that the interest which the Egyptians took in their dead and the life of those who have passed the gates of death indicate an earlier ancestor worship, but if this be true it has left no traces of the character which made Taoism, Brahmanism, Buddhism, and Shintoism a revolt against it. But the funerary rites bestowed upon the dead indicate rather clearly that some form of ancestor worship prevailed in earlier times of which we have no traces.

The Egyptians seem to have had no such philosophic systems as prevailed in India and China. In their place was their Polytheism, in which the gods did service

for creative agencies, and for the basis of religious devotions which seem not to have concentrated on a single deity. They never got beyond the Polytheistic stage to a Monotheistic system. The nearest to this apparently was the god *Re*, the sun-god. It was probably the failure to reduce their theological system to unity in Monotheism that preserved their belief in a soul and its survival from such a fate as it met in Buddhism. Polytheism preserved such a conception of supernaturalism that it was not difficult to maintain man's survival, especially as some of their gods were deified heroes, a doctrine which probably had the same source as their belief in a future life. It is this last which has importance for us at present.

The best authorities seem agreed that the Egyptian embalming of the dead originated in their belief in a life beyond the grave. Whether it signified a belief in the bodily resurrection, as it might suggest, is not certain and there seems to be no collateral evidence of this. But the extreme care of the body after death is taken to indicate clearly that it had its origin in the belief in another life. Hence their theory of the soul is the interesting part of their doctrine. They seem to have made a twofold distinction in their metaphysical psychology, or a triple division of man into body, the "double" and the soul. The "double" or *ka* was that part of man which was the object of funerary gifts and services. The soul or *bai* was of a more tangible nature and was that part of man which hovered around the tomb, according to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, and might assume any shape it pleased.

There are hints in this of the later distinction between the spirit and astral or spiritual body. Assuming this to be the case, the *ka* would be the spirit and the *bai* the ethereal organism or spiritual body. Or if the former was the "spiritual body" the latter would

be the "astral shell." The belief that the *bai* could assume any shape it pleased coincides with what is apparent in certain types of visions and apparitions recorded by psychic research. One wonders whether the Egyptian ideas may not have been derived in this way, just as primitive Animism and its doctrines seem to have been derived from similar phenomena. But whether so or not, the theory of the soul and its survival has more detailed interest than that of oriental peoples and the nature of the life after death was more distinctly mapped out in the funerary rites and ceremonies than with the religions of India, China, and Japan, though these latter did not lack in definite ideas.

5. Hebrew Beliefs

The Hebrews are noted for their monotheism both in respect to its firmness and purity. But this general view was superposed upon an earlier period of polytheism of which there are few traces, so thoroughly had the leaders of the montheistic cult eradicated polytheism from the better type of national thought. The literature, however, which makes this evident contains no evidence that the future life was an important part of the Hebrew's religious belief. The Old Testament is almost devoid of evidence that he believed in a future life at all. It was certainly not the key to their religion as it was that of Christianity. There are only a few indications of its existence in the Hebrew mind in the Old Testament, whatever may exist in Talmudic literature. They are the question of Job: "If a man die shall he live again" (Job 14:14), possibly the same author's statement: "And after my skin hath been destroyed, yet from (without) my flesh shall I see God: whom I shall see for myself and mine eyes shall behold and not another," (Job 19:26), and the whole history

of witchcraft as depicted in the Bible. Take also the ghost of Eliphaz in Job 4 and verses 12-17. The story of the witch of Endor is a clear proof of what went on when it could get any freedom and indicates a survival of the more primitive times when Animism prevailed here as elsewhere.

Saul, the King, who had himself persecuted and suppressed witchcraft, found himself in dire straits with the Philistines and sought the aid of the Witch of Endor. She called up the dead prophet Samuel, complaining that he could not longer get divine aid either by the prophets or dreams. The whole incident makes very clear what the Judaism in power had supplanted, and it only repeats what left better traces of itself in the religions of China and Japan. The dreams of Joseph indicate the same general system. The suppression of human sacrifices points to what existed prior to developed Judaism, and the prophets were the more intellectual and ethical leaders of the people, resembling Buddha and others in their mission, but claiming a relation to the divine that made them more rational teachers of this than witchcraft was or could be.

Probably it was the revolt against the cult of primitive Animism that destroyed, as in India and China, the dominance of that primitive system. At any rate the cult was originally there and kept itself alive against the laws intended to suppress it, while the inferiority of its ethics availed to retire the immortality of the soul into the background of Hebrew interest and left an Idealistic monotheism with strong government in its place.

The doctrine of angels implied a spiritual world whether it included man in it or not. But the idea of Sheol implied the survival of man. The idea is clear in Daniel 12:2, where the doctrine of the resurrection is indicated: "And many of them that sleep

in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life and some to shame and everlasting contempt." But the doctrine was not the basis of the Judaistic religion. That was the existence of God, and a future life was secondary in interest. Like all the revolts against savage Animism and its practises Judaism turned to the theistic and ethical system for guidance. Taoism, Buddhism, Brahmanism, and other systems, when objecting to or compromising with Animistic beliefs and the superstitions of the uncultured sought to protect life and its meaning by some sort of philosophy and ethics, sometimes defending immortality, but always minimizing the conceptions of the uncultured people. Judaism seems to have been no exception. While the belief in immortality was evidently retained as taken for granted or could not be uprooted from the ordinary mind, the intellectual classes fell back, as later Christianity did, on a theistic and ethical scheme for the defense of both individual and social systems. Its monotheism probably originated in the same intellectual conditions that made Xenophanes in Greece.

6. *Zoroastrianism*

This was the final religion of Persia and followed the Animistic period of belief as Taoism and Buddhism had done in China and India. It was unique in that it was directly opposed to the pantheistic conceptions of Buddhism both in respect to the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. It was a system of Dualism as opposed to the Monism of the other oriental nations. This means that it held to the existence of two eternal principles, the Good and the Evil, or God and Satan as expressed in the Christian system. Buddhism held to one eternal being from which all else was created or rather formed. Zoroastrianism made good

and evil distinct and would not trace their source to one being. Hence it was emphatic in regard to the freedom of the will. Zoroaster believed in spirits both good and evil and that man's life here was a preparation for the next. The result to man in the future existence awaiting him was determined by his life on earth and he was in need of prophets to guide him through his earthly life. His system had a doctrine of Judgment, and a heaven much like that of Christianity, a fact to be noted because of the light which it throws upon the belief in a life hereafter as one of the most important ideas in the system. There is no trace in it of ancestor worship. It did not build upon that, as did Taoism and Buddhism. It may have so thoroughly supplanted it as to leave no traces of it in particular, though probably this is true only of the cult in the higher classes which held the belief.

CHAPTER III

GRECO-ROMAN IDEAS

THESE two civilizations are closely related to each other in their political and economic institutions, though differing also as widely as they resemble each other. It was their proximity to each other and their contemporaneous existence that brought them into various connections. Their religion and belief in a future life are the two subjects of interest to us here and nothing else. The records of their later beliefs, philosophical and religious, are comparatively copious. Those of other nations, save India, are not so full. Those of Greece and Rome are sufficient to form tolerably clear conceptions of their religious beliefs, though the primitive ages upon which their interesting civilization was superposed are perhaps more effectually destroyed than the primitive ideas of India, China, and Japan. The Pelasgians and Dorians who represented predecessors of the Greeks and the Etruscans, who seem to have been the immediate predecessors of the Romans, have left little or nothing of their religious ideas and there is no such evidence that the Greeks compromised with the Dorians and Pelasgians, or the Romans with the Etruscans, as did the Taoists and Buddhists with the Animism of prior times. They may have done so to some extent and mythology, in connection with their polytheism, distinctly favors this view with the limitations apparent at the same time. But their intellectual and political culture observed few traces of the past except to reject or despise them

while admitting that they existed. We have largely to infer the primitive ideas from their vestigial nature taken in connection with their more definite existence and survival in uncivilized races.

1. *Early Greek Ideas*

There are two periods of interest in connection with early Greek ideas of religion and immortality. The first is the pre-Homeric and the second the Homeric, extending down to the time of philosophic reflection. We have to infer much of the pre-Homeric period from what we know of other nations and the general evolution of ideas. Homer and Hesiod were on the boundary line between two very different stages of culture and we can infer what they came from by the modifications of the ideas that prevailed with them and their contemporaries. They show us what the mythological period was and hence what the uneducated mind of that dark period before them must have believed. We describe the religious beliefs of that pre-Homeric age as mythology and mean by it that its conceptions were unreal, however real they may have been to those primitive people. It was a doctrine of polytheism in which there was a mixture of nature worship and deified heroes, the personification of the forces of nature and transformation of heroes into gods. These ideas seem to have gone hand in hand among other peoples as well, so that their relation here is not anomalous. The latter implied the immortality of the soul, and though there is no explicit evidence in philosophic and other writers of the extent to which a future life was believed there is evidence in the casual references to it, in the religious rites, funerary ceremonies, ancient epitaphs, and other sources to show that the common people never felt any skepticism about it. The various mysteries seem to have been connected with the belief,

though not as doctrines supporting it, but as rites by which one's path to the nether world was made easier. At least that is the opinion of many scholars.

How the Greeks came by their gods is not of importance to us here. It is their function in religious and practical life that concerns the problems before us. As personifications of natural forces they were of primary interest to the practical life of the people. Agriculture, war, and trade were under the care of these divinities who had to be propitiated if men were to be successful, and hence religion was the respect paid to powers capable of inflicting evil upon men. It was not to gain immortality that the gods were established, as in later Christian thought, but to purchase favors by obedience and service. Immortality was guaranteed, not by the gods, but by the nature of things and, though this was assured, the gods had something to do with the condition of those who passed the gates of death.

Their inevitable connection with some conception of a virtuous life easily involved them in the service of man wherever his happiness might be affected by their power. Some conception of a judgment in another world is indicated clearly in the stories of Minos and Rhadamanthus who were judges of the fate of those who passed the river of death. We shall later see Plato's account of it and can refer to it here only to suggest how general the belief in a future life was. It was so strongly rooted in the national life that even philosophy, except with the Epicureans, endeavored to sustain it, a course not so clear in the oriental philosophies as we have seen. At death Charon ferried the soul across the river Lethe and Minos and Rhadamanthus sat in judgment on those who thus entered Hades. A man's lot in that kingdom was according to his life on earth, the conception here being much the same as in Christianity, save that it is colored by

mythological personalities more distinctly than in Christian ideas and save as Satan and similar agents are supposed to figure in the process.

According to some writers the Pelasgi had a pure monothesitic type of religion and it was followed by the polytheistic system of the Greeks. This is quite possible, since the Hellenes succeeded the Pelasgi, driving them out of existence, as the Spanish did the Aztecs in Peru and almost destroying all traces of their customs. As already remarked the polytheism of the Greeks was a mixture of hero worship and the personification of the forces of nature. It is probable that the hero worship followed upon that of personifying physical forces and represents the humanizing of things through the belief in immortality and the substitution of customs founded on communication with a spiritual world for attempts to pacify the forces of nature, but this substitution was made in entire harmony with nature worship. This hero worship was the form which spiritualism took in Greco-Roman life as distinct from the ancestor worship of the orient. No doubt it had the same general source. The oracles and the "mantic" art are evidence of this. The Homeric conception of the after life and ghosts is a gloomy one and it is reflected in the story of Achilles that he would prefer being a day laborer among the living to the life after death. A man of Achilles' character might well suggest the comparison, but the object of Homer was to depreciate the after life in comparison with the present which was a tendency in the whole of Greek civilization with its love of nature.

The mantic art shows what the primitive ideas were and it survived far into the period of higher civilization. Curtius speaks of it as follows: "The mantic art is an institution totally different from the priesthood. It is based on the belief that the gods are in constant proximity to men, and in their government of

the world, which comprehends everything both great and small, will not disdain to manifest their will to the shortsighted children of men who need their counsel." Speaking of the worship of Apollo the same author continues: "The god himself chooses the organs of his communications; and as a sign that it is no human wisdom and art that reveals the divine will, Apollo speaks through the mouth of feeble girls and women. The state of inspiration is by no means one of especially heightened powers, but the human being's own powers—nay, own consciousness—are as it were extinguished, in order that the divine voice may be heard all the louder; the secret communicated by the god resembles a load oppressing the breast it visits; it is a *clairvoyance* from which no satisfaction accrues to the mind of the seer."

A better description of mediumship could hardly be given and the oracles were undoubtedly this type of phenomena, good and bad, genuine and fraudulent. The philosophic period which sought to get different types of evidence for immortality and the future life did much to destroy the evidence of what the earlier ideas and methods of religion were, though saying enough about them to enable us to conjecture them. Literature and historical records preserved what the intellectual classes thought and said, but was not as careful to preserve an exact account of the common religious ideas, and the higher civilization so generally supplanted the lower that the latter did not survive in the customs of the common people, especially after the decline of both Greek and Roman civilizations. The common ideas of a future life were very simple and probably represented a clear duplication of the present life in many details, as indeed the mythical account given by Plato indicates, though even this had been refined by philosophic reflection. The more primitive ideas were represented in the sacrifices and supersti-

tions associated with the worship of the gods and the expectation of a happier life beyond the grave.

2. *The Philosophic Period*

This period is divided into two general schools. (1) There were those who believed in a future life but did not venture to say what it was like. (2) There were the materialists who, in the later period, denied it. Both represented the arrival at that stage of thought which accepted the judgment of sense perception as assigning limits to what could be asserted or believed about the future life. The skeptics and materialists denied that any such life existed, while the idealists still clung to a transcendental world but did not undertake to describe it in scientific terms.

It is usually supposed that the idea of a "soul" and its survival was late appearing in Greek reflection. This is not correct. It saturated the thought of some of the earliest philosophers but was concealed partly by their abandonment of fetishism and partly by the pantheistic conception of many of them and partly by their primary interest in *material* causes; that is, in the elements or "stuff" out of which the world was made. They early disregarded the primitive religions which were based upon fetishistic spiritualism, and though they often clung to the animation of matter they were careful not to allow any identification of their views with the naive Animism and Spiritualism of the times, or if some of them, as they did, recognized the spiritualistic view, they were not primarily interested in it. This view had no explanation of nature or the cosmos and it was the cosmos that they were chiefly trying to explain.

Even the earlier Ionian physicists, though they talk of nothing but "water," "air," "fire" the "indefinite," etc., betray clearly that some of their ideas of causes,

especially when they needed efficient causes, were borrowed from the Spiritualist's doctrine of activity. Some of these physicists actually believed in a soul, but not being specially interested in it, the problem of survival had no importance for them. They were spoken of as materialists, but only because they maintained that matter was the primary substance in the world and "soul" was to them but a fine form of this matter, when they admitted its existence. The Eleatics were too absorbed in Pantheism or Monism to think or say much about the individual soul and its destiny.

But Heraclitus, who opposed the Eleatics, was more definite on this matter and admitted a soul and its survival. He said that "men are mortal gods and the gods immortal men; our life is the death of the gods and our death their life. So long as man lives the divine part of his nature is bound up with baser substances, from which in death he again becomes free. Souls traverse the way upwards and the way downwards; they enter into bodies because they require change." He attributed a further existence to souls escaped from their bodies, and said that there awaits man after his death that which he now neither hopes nor believes. He makes mention of demons and heroes and assigns the demons as guardians, not only to the living, but to the dead. This is pure and unadulterated Spiritualism, even of the modern type, and was probably derived in the same way.

The close affinity of early Greek thought, extending throughout its later history, to modern Spiritualism and Theosophy is evident in the following facts, even though the philosophy was establishing systems evading or denying the ideas of religion. When philosophy arose it faced two questions: (1) Monotheism as against polytheism that had its affinities, on one side, with nature worship and, on the other, with animism or Spiritualism, and (2) A Future Life. Religion

tended to polytheism and philosophy to monotheism. In the first period the Mysteries prevailed which were connected with some form of Spiritualism. The Orphic Mysteries believed in transmigration and in it we have the ancestral idea of Plato's doctrine, though he eliminated the elements which made it interesting to the religious mind. Some held that transmigration was for punishment. This view may have been a distorted form of what is apparent in obsession or "earthbound" conditions where temporary possession may be a method of clearing away the hallucinations that constitute "earthbound" conditions. Pindar, however, regarded transmigration as a privilege accorded to the best spirits to earn higher happiness. This is merely a modified form of the previous view and is reflected in mediumistic phenomena where spirits claim that their service to the living is a part of their own salvation and spiritual development.

The Ionian school of philosophers are known as physicists and were the first to exalt "natural" or physical causes. They were Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes. There is little preserved regarding their opinion of spirit or soul. According to Plutarch, Thales admitted that there was a soul which he defined as "*Physis aeikinetos ê autokinetos*," or "matter always in motion or capable of self-motion." Here was the rising distinction between inertia and spontaneity, culminating in the distinction between mechanism and teleological action. With Anaximander the soul was of the nature of Air. It was Air in the philosophy of Anaximenes which constituted the fundamental substance from which all other things were formed. But Anaximander did not conceive the air as we do. He thought of it much more as scientific men think of the ether. It was not regarded as gross matter until the time of Lucretius who had to prove that it was the same kind of substance as is constantly revealed

to the senses, and perhaps the final proof of this did not come until the existence of the air pump and the discovery of gravity. Hence Anaximander had more or less the notion of "spirit" in his conception of the air and Anaximines made it the universal element from which all things were created. Anaximander's element was the infinite or the indefinite and so was not accessible to sense, but the abstraction of all the material qualities that appealed to sense. The concession that both made to the idea of a soul was a sop to popular opinion.

Heraclitus had as his great principle Change or Motion, "the eternal flux." His was a dynamic principle or cause, though he combined it with material causes. The principal material cause was "fire" or heat. But he made this as indefinite and transcendental as any later thinker. He regarded the soul as a fiery vapor, and believed in transmigration. He said: "While we live our souls are dead in us, but when we die our souls are restored to us." This reminds us of the constant statement made through Mrs. Piper and other psychics that while we are alive, our souls are as if asleep. Souls go up or down. That is, they rise or go downward toward the earth, develop to "higher spheres" or remain earthbound. With him gods and heroes were probably identified, as was done by other and later thinkers, suggesting that the dead act as our helpers. He supposed that "demons," which is but a term for "spirits," were in everything. This is pure Animism and extended the idea of spirits into all organic life and perhaps the inorganic. These "demons" he regarded as guardians of both the living and the dead, maintaining the very doctrine of modern Spiritualism. Transmigration is a process of purification and the "demons" finally enter a purer life. Modern Theosophy is clear in both these views.

All these earlier systems were monistic in the view

that there was one *kind* of reality or substance, though many forms of it. But the next school is the Atomists, and their views here are especially interesting, as they were the founders of Materialism.

Empedocles believed there were four elements in the structure of the cosmos, they were: earth, fire, air and water. Later Atomists simply multiplied this number. The force which affected the colligations of these elements was "love and hate," or attraction and repulsion. But he did not limit his theories of things to this. He largely accepted the popular religious doctrine. He believed in transmigration of souls, and in regard to murder and perjury in particular he thought they were punished by being separated from the Blessed and made to wander 30,000 seasons in various forms of existence. "Guilt laden spirits were tossed about in restless flight." Here we have the Spiritualists' wandering spirits, happening to communicate in capricious way as they chanced upon a suitable medium. Empedocles thought the very elements were gods or demons as moving forces.

Democritus modified the atomic doctrine by making the atoms infinite in number, but the same in kind. He had a soul doctrine, however, in which he made the soul corporeal, though animating the body just as primitive Spiritualism or Animism believed. It was in constant motion and of the nature of fire. The body was merely the "vessel" of the soul. He ultimately identified this soul with the Deity, thus admitting the divine, though in the pantheistic form. Zeller says of his religion: "He assumed that there dwell in the air beings who are similar to man in form, but superior to him in greatness, power, and duration of life. These beings manifest themselves when emanations and images, streaming from them and often reproducing themselves at a great distance, become visible and audible to men and animals, and they are held to be gods, although

in truth they are not divine and imperishable, but only less perishable than men. These beings are partly of a beneficent and partly of a malevolent nature."

Here we have views that combine various forms of Spiritualism. (1) There is the existence of spirits. (2) There is a doctrine of apparitions explained more or less by the theory of matter as it affects sense perception. (3) There is almost our conception of telepathy. Distance has no effect on the production of these phantasms, and the mode of describing their action is closely related to the spiritualistic doctrine of materialization. (4) Their temporary nature is identical with some modern views which hold that spirits ultimately perish, though granting that they survive the body for a time. This view is probably based upon the less frequent appearance of older spirits than those who have recently left the body. (5) There is also the distinction between good and malicious spirits. He also admitted the significance of dreams.

All this only shows that side by side with the effort to determine the material or structural causes of things the earlier philosophers believed in the existence of souls, having borrowed their doctrine from the prevailing animism of the time, and so maintained a sort of dualism in spite of the fact that all the elements of nature were of one kind, differing in degree of density. But souls inhabited bodies just as later religious doctrines held. The admission prepared the way for a doctrine of efficient causes along with material ones, and this idea came out in Socrates, Plato, Anaxagoras and Aristotle, and then later in Christianity.

It is interesting to note with Tylor, in his *Primitive Culture*, that the materialistic conception of sense perception was an adaptation of a spiritualistic theory. The Animists of all ages attached a soul to everything. Every conceivable object had its soul or double. Empedocles thought that bodies threw off emanations or

idola, images like the objects themselves, and which impinged on the eye whose perceiving power met the object and thus gave rise to sense perception. In this he was but modifying the doctrine of Animism to account for sense perception so that it is thus curious to observe that the basis of materialism was spiritualism! The early materialists admitted the existence of a soul without being emphatic in the denial of its continuance, but the later followers of the school wholly denied it. This, of course was after Animism had played its role, and culture had gone far enough to forget or ignore the primitive ideas on which the earlier thinkers had fed.

Primitive materialism admitted the existence of spirits, but ignored their causal action (*causa efficiens*) in the material cosmos in the interest of a doctrine of elements or "stuff" (*causa materialis*) out of which things were made, and when it wanted instigative or efficient causes, it put them in matter itself. This developed into the Epicurean materialism which, though it admitted the existence of the gods and of human souls, it denied the causal action of the former or both in nature and the persistence of the latter after death.

The other school did not offer so materialistic a theory of knowledge. When it undertook to explain knowledge at all, it was by the influence or impression of motion on the sensorium, and this took it away from the primitive ideas. But it was no doubt the influence of intellectual culture that took philosophy away from the naive ideas of the superstitious classes while the instincts of human nature, as well as an interest in social and political problems, made them cling to a belief in a future life.

Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans come next for consideration. It is impossible at this date to separate the master and disciples in the discussion. But it is agreed that the transmigration of the soul was the

form in which they believed in immortality. Apparently the doctrine had no special relation to either their ethics, religion or politics, though they were mentioned together. They seem to have simply adopted the popular ideas about this and Plato has discussed them in his myths. He seems to have been influenced by the Pythagoreans. But this transmigration was neither based on Pythagorean ethics nor was it presented to support ethics, though it is clear that certain ethical ideas got into the doctrine. They regarded the soul as put into a body for probation and that no man had the right to sever that connection. They believed the spirits of the dead inhabited the air or a place under the earth, according to their character apparently. Hence it appears that their doctrine of immortality was no part of their philosophy, but a part of their mysteries, according to the opinion of Zeller. Had it been more intimately connected with their theory of ethics it would have had more interest for us here.

Plato is next in interest. Socrates was a pious believer in some sort of existence after death, but he expressed no philosophic views about it and what Plato puts into his mouth is Plato's own highly refined opinions. Plato had two entirely different ways of looking at the problem, the mythical and the scientific. It was the mythical that had the larger influence on Christianity and drew him to Christian philosophers. I shall quote the *Phaedo*. It is put into the mouth of Socrates who is made to tell the story a short time before his death.

"For after death, as they say, the genius of each individual, to whom he belonged in life, leads him to a certain place in which the dead are gathered together for judgment, whence they go into the world below, following the guide who is appointed to conduct them from this world to the other; and when they have there received their due and remained their time, an-

other guide brings them back again after many revolutions of ages. Now this journey to the other world is not, as Aeschylus says in the *Telephus*, a single and straight path—no guide would be wanted for that, and no one could miss a single path; but there are many partings of the road, and windings, as I must infer from the rites and sacrifices which are offered to the gods below in places where three ways meet on earth. The wise and orderly soul is conscious of her situation, and follows in the path; but the soul which desires the body, and which as I was relating before, has long been fluttering about the lifeless frame and the world of sight, is after many struggles and many sufferings hardly and with violence carried away by her attendant genius, and when she arrives at the place where the other souls are gathered, if she be impure and have done impure deeds, or been concerned in foul murders and other crimes which are the brothers of these, and the works of brothers in crime—from that soul every one flees and turns away; no one will be her companion, no one her guide, but alone she wanders in extremity of evil until certain times are fulfilled, and then they are fulfilled, she is borne irresistibly to her own fitting habitation; as every pure and just soul which has passed through life in the company and under the guidance of the gods has also her own proper home.

“Now the earth has divers wonderful regions, and is indeed in nature and extent very like the notion of geographers, as I believe on the authority of one who shall be nameless.”

“What do you mean, Socrates?” said Simmias. “I have myself heard many descriptions of the earth, but I do not know in what you are putting faith, and I should like to know.”

There follows a long description of the earth and the regions of Tartarus which it is not necessary to quote,

and then comes the account of what happens to the dead.

“Such is the nature of the other world; and when the dead arrive at the place to which the genius of each severally conveys them, first of all, they have sentence passed upon them, as they have lived well and piously or not. And those who appear to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the river Acheron, and mount such conveyances as they can get, and are carried in them to the lake, and there they dwell and are purified of their evil deeds and suffer the penalty of the wrongs which they have done to others, and are absolved, and receive the rewards of their good deeds according to their deserts. But those who seem to be incurable by reason of the greatness of their crimes—who have committed many and terrible deeds of sacrilege, murders foul and violent, or the like—such are hurled into Tartarus which is suitable destiny, and they never come out. Those again who have committed crimes, which, although great, are not unpardonable—who in a moment of anger, for example, have done violence to a father or a mother, and have repented for the remainder of their lives, or who have taken the life of another under the like extenuating circumstances—these are plunged into Tartarus, the pains of which they are compelled to undergo for a year, but at the end of the year the wave casts them forth—mere homicides by way of Cocytus, parricides and matricides by way of Periphlegethon—and they are borne to the Acherusian lake, and there they lift up their voices and call upon the victims whom they have slain or wronged, to have pity on them, and to receive them, and to let them come out of the river into the lake. And if they prevail, then they come forth and cease from their troubles; but if not they are carried back again into Tartarus and from thence into the rivers unceasingly, until they obtain mercy from those whom

they have wronged; for that is the sentence inflicted upon them by their judges. Those also who are remarkable for having led holy lives are released from this earthly prison and go to their pure home which is above, and dwell in the purer earth (heaven in Plato's idea, or ether); and those who have duly purified themselves with philosophy, live henceforth altogether without the body, in mansions fairer far than these, which may not be described, and of which the time would fail me to tell.

"Wherefore, Simmias, seeing all these things, what ought we not to do to obtain virtue and wisdom in this life? Fair is the prize and the hope great."

Those familiar with the Christian scheme of rewards and punishments will recognize the similarity here with very common ideas still. But they may not notice the remarkable significance of the first part of the passage as it is similar to what Spiritualism has taught for many ages. It is that each soul has its "guide" or genius during its embodiment and that this guide meets the soul at death and leads it into its proper place in the next life. But there is here a hint at reincarnation in the doctrine that the soul obtains another guide to "bring it back again after many revolutions." In other respects the man familiar with the teachings of Spiritualism will recognize an old doctrine, and one wonders whether Plato had any acquaintance with mediumship. But Plato, still in the personality of Socrates, adds the following important statement.

"I do not mean to affirm that the description which I have given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true—a man of sense ought hardly to say that. But I do say that, inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal, he may venture to think, not improperly or unworthily, that something of the kind is true."

In the Tenth Book of the Republic he gives a similar myth, that of Er, son of Armenius, but I shall not

quote it. It suffices to know that Plato regarded such a conception of the soul as mythical and imaginative, and we may then well ask what he regarded as the scientific conception.

Now Plato expressed his more scientific view in the doctrine of metempsychosis or transmigration, reincarnation being another term for the same. This theory was that the soul had to pass through one physical embodiment after another in its process of purification or salvation. During the period of Christian domination and the interpretation of Plato after the conceptions of his mythical views, the real nature of his reincarnation was not observed. It offers a clear picture to the mind when viewed in the ordinary way. But Plato did not have a mythical or imaginative conception of it. In the first place he held that memory was lost by death and subsequent reincarnations had no memory connection with the past. It was probably this conception of the process that led Christianity to eliminate reincarnation from its affiliations with Plato. But in any case we shall not fully understand Plato's real view of immortality unless we look at what he meant by the scientific view of it.

It would take a volume to explain this fully and especially to work out its philosophic basis, and I do not mean to undertake such a task. But its origin and meaning, I think, can easily be stated dogmatically. It must be found in the main trend of Greek ideas. What had impressed minds like Plato was the evidence of permanence and change in the world. Certain things were eternal, others were ephemeral. The evolutions of nature, in spite of change and death, showed the permanence of type. The habit of seeking the explanation of things in the material causes, or stuff, out of which things were made, and the observation that these combinations perished demonstrated the perishable nature of organic and complex things. But there was

always identity of type and the material cause of this was supposed to be the permanent element of things. The accidents perished. The essential properties were permanent. But the individual was transient. The eternal was the abstract universal, as it is sometimes called. This was merely the common properties that determined the type and that did not constitute the nature of the individual.

Hence Plato's eternal or immortality was nothing more than the permanent or repeated qualities that appeared in the perishing individual. He had no such conception of a future life as had haunted the minds of the Christian world. He employed the same language but it was tinctured with philosophy totally opposed to Christianity. But Plato, nevertheless, was a many sided man, and we cannot pick out his view of reincarnation as representing the whole of the ideas that floated through his speculative vision. There are touches here and there, besides the one that I have mentioned, which showed that he was often on the borderland of another philosophy and what could have deterred him from following up the clues no one knows, unless it was that the philosophic and scientific reaction against the primitive religions prevented attaching any value to phenomena that kept the mind on the boundaries of madness.

Aristotle affirmed the immortality of the soul, just as Plato did, but he qualified it so that students have to inquire into his meaning. It was the rational soul that survived while the animal and vegetable soul perished. This distinction requires us to examine what he meant by the "soul" in general, and what he meant by the rational "soul" or intellect in particular. If he had meant by the rational soul that self-consciousness survived but that the sensory consciousness perished, we might have understood him to mean very much what Mr. Myers held; namely, that the subliminal

was the real soul that survived and the physical consciousness passed away, except that we should not identify the rational and the subliminal. We might well conceive the inner consciousness of man to survive and the sensory to perish with the organism, but Aristotle had no such conceptions of the problems as are implied by psychic research and his terms only happen to coincide partly with distinctions we make. He came to his doctrine through his general philosophy. He was no doubt influenced in early life by the doctrine of Plato which ended in transmigration. Aristotle, while he did not express himself in that language, was not far removed from the ideas of Plato. He recognized three kinds of soul: the vegetable, the animal, and the rational. These were in reality distinctions between the vegetable, the animal and the human kingdoms. Vegetable souls were what we should to-day call vital force. Animal souls were the forces which organized the bodies of the animal kingdom and combined the vegetable and other forces. Probably he would have limited the animal soul to the sensory functions. At any rate the rational soul was found only in man and represented his intellect or reasoning powers, which the animals were supposed not to have. Now this intellect was the divine part of man and came to him from without. It was immortal.

But there is no evidence that Aristotle thought it personal survival. He was so influenced by the monism of the time that he probably had the same conception of its survival that Plato had, except that he was careful to clear it of mythical elements and eschewed the ideas of metempsychosis. He did not make clear just what he meant and probably regarded the intellect or the rational functions of the mind as the "essence" of all minds obtained from the Absolute or the divine, and so did not give it personality in survival any more than Plato did. Probably like all the philosophers he

kept aloof from the plebeian ideas associated with ancestor worship and the spiritualism of the oracles. We know from the persecution of Socrates that the philosophers had to make concessions to the beliefs of the rabble or suffer as Socrates did, and as Aristotle is said to have once left Athens to save philosophy a second disgrace like that of Socrates, we may well imagine that he took a prudential course in his attitude on this question. The language conceded immortality though a critical examination of it reveals that it had no such meaning as the mythical conception in the popular views stated and rejected by Plato. Aristotle's view amounts only to the fact that a man's mind was related to the Absolute in the same way that his body was. He regarded them as different things, but they were both subject to the same destiny. It was their substance that was permanent and not their form, and this view did not carry with it any survival of personal identity.

The Stoics were largely confined to Ethics in their theories. They had a theory of nature, but religious and ethical ideas were the dominant ones in their system. Religion, however, as applied to their views had no such meaning as understood by the common people and may be said to have been exhausted in their ethics. They lived and taught in the decline of Greco-Roman civilization and labored under two limitations, a view of nature which was one of inflexible law and which, though it was regarded as rational, placed such restraints on human freedom that life had to be pursued with indifference to pain. The Stoics took no such joyous view of things as did the earlier Greeks who lived in a happier civilization. They had all the desires of the nature loving Greeks, but felt it a duty to submit to an order which did not allow their satisfaction and their lives had the appearance of gloominess to those who gave way to their passions. Hence their

ethics were somber and uninviting. In such an atmosphere and with resignation as their chief maxim they were not likely to take as much interest in the problem of a future life as other schools. Some of them, however, held views closely allied to the Christian. The general materialism of their age and the infection of their own philosophy with this materialism made them less assured of immortality, and they held it not only with some reservations but some of them made the future life only for an indefinite period. It was Seneca that approximated the Christian view more especially. Some of the earlier members of the school probably did not believe in immortality at all, though it is clear from the doctrine of a temporary existence after the death of the body that they had come into contact with facts or speculations that suggested it. In any case the doctrine had little interest for them.

The Epicureans denied immortality. But they had a curious belief for philosophers who denied a future life. They admitted that man had a soul, which they regarded as a fine material or ethereal organism, but they held that this organism perished at death. That is the soul as well as the body perished. They gave no evidence of this and it was perhaps their object to remove the fear of death that prejudiced them against the continuance of life after death. The representations of that life were such as might well frighten brave men, and the Epicureans had a philosophy to defend and did not see that the only safe way to protect their denial of immortality would have been to deny that a soul existed and to affirm that mental phenomena were simply functions of the body. This was the position taken by later materialists. But to admit that there was a soul at all was to suggest a view which might protect survival. The Epicureans made the atoms imperishable and had to assume that the soul was a complex organism to make it perishable. But they did

not see that you required evidence that a complex organism which was independent of the body perished at the same time as the body did. However they held that view and it remained for another system to dispute it and to perfect a philosophy to which Epicurean maxims did not apply. It was the Christian doctrine of the resurrection that laid the foundations for a different view.

3. *The Roman Period*

There is little in this period that excites interest. The Romans were a practical and not a philosophic people. Conquest and politics were their chief occupation and interest. They were not, as were the Greeks, a nature loving people. Life with them was more somber and serious, at least for those whose ideas and character have been brought down to us by history. It might have been different with the common citizens of whom history so often says little. But it is probable that the ruling classes did not constitute an exception in temperament to the majority of the population. Hence we are probably safe in supposing that, as they are represented in history, the Romans were lacking in the love of nature which might prompt an interest in the continuity of life with any such enthusiasm as marked their other interests.

Roman beliefs also had their two periods, the earlier and the philosophic. The earlier belief seems to have begun in Fetishism and Animism. The relics of them are found in the Lares and Penates or household gods of common life. They indicate a period when men believed in the gods and the human soul with the power to communicate with the dead. When the philosophic period arrived these household gods retired into mere customs and had no special significance for the educated classes. They were mere evidence of ideas that had

passed away with a higher civilization. Skepticism, which arose with philosophic reflection, displaced them except as artistic expression, and though the interest in a future life may have remained intact, as indicated by some of the writings of Cicero and others, the evidence that would appeal to the intellectuals was not such as to obtain their assent any more than it does with the same class to-day.

Cicero believed in immortality, but some of his arguments for it are childish, as were most arguments in antiquity. Some of his arguments are the regulation philosophic ones and are based upon the worth of intelligence, which is a purely aristocratic conception and does not meet the question. His *Tusculan Disputations*, in which he discusses the subject, deal mostly in literary quotations and shallow arguments, though appealing to natural human sentiments. There is no clear conception of what he thinks the after life is or may be, and he would probably have confessed entire ignorance of that, though believing that we survive. But there is no well defined view of the subject. The school of thought to which he belonged was not accustomed to assurance on such things.

Seneca was more explicit. He held to a happy existence after death and conceived this life as one of probation and death as marking the day of judgment. He evidently refined and rationalized the mythical view of Plato and made it similar to that which Christianity adopted. There seems to be no trace of primitive Animism in his doctrine, and little argument to prove it. His Stoical ethics made it unimportant to insist upon immortality as an ethical stimulus.

It was the same with Marcus Aurelius. His calm and Stoical life and reflections have no apparent interest in a future existence. The rational life in the present sufficed and indeed this marked the whole Stoical school, so that the interest in immortality

marked a different type of mind, perhaps one that had less self-sufficiency and grit of character to take things as they are. But whether so or not, the immortality of the soul was not so essential a feature of Roman thought as of the centuries which followed the decline and marked the success of Christian civilization. The reaction against the primitive Animism of the earlier periods in both Greece and Rome, like the philosophic movements in India, China, Japan, and Persia against savage Spiritualism, had carried with it much antagonism to the belief because of its associations with much inhumanity and more superstitions.

Christian belief need not be examined here. Suffice to say that it was rather a direct answer by alleged facts to the Epicurean Materialism than any adoption of Platonic and other views. The Epicurean, by admitting the existence of a soul, an ethereal organism different from the grosser physical body, prepared the way for attaching importance to apparitions and coincidental dreams, and it is probable that the story of the resurrection grew out of such an experience, distorted by time and legend into the physical resurrection. The existence of a well worked out theory of the resurrection among the Pharisees prior to the origin of any story about Christ, rather suggests what the sequel to Epicurean Materialism would be if the human mind attached any interest to apparitions, and this too without deciding whether they were hallucinations or realities. To meet this position materialism had to revise its doctrine and it did so by abandoning the ethereal body and claiming that consciousness was a function of the body.*

* For fuller discussion of the relation between Epicureanism and Christianity see the following works by the present author: *Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 435-445; *Psychic Research and the Resurrection*, Chap. XII.

CHAPTER IV

CHRISTIANITY AND PSYCHIC RESEARCH

CHRISTIANITY has always been represented by its followers, at least until recent times, as a unique religion. It was contrasted with all the others, Buddhism, Brahmanism, Confucianism, Shintoism, Zoroastrianism and all other systems. The resemblances between them were slurred over or disregarded and the points of difference emphasized to prove that Christianity was the only true religion. There are differences and great ones. The oriental systems were largely ethical and spiritual teaching, mixed up with philosophy, and unaccompanied by the miraculous as illustrated in Christianity. There may have been some incidents in the lives of their founders that would give rise to remarkable stories, but these were not the essential conditions of these religions. The miraculous more distinctly characterized Christianity, though its ethical and spiritual teaching was quite as prominent and essential. The miraculous was appealed to as evidence, not as its object. But in the course of its evolution the interest of its conquests led it to make itself unique as a religion. It took eighteen centuries to make it look with a tolerant eye on oriental systems and to discover certain affinities in ethical and spiritual ideas. They may not be great, but they are there, and further investigation will find connections not now suspected except by students of anthropology.

Now it was not the ethical and spiritual teaching that gave Christianity its unique character. Its own

founder taught that he came only to restore the ideas of the prophets, but his credentials, whether presented by himself or invented by his followers, were in the doctrine of "miracles." They were supposed to guarantee the divinity of his character and teaching. We may therefore represent Christianity as based upon four connected types of alleged fact. (1) The Virgin birth; (2) "Miracles"; (3) The incidents of the Resurrection, and (4) Its ethical and spiritual teaching. The first and last type have no interest for psychic research as a scientific investigation of unusual mental phenomena, and hence will not come up for special consideration here. The relation of psychic research to Christianity is determined by the second and third types of alleged fact. The second, that of "Miracles," may be divided into three aspects: (*a*) Physical "miracles," (*b*) Spiritual healing, and (*c*) Mediumistic phenomena and sensory automatisms, or clairvoyance and clairsaudience. While the resurrection is given a place by itself it probably belongs to the type of sensory automatisms, but I have isolated it because of its relation to the doctrine of survival after death. Regarded as an apparition after Christ's death, with attendant misinterpretations of its physical character, it makes a unique incident in the origin of a religion emphasizing immortality as its chief feature, or one of them.

For a similar reason I have isolated the story of the Virgin birth from "Miracles," though it is in reality one of that class. But it is so unique in character that it cannot be reduced to the type of psychic phenomena with which we are familiar and I desire here to bring out the alliances of Christianity rather than its uniqueness. The fundamental object of "miracles" was to establish the spiritual claims of Christ. "The Jews seek a sign," said St. Paul, and they did this in order to have ethical and spiritual

teaching guaranteed, and in this the Virgin origin of Christ was a determinant factor. It concentrated attention on the genesis or historical origin of the system as the security for its divine nature and teaching. The validity of the Gospel was made to rest on the historicity or integrity of a physical event. This, I cannot but help think, was the great mistake of Christianity, at least in its later development. The effect of it was to expose its ethical and spiritual teaching to the vicissitudes of belief about historical events instead of its function in the realization of the ideals of the community. Validity, not genesis, should have been the point of view regarding its ethical and spiritual principles. These may guarantee themselves or have their value determined by pragmatic considerations. But the question of the historicity of certain events has no such solution. It was precisely because Christianity placed so much importance on historical genesis that it got into so much trouble with evolution when that doctrine came forward. Christianity had asserted a certain specific origin supposed to secure the validity of its teaching, but science questioned the alleged facts of that origin and evolution disputed the catastrophal and "miraculous" character of the cosmic process, at least in the form in which Christianity had presented it, and the moment that the human mind was conquered by that theory the whole historical basis of Christianity dropped from under it and left the common mind to draw the conclusion. Its teaching was supposed to be protected by a certain set of alleged historical events. When they disappeared as mythical, the mind asked whether the ethical doctrines based on them did not fall with them. Ethical and spiritual truth must be based upon personal insight, not on the integrity of a mere physical event, whatever importance this may have. We determine the validity of ethical and spiritual truths by their function in life, by their

pragmatic connections, and not by appeals to tradition. The meaning of the cosmos may have something to do with the proof or acceptance of past events, and we may learn in that way what its tendencies are. To these we have to adjust ourselves. But unless those events illustrate an ethical and spiritual truth they have no pragmatic value, though they have a philosophic interest, related, perhaps, to spiritual truths, but not determining their validity.

Consequently, as having no importance for the connection of psychic phenomena and Christianity, I dismiss the story of the Virgin birth and confine the discussion to the types of phenomena which define the scientific interest of psychic research. These are the "miracles," or at least a part of them, and the story of the resurrection with its accompanying incidents.

The resurrection was fundamental to Christianity because the immortality of the soul was the key to its religious interpretation of the ethical meaning of the cosmos. It has usually been considered a perfectly unique event, an exception to the laws of nature and so a phenomenon in which Providence contravened those laws. (But what I wish to show here is that a doctrine of the resurrection was maintained long before such an event was told of Christ, so that, assuming that there is a truth in the story about Christ, it was not exceptional or "miraculous.")

Homer speaks of rising from the dead, or the resurrection, three times in the *Iliad*. Aeschylus also speaks of it twice in his dramas. Sophocles once, and Herodotus once. This is from five hundred to nine hundred years before Christ. They are, however, not affirming the doctrine or the fact. They simply show that they are familiar with the idea, while we must go to the popular opinion and the views of some of the earlier philosophers to ascertain just what was actually believed in regard to this point. The New Testament

itself alludes to it a number of times in connections which show that it was believed before the story was told of Christ. The controversy between the Sadducees and Pharisees turned upon this doctrine in one of their differences. The Pharisees believed in the resurrection and the Sadducees denied it. This is stated as representing facts and beliefs before the crucifixion. Hence a doctrine of the resurrection is not so unique as many would have us believe. Now how did this come about?

The Pharisees and the Sadducees were the intellectuals of the time, the Sadducees being materialists and the Pharisees spiritualists, if I may use these terms to describe them. The former denied immortality and the latter believed it and remained by that feature of Judaistic religion, into which we cannot enter here. But it was the contingency of certain philosophic developments that brought about the discussion on this particular point. Greek philosophy, after all its evolutions, had terminated in two schools, the Epicureans who were materialists and the Neo-Platonists who were spiritualists. The Neo-Platonists, in the doctrine of the Logos, as reflected in Philo Judæus and the Gospel of St. John, were the only school that affected Judaistic thought consciously. Materialism seems to have met with no scholastic support as an interpretation of nature. It did affect the attitude of the Sadducees on the question of immortality. The Hebrews seem to have been divided on that belief, probably because of the pure monotheism which had originated in an attack on polytheism and fetishism. Primitive animism, which was savage spiritualism, infected the common people in Palestine as elsewhere and the purification of Judaism by monotheism represented a reaction against this animism and with it the belief in immortality. It was therefore not inconsistent with their theism to deny immortality. The Sadducees might well take this position without wholly compromising their

religion, though they were probably the skeptics of the nation. The Pharisees were more strict adherents of the traditional religion and evidently accepted immortality in deference to the claims of those who claimed to have communication with a spiritual world. There is no trace of the evidence on which they relied, but they believed in the resurrection which might well be based upon the phenomena of apparitions.

The issue might very easily have been precipitated in the following manner, as materialism tended to define it very sharply. The Epicureans believed that man had a soul, which they denominated an ethereal or fine material organism. But they maintained that it perished with the body. They believed in the existence of the gods from dreams, probably being familiar with apparitions, but they placed them in the intermundia, the space between the worlds, so that they exercised no influence on the course of things and events. But the human soul was supposed to perish at death. They had no proof for such a negative belief, but they held it. All that an opponent had to do in order to refute the system on the point of immortality, or at least of survival after death, would be to point to well attested apparitions of persons after death as evidence that the ethereal organism, the "spiritual body" of St. Paul, or the astral body of the theosophists, continued instead of perishing.

If the Epicureans had not admitted the existence of such an organism it is probable that the attack on the system could not have been made in that way. But it invited refutation by just this method and so created a scientific point of view in the study of the problem. All that the critic of materialism had to do was to seize upon apparitions to maintain survival, and if Christ appeared to his disciples after death, he furnished an event of strong argumentative import against the Sadducees and the materialists generally.

It would not matter what form the story would take. So long as it was believed in some sense it would serve as an appeal, scientifically at that, in support of survival.

Hence, since the doctrine of the resurrection existed before Christ's crucifixion, and if we can accept the story of the Gospels themselves, his resurrection was predicted, the reason that this created so much interest and served as the foundation of a religion was the extraordinary nature of the personality to whom it happened. An apparition of ordinary people would not impress the multitude, but one of such a personality as Christ is represented to be would excite unusual interest and to the same extent emphasize the meaning of the fact. Other circumstances conspiring, especially the condition of the poor and downtrodden, the belief and proof of immortality might well spring into a central position in religious reconstruction. Apparitions, of course, are well known psychic phenomena and easily suggest a resurrection, and when distinctions of matter are not clear might well give rise in the common mind to a bodily resurrection. But of this we need not speak. The main point is to find a connection between general human experience and the alleged incidents of the crucifixion and reappearance of Christ.

That Christ's alleged reappearance, on one occasion at least, took the form of the usual psychic phenomenon is indicated in the story of his appearance to his disciples on the way to Emmaus after the "resurrection." At first they did not recognize him and only when he expounded the Scriptures in the old authoritative way did they realize who it was. The story has its difficulties as a narrative of facts, but it is not the genuineness of it that concerns us, but the belief in it by those who record it. They describe the facts as persons who are familiar with psychic phenomena, though not familiar with their nature as modern science might be.

Pure invention would have made them recognize him at once, but the phenomenon is described as if it were a clairaudient phenomenon, and, whether so or not, it has its affiliations with phenomena which occur frequently with mediums.

Perhaps a more conspicuous instance of the belief in apparitions and the association of spiritualism with the phenomena of Christ's life is found in the story of Christ walking on the water. Matthew and Mark say that the disciples thought it was a spirit when they saw him walking on the water. John says nothing about this feature of it. But no one would have made such a statement without being familiar with what is known as spirits or apparitions, whatever the interpretation we give them.

Take again the stories of the Transfiguration and the appearance of Moses and Elias. The Transfiguration is a phenomenon with which some of us are perfectly familiar in mediumistic phenomena. I have myself witnessed muscular changes in the appearance and expression of the face produced by control and others have reported noticing light changes in the same. Whether the changes in light be referred to illusion or not makes no difference. The phenomena of veridical hallucinations would prove this, because they mean that the effect is subjective while the cause is objective: they are phantasms produced by the thought of an external agent, living or dead. It is their occurrence that is the important fact and if the cause be external we have only to determine what it is in order to understand their significance. So I shall make a present to any one of the explanation of such phenomena as muscular or light modifications in the faces of mediums. The main point is that they occur and can be compared with the story of the Transfiguration.

The appearance of Moses and Elias is only a narrative of apparitions. The people of that time believed

in them so generally that they supposed John the Baptist was Elias risen from the dead. Christ is said to have stated that he was this, Matthew 11:14. This again is further evidence of the idea of the resurrection as a belief widely extant at the time. But in this instance it is not a question of the resurrection, but of the apparition of two ancients. The story may not be true, but it attests the belief in apparitions, and connects them with the personality of Christ as one with a revelation for mankind. He was in contact with the dead and thus communicated with them. Worth noting also as further corroboration of the idea of a resurrection is the statement that many people thought Christ was John the Baptist risen from the dead, and they held to this without insisting on his physical or personal identity. That is the form of a resurrection which is familiar to us in controls who are present, but are not confused with the personality, physical or mental, of the living person. All of them are psychic phenomena, or conceptions formed by that point of view.

Again take St. Paul's vision on the way to Damascus, told in Acts 9:1-22, 22:3-21, and 26:9-22. The accounts are not perfectly consistent in all details: for instance, in the first account those with him are said to have heard a voice, but saw no man. The second account says his companions saw the light but heard not the voice that spoke to Paul. The third account implies that the others saw a light, but says nothing about their hearing or not hearing the voice. But in spite of these discrepancies the story as a whole is fairly consistent in all three accounts. They are agreed that St. Paul saw a vision and heard a voice. As St. Paul tells the story himself, according to the narrative, it is first hand and one of the best authenticated of the New Testament. Again it is an apparition of the dead, this time mainly an auditory one,

a case of clairaudience on the part of St. Paul. It is a psychic phenomenon determining the nature and meaning of Christ and Christianity. It has all the features of mediumistic phenomena both experimental and spontaneous. Our records are full of illustrations of the phenomena.

Again take a mediumistic phenomenon, that of Christ with the strange woman at the well. Though knowing nothing about her he told her that she had had five husbands and that the man she was living with at the time was not her husband. Seeing his supernormal information, she at once remarked that he must be a prophet, the fact implying just what conception the people had of a prophet, a spiritual medium and teacher. The account appears in John 4:7-29. The phenomenon is a common occurrence with mediums of the genuine type, so common that there is no mistaking the meaning of the New Testament story. Apart from our own verification of such phenomena we would not believe this one, but psychic research has proved their occurrence and with the proof has thrown light upon what was going on in the work of Christ.

The apparitions at the time of the resurrection are further illustrations of psychic phenomena with which we are familiar, though we do not give them the physical interpretation which men did for many centuries. We have ascertained their really spiritual nature, if they are to be accepted at all as significant incidents.

There is no mistaking the nature of all of these events. They implicate the origin of Christianity in psychic phenomena, of the types which we are able to observe or reproduce by experiment to-day and so take Christianity out of the category of unexplainable facts, putting it along with the ordinary laws of nature.

The most conspicuous phenomena, however, in the

New Testament are the "miracles" of healing. It is remarkable that the Christian Evidences of the previous century laid less stress upon this type of "miracle" than on the physical violations of the law of nature. They were the practical side of Christianity and yet the defenses of "miracles" centered around the possibility of intervening in the physical laws of the world. The facts most difficult to believe were chosen for defense instead of those which were more or less easily reproduced in the present. But, as Christianity had developed into a philosophic machine or system for defending a creed rather than pragmatic service to men, it seems not to have seen the real significance of healing in the work of Christ, or not to have tried to investigate and apply that part of his work. However this may be, the practical aspect of Christianity in its founder was concentrated in ethical teaching and spiritual healing.

The comparative importance of healing in the stories about Christ's work and the other types of psychic phenomena can be shown by the statistics on the subject.

The Gospel of Matthew mentions 18 cases of healing, Christ walking on the water, assumed to be a spirit at first, the Transfiguration, and the Resurrection. Mark mentions 13 instances of healing, Christ walking on the water, supposed to be a spirit, the Transfiguration, and the Resurrection. Luke mentions 20 instances of healing, the appearance of Christ to his disciples when they were on the way to Emmaus, the raising of Lazarus, which might be regarded as the 21st instance of healing, and the Transfiguration, with apparitional incidents connected with the Resurrection. John has 4 cases of healing, the raising of Lazarus, and Christ walking on the water with no mention of his being taken for a spirit. The Acts of the Apostles mentions 2 instances of healing, the vision and rescue

of Peter from prison, and the vision of St. Paul on the way to Damascus. After these the whole subject of healing and "miracles" is dropped. The Epistle to the Romans mentions none of them and the later parts of the New Testament are as free from narratives of the kind as later literature when "miracles" were supposed to have disappeared. They are practically confined to the four Gospels. If mythology was the chief agent in creating the stories they should have been as frequent in the later as the earlier period.

I must repeat that it is not necessary to believe the narratives just as they are recorded. At their best they would be abbreviated, distorted by misinterpretation, or magnified in that age of poor scientific observation. But it is not their accurate truth and reality that is the important thing for the psychic researcher, but the circumstance that we are able to-day to perform similar healing and so to make the stories in the New Testament credible, in so far as they can be reproduced in the present. It is natural enough for the physicist not to believe in such things unless they can be reproduced to-day and skepticism was entirely within its rights when rejecting the accounts. But since we have applied "suggestive" therapeutics on so large a scale in modern times, instituted mental healing, used mediums for the same results, and in a thousand ways repeated and corroborated the facts of earlier times, it is no longer impossible to believe what was said about Christ in this respect. It emphasizes the pragmatic side of his work, while the ethical and spiritual was all that had survived among philosophic thinkers.

Certain specific instances have an interest for the record of facts which can be corroborated to-day. The first is an illustration of mind-reading or telepathy: Mark 2:3-12. Christ had said to one "sick of the palsy," when he came to be healed, "Thy sins be for-

given thee." The scribes took offense and "reasoned in their hearts" about it. Christ "perceiving in spirit that they so reasoned within themselves" asked them why they did so, as they had thought that "none could forgive sins but God only," and then changed his form of suggestion or command to suit them. Divining their minds as he did he was only exercising telepathy, which we have adequately proved to-day. We must remember that the Greek word for "sin" also means a "mistake."

The second incident is an important one. A nobleman came to Christ to have his son healed. The patient was at home dying and the nobleman wished Christ to come with him to heal the son before he died. The remainder of the narrative I quote, John 4:50-54.

"Jesus saith unto him, Go thy way; thy son liveth. And the man believed the word that Jesus had spoken unto him, and went his way.

"And as he was now going down, his servants met him, and told him, saying, Thy son liveth.

"Then inquired he of them the hour when he began to mend. And they said unto him, Yesterday at the seventh hour the fever left him.

"So the father knew that it was at the same hour in which Jesus said unto him, Thy son liveth."

Here is an instance of absent treatment and the recording of the coincidence in time between the act of the healer and the improvement of the patient. I have myself records of similar coincidences and healing effects. There are two other cases of absent treatment by Christ, though the time coincidence was not marked or recorded, if any. Mark 7:24-30, and Luke 7:1-10. They need not be quoted.

Another instance of healing, not one of absent treatment, is especially good because it happens to record facts indicating the *modus operandi* of Christ, connecting it with modern suggestive therapeutics. I take the account of Mark (5:22-43) because it gives fuller

details than those of Matthew (9:18-26) and Luke (8:49-56), though they all agree as far as they go. A ruler of the synagogue by the name of Jairus came to Christ to have him cure his daughter who lay at the point of death. Christ went with him and found the friends ridiculing him for his expectation of curing the child. They remarked that she was already dead and "laughed him to scorn." But he put everybody out of the room, saying that she was not dead but asleep, in a trance or comatose condition, and took the father and mother with Peter, James and John into the room, and taking the child by the hand said in her language: "Talitha cumi," which was "Damsel arise." She arose and walked and he ordered that she be given something to eat.

Now here is a case where Christ's knowledge of the conditions was such that he could distinguish the trance from death. Others could not. Just as every mental healer or psychic researcher who knows his business to-day would do, Christ ordered the guests out of the room and took three of his disciples, the most psychic of them all, into the room and applied suggestion resulting in the immediate recovery of consciousness. I have myself witnessed such sudden recoveries from the trance, once when the psychic showed the signs of death. The heart had apparently stopped action and breathing had ceased. Recovery did not take place instantly, but did in half a minute. But the sudden removal of trances by suggestion is a well-known phenomenon to-day, and this New Testament incident only records facts which scientific knowledge confirms to-day.

I may take another fact of some interest. It is the meaning of the word "Angel." That word in the original meant "Messenger" and that means an intermediary between two parties. Its original import was a *messenger* between the dead and the living. But the

abandonment of the spiristic point of view of Christianity and its phenomena resulted in creating a new meaning for the word. It usually means, perhaps always, in common parlance, merely a spiritual being without any implication of its function. But the proper meaning in the New Testament and times prior to it is that of a "messenger" between the dead and the living. It was so used in Homer, Herodotus, and Sophocles. It lost that meaning only because Christians abandoned the real meaning of their religion. Those who employed the term knew what psychic phenomena were and apostasy is the cause of the change in its import. One of the best proofs of this and of its New Testament meaning is the statement in Acts 12:15. Peter had escaped from prison under circumstances that were incredible when he was seen by some of his friends. They explained the appearance, rather than believe that he had actually escaped, by saying: "It is his angel," meaning thereby his guide or familiar spirit, the terms used in spiritualistic literature to-day, and the New Testament commentators and translators frankly recognize this import to the term and refer to this very passage. This only shows how the disciples looked at the incidents of the Gospel and that they were simply spiristic phenomena.

It will be interesting to add an incident of some importance in connection with the meaning of the term "Angel" as "Messenger." The Imperator group of personalities, through Stainton Moses, Mrs. Piper and Mrs. Chenoweth, called themselves Messengers, and gave certain historical names for themselves through Stainton Moses and other quite different names through Mrs. Piper. Now Imperator had given the name Malachi through Stainton Moses as his real name. But no such name was given through Mrs. Piper and so it was regarded as an error that another name was given. But I have learned from a Hebrew student that

“Malachi” means *Messengers* and is not the name of a person at all. No one knows who the author of the prophecies by that name was and they are simply described as coming from the “Messengers” who are called “Malachi” in Hebrew. Now as the same personalities called themselves Messengers through the several psychics and in doing so they happened to give in English exactly what Imperator gave through Stainton Moses in Hebrew, the facts thus make the incident correct rather than wholly erroneous. But the important thing is that the Imperator group call themselves by the name which means “Angel” in the proper sense of an intermediary between the dead and the living and so perpetuate the very name and function of such agents in both Testaments, and connect spiritism with the religion that has so long dominated western civilization.

It is possible to treat the story of Christ’s temptation from the psychic point of view. I shall not assert this with any confidence, as the evidence within the narrative does not make it unquestionable. Taken literally they are narratives that seem so much like “miracles” that they are exposed to the skeptic’s theory of invention to magnify the nature and mission of Christ, and unless they can receive an interpretation in terms of provable psychic phenomena, they may be regarded as mythopœic.

Suppose, however, that the alleged experiences were symbolic visions on the part of Christ after the type of pictographic and symbolic experiences of mediumistic cases, which are very common. Such a view would relate them to the phenomena often called traveling clairvoyance, which, however, is clairvoyance without the traveling. It has the appearance of this and most people think they are instances in which the soul leaves the body and travels to the places represented in the visions. But investigation shows that in one type of

mediumship which is pictographic the thoughts of the dead become hallucinations to the living psychic, and he or she cannot distinguish them from being as they are represented, objects of consciousness. We have the same experiences in our dreams where we are not aware of our locus, but think we are where the dream imagery puts us. Most psychics talk of leaving the body in such experiences and of going to the places represented in the apparitions. But in as much as we have distinct and conclusive evidence that mental pictures may be produced by the thoughts of external personalities we do not require to express the phenomena in terms of traveling, but in telepathically induced hallucinations, whether by spirits or by living people. Add to this the fact that many such visions are symbolic and we may have a clue to what took place in the temptations of Christ. There is not evidence to prove this as a fact, but it is easier to believe it after what we actually know in psychic research than it is to believe either in the miraculous character of the accounts or the mythopœic tendency of the time.

Most of this discussion has been directed to the work of Christ. But we should miss much if we disregarded the relation of St. Paul to the phenomena under consideration. The orthodox type of religious mind has never noticed St. Paul's ideas on this subject, because psychic phenomena were not a part of its recognized facts. It had no standard for understanding what he was talking about and hence vague "spiritual" or intellectual ideas were assumed to be his meaning. But any man familiar with psychic phenomena will recognize in the letters of St. Paul a wide acquaintance with the facts as readily as a physician will recognize a disease from the descriptions of Hippocrates.

How much St. Paul knew about psychic phenomena before his conversion no one knows. He has given us

no information on that point. It was his conversion to Christianity that marked a great change of mind. His experience on the way to Damascus was a psychic phenomenon of the first magnitude, no matter what interpretation you put upon it. From what we know of similar men and women of this age, we can readily understand how he became suddenly seized with a "control" or invasion of an outside intelligence and turned right about in another direction than his orthodox Judaism. He was a man of great earnestness and worth saving, and the apparition of Christ on the way to Damascus, whether it was real or symbolic makes no difference, was the beginning of mediumship with him, and from that time on he began to recognize the phenomena, in all their types, among others and his allusions to them show that he saw them in many forms. The 12th, 13th and 14th Chapters of I Corinthians are summaries of the whole field with a good deal of sound sense regarding them, and one might imagine that he had been a scientific student of them.

It is evident from the records in the New Testament, both regarding the day of Pentecost and other occasions, that there was a great deal of what is to-day called *glossolalia*, without implying any special explanation of the phenomena. "Speaking with tongues" is the vernacular for it and in the New Testament it is often called "speaking with unknown tongues." In our own time it is speaking a language which the subject does not know, and while I have not witnessed it on a large scale, I have seen several cases where it has occurred and cannot be ordinarily explained. I have seen cases, however, in which the speech could not be called a language at all. It was merely nonsense syllables. Unscientific people speak of such phenomena as due to spirits, and while this may be, there is certainly no evidence for this in the ordinary glossolalia. However this may be, any inexplicable phenomena of

the kind were referred in apostolic times to spirits, and St. Paul shared the general ideas on this subject. But he was somewhat discriminating in regard to them. He frankly recognized that it had no importance for general truth unless interpreted. He thought it might be "edifying" to the subject of them, meaning no doubt that the glossolalic patient might have elational and helpful moral impulses from such experiences, but unless some intelligible meaning could be given to the facts: that is, unless interpretation could be applied to them, they were of no use to others. This was an incipient distinction between meaningless and meaningful phenomena of the kind.

To illustrate St. Paul's conceptions, in the 12th Chapter of I Corinthians, 8-10, he says: "For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom: to another the word of knowledge by the same Spirit: to another faith by the same Spirit: to another the gifts of healing by the same Spirit: to another the working of miracles: to another prophecy: to another discernment of spirits (clairvoyance): to another divers kinds of tongues: to another the interpretation of tongues."

The whole gamut of psychic phenomena is run over here. The terms in which they are defined would not adequately describe their more strictly scientific conception to-day, but we can easily recognize them. The 13th Chapter of the same letter is a good homily on the tendency to schism in the world when people get a new idea and forget the "charity" or tolerance that should become them. St. Paul noticed that every individual that found himself psychic wished to set up as a prophet and to domineer over others. He therefore counseled them to recognize that "speaking with tongues of men and angels" had no merits unless the subject of them had "charity," or respect and tolerance for others. In the next Chapter, the 14th, he takes up the same situation and emphasizes interpretation

as most important. Revelations need to be understood to be useful, and mere glossolalia or speaking with tongues carried no merits in it unless we gave its meaning. Shouting spirits when utterances were unintelligible had no value. Edification came with good sense. A passage should be quoted, because its clear significance is not apparent to any but psychic researchers. Chapter 14th and verses 6-11.

“Now, brethren, if I come unto you speaking with tongues, what shall I profit you, except I shall speak to you by revelation, or by knowledge, or by prophesying, or by doctrine? And even things without life giving sound, whether pipe or harp, except they give a distinction in the sounds, how shall it be known what is piped or harped? For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle? So likewise ye, except ye utter by the tongue words easy to be understood, how shall it be known what is spoken? For ye shall speak into the air. There are, it may be, so many kinds of voices in the world, and none of them is without signification. Therefore if I know not the meaning of the voice, I shall be unto him that speaketh a barbarian and he that speaketh shall be a barbarian to me.”

This is all common sense and there are many spiritualists or sympathizers with it to-day who need to learn this elementary lesson. St. Paul is only insisting upon intelligibility as the first condition of accepting anything from spirits. I have no doubt that, in that time, the standard of evidence was very much less rigid than we should insist on to-day, but we have here a demand, on the part of the apostle, that some discrimination be used in judging the phenomena. In the same chapter he further says: “Wherefore tongues are for a sign, not to them that believe, but to them that believe not: but prophesying serveth not for them that believeth not, but for them which believe.” Here is

the tacit recognition that the skeptic must have the supernormal assured to create belief, while the believer may accept what the unbeliever would not and perhaps could not until he was otherwise convinced. Evidently St. Paul met people and plenty of them who needed caution in what they accepted as spiritual. But he unmistakably shows his knowledge of the phenomena.

The whole doctrine of the resurrection which is taught in the 15th Chapter of the same Epistle is filled with doctrines of psychic research. St. Paul's doctrine of the spiritual body here is clear and it answers the Epicurean without asserting the resurrection of the physical body. The whole record of St. Paul's statements on the subject indicates probably a far larger outburst of these phenomena than any one can imagine except those who are familiar with psychic phenomena in general.

I wish to repeat and emphasize the fact that the argument which I am presenting for psychic phenomena in the New Testament and determining a reconstruction of its meaning does not depend on the truth or accuracy of the incidents narrated in it. Criticism has availed to distinguish between many things acceptable and those not so, but in this discussion I do not care whether the stories of "miraculous" healing are true or not. I shall make a present to any critic of any view he chooses to hold about them. It may not be true that Christ cured Jarius's daughter and it may not be true that Peter escaped from prison as asserted. But it is certain that the New Testament records statements which have no meaning at all unless they imply a knowledge of psychic phenomena. They may be wrong, if you like, in the application of their knowledge to the special cases, but their accounts are not intelligible unless they imply a knowledge of the phenomena which psychic research has proved over and over again to be real facts. I have no doubt that, accepting the

narratives as conveying some sort of truth about what happened, they may be too brief to be sure of all that occurred and they may be mixed up with interpretations and inferences instead of accurate observation of the facts. But all that does not alter the perfectly evident fact in the records that the narrators and their witnesses were familiar with psychic phenomena and this suffices to determine the interpretation of the Gospels and to fix the standard of belief as to what can be accepted and what doubted or held in suspense of judgment. To speak of the appearance of Moses and Elias is only to speak of what people had already believed in general to be facts; namely, apparitions of the dead. Whether Moses and Elias appeared on this special occasion may be debated or disbelieved as much as you please. But you cannot question what the story implies; namely, that the people believed in such things and that we have proved them to be true in modern times, whatever explanation you give of them. In the English Census of Hallucinations they collected a large number of apparitions of the dying and came unanimously to the conclusion that they were not due to chance. They offered no positive explanation of them, and taken with the apparitions of the dead collected, Mr. Gurney and Mr. Myers felt that there was a strong argument for survival in these verified apparitions alone, to say nothing of mediumistic experiments which multiplied and complicated the evidence so that there is no escape from the conclusion, except by men too ignorant to do their own thinking. But apparitions of the dead and dying, however explained, are facts and suggest that it is not incredible that an apparition of Moses and Elias may have occurred as narrated, whatever explanation you prefer to offer.

It will be the same with the "miracles" of healing. You may make allowance for all the distortion and exaggeration you like, the facts will remain that we

have multiplied evidence everywhere for nearly a century that such phenomena occur to-day. I have myself cured a man who was regarded as insane and sent to Bellevue Hospital because he could talk of nothing else than rats in his brain. I do not blame physicians for their diagnosis and recommendation of the case. He had no money to pay their bills and they could hardly do anything else, unless they frankly changed their views of psychic phenomena. But however that may be, I took the man, used hypnotic suggestion and cured him completely in three days. This was about five years ago and he went on the stage as a musician and is earning his living and is happy. The policy of the physicians would have made him insane instead of curing him. I have often cured minor difficulties by suggestion, though I do not make a practise of this art. I aided in the cure of another case diagnosed as insane by New York physicians and sent to Blackwell's Island. The man would not allow their recommendations to be carried out. He is now well, happy, and earning his living. He too had no money to pay the doctors.

But the School of Nancy and the Salpêtrière represent the existence of mental healing on a large scale and the Emmanuel Movement is a direct effort to restore the primitive Christian healing, but even the church will not see the light and begin the reformation that will again restore it to power. It is only stupidity that does not see the connection between our modern spiritual healing and that of the New Testament.

It is not to be questioned that the mind of the patient has something to do with the result, but it is not everything. I shall leave to scientific investigation the determination of exactly what the subjects of such cures contribute, but that has nothing to do with the question whether they are instances that cannot be explained by orthodox materialistic medicine. And moreover it is not here the question of the nature of

the cures, but whether mental and spiritual healing of the present day is not the same as that of the New Testament, and that once proved, we have an entire reconstruction of Biblical interpretation. Science becomes reconciled with religion, even though the reconciliation is one involving the entire triumph of science.

The interesting circumstance in the whole question is that by far the largest majority of the "miracles" were phenomena of healing. Very few other "miracles" are narrated and with them we have nothing to do, unless we can duplicate them to-day. Then we should either accept those of the New Testament or explain them scientifically. No doubt early ages had their difficulties with these narratives, as the whole history of Christian Evidences abundantly shows. "Miracles" were the great stumbling blocks of all intelligent men. Even the church did not attempt to keep up the "miracles" of healing, or attempting them did not succeed, though some writers maintain that they never wholly ceased. Harnack, it seems learnedly tries to prove that there is good evidence for some remarkable cures in later Christian and mediæval times. But the proper way to settle such a problem is not to discuss ancient history or endeavor to vindicate the trustworthiness and testimony of people out of the reach of cross-examination, but to experiment and investigate to-day. See if you cannot produce the same results now, where observation can be thorough and witnesses can be examined. That is science and intelligence. Writing and criticizing legends is not science. Apropos of this remark it is interesting to know how many men have spent years and fortunes trying to understand Joan of Arc. But they will not spend five cents or five minutes investigating the same kind of persons to-day. Andrew Lang studied and wrote a great deal about Joan of Arc and vindicated the psychic character of her phenomena. But he thought it very vulgar to

experiment with Mrs. Piper! Your modern student, like the dogmatic theologians, love to dwell in the nimbus of mythology, but never to get down to verifiable facts.

Science is the verification of assertions about the past by the examination of the present. Tradition is not the standard of truth, but depends on present knowledge of the laws of nature. Too many people think science is the mere result of certain men's thinking. It is nothing of the kind. It is a *method*, a method of verification in present experience of any claims made about the past or future. It is an examination of the present moment and successive ones until we can distinguish between the transient and permanent elements in it. Then we can reasonably decide what is credible and what is not credible in the past. Of course, we may not be able to prove by investigation of the present whether a particular event or alleged event happened in the past, but we can ascertain whether it was possible or not, and when an event is a proved fact for the present it is not possible to deny its credibility in the past. Now science has abundantly proved the existence of all types of psychic phenomena that we have been reviewing in the New Testament and only certain physical "miracles" remain unproved. We do not have to believe them until they are made credible by present experience and proof. It is actual experience that is the fundamental test of truth and it has been nothing but an absurd confidence in tradition that has prevented men from examining the credentials of their beliefs in personal investigation.

One circumstance that tends to support the belief that remarkable cures took place under the supervision of Christ is the fact that the Apostles did not succeed after Christ's death so well as he did. Very few cures are recorded by them and these not so conspicuous as those of Christ. The Acts of the Apostles mentions

only *two* and the Epistle to the Romans mentions none at all. "Miracles" declined. The mythopœic instinct should have been as active under their careers as under that of Christ. But the "miracles," so far as the New Testament accounts are concerned, are almost confined to the four Gospels and the life of Christ. It is probable that the Apostles' inferiority to Christ in power had more to do with the decline of "miracles" and the belief in them than the influence to which Mr. Lecky appeals. He thought it due to the gradual disappearance of the belief because of the growth of scientific intelligence. This was no doubt true, but this growth of the belief in "natural" laws was itself due to the neglect of the facts which psychic research rejuvenates. The power to do the same things that are reported of Christ was neglected or did not exist, and the belief fell as much by this default as by the progress of ordinary scientific knowledge.

The religious mind has been too intent in the past on combating science. If it could have clearly seen that scientific method is its best friend, it might have held the materialistic tendencies of this age in check. But it has always had the bad taste and bad politics of antagonizing the method which promised it the best of vindication. The conflict of religion and science is one of the standing beliefs of the age. Certain religious teachers may protest against this verdict all they please, it is a fact proved by the literature of both the scientific and religious world, and the first instinct of most religious people is to depreciate science whenever it proves a fact that suggests opposition to some favorite religious creed. But all this must be given up and science given the place which even Christianity gave it. Christianity was founded on alleged facts, not on a philosophic scheme of the universe. It appealed to observed facts to prove immortality, not to *a priori* dogmas which one age may believe and the

next reject. It was, in fact, a scientific religion, and in taking up the attitude of opposition to science it was but pursuing the way to the grave whose course it took as soon as it abandoned the pragmatic character of its master and refused to apply his gospel of brotherhood. It has, in fact, never tried persistently to carry out his teaching either in respect of healing or practical efforts to organize a brotherhood on a large scale. To approach it through the truths of psychic research is to discover its fundamental meaning and to give Christ and his work the unique place it deserves while it gives it scientific credentials. The reconstruction of the church, as organized idealism, is necessary, but it cannot be done without verifying its claims in the actual experience of the present. It rests with its devotees to see this and to make a rational effort to pursue this policy. Instead of this, it seems to be pursuing a course which Carlyle reproached so severely when he accused the aristocracy of not leading the world but simply preserving its game.

CHAPTER V

MODERN AND SCIENTIFIC DOCTRINES

MODERN ideas of a future life, so far as they affect western civilization, have been determined by Christianity. That system was founded on two doctrines: (1) The immortality of the soul and (2) the brotherhood of man. The social scheme which was at first adopted to carry out the latter of these two doctrines was soon abandoned and there remained only the first one to dominate the thought of the church. Various subsidiary beliefs became attached to the system, assumed to be necessary to protect its validity and apparently the essential feature of it. But nevertheless they were to preserve the belief in immortality and salvation. A complete account of this would require the entire history of Christianity, but this cannot be given here. It is too complicated with sectarian variations from the original and these differ so much as to be almost diametrically opposed to each other in some of their characteristics. There seems to be more unity in the ancient religions, but that may be due to the paucity of historical material to show sectarian differences. At any rate we have abundant material for the study of Christianity and its sectarian ramifications. At the center of them, however, in spite of differences that are emphasized more than their common elements, is the immortality of the soul which has preserved its vitality for more than eighteen centuries, while its social scheme was relegated

to desuetude, to be revived in modern Socialism on an economic instead of an ethical basis.

Much can be said to dispute the view that the doctrine of immortality constituted the main doctrine of Christianity. Something, however, in this matter will depend on what we mean by "Christianity" and what we accept as authentic in the New Testament. If we are to define Christianity as the teaching of the Gospels or confine it to the period of Christ's teaching, we eliminate much that characterizes it to-day. This cannot very well be done after the term has come to mean so definite a thing to-day. But we can distinguish between primitive or original Christianity and modern Christianity. It is clear that the Gospels do not emphasize immortality as did the whole philosophical, theological and ecclesiastical schemes of later times. It is more implied than taught, and critics may raise the question whether legend and tradition may not have introduced much of it into the documents which we now possess. For instance, the story of the rich man and Lazarus is not found in Matthew and Mark, but in John and Luke, Mark is supposed to be the oldest Gospel and does not contain it. But in any case the story rather implies or takes immortality for granted. Its chief object is to teach human ethics and immortality is drawn in to enforce them. The doctrine of the resurrection which was a moot question between the Pharisees and Sadducees, and was referred to by Christ on one occasion, if we accept the account, implies it, but does not make it the central question about which the life and teachings of Christ revolved. The Sermon on the Mount is far more representative of this primitive Christian teaching than the doctrine of immortality. This doctrine received its chief interest and impetus from the death of its founder and the story of the actual resurrection. The ethical problem became subordinate, except as a means to the attainment of

salvation which was happiness in another life. But however we may assert or assume that immortality was not the main doctrine of Christianity at first, it quickly became so, and remained the chief interest ever since. The practical problems of social ethics and healing were assigned a secondary place and human interest concentrated on immortality and salvation, often to be attained, not by brotherhood and ethical life, but by rituals and ceremonies.

It was the resurrection that turned the fortunes of Christianity. But the doctrine was developed after the death of Christ and took the form of the physical resurrection in later times. But opinion seems to have been divided in the apostolic age. Some seem to have believed in the resurrection of the physical body and some, especially St. Paul, in the resurrection of the "spiritual body." Thus early began the division between thinkers on the subject, but the doctrine of the resurrection of the physical body finally prevailed until comparatively recent times when it has been supplanted by most theologians who are acquainted with history and science. But it is clear that St. Paul believed in the existence of the "spiritual body" and that his interpretation of the resurrection applied to this "body" and not to the physical organism. The latter doctrine offended the philosophers almost as distinctly in that age as in the present, but the Pauline conception offered less resistance. Both views showed the emphasis which was laid upon immortality as the distinctive feature of the Christian religion, though the ethical teaching of Christ still held its place as a part of the system.

The Pauline doctrine of the "Spiritual body" does not explain itself, and it was not a new idea even in his time. The whole doctrine of the resurrection had rested upon it long before Christ. We have seen that many of the early Greek philosophers believed in "spirits" and that the doctrine which divided the

Pharisees and Sadducees was very old, in fact extending back to the time of Homer and Aeschylus. The earliest conception of the resurrection was thus one of apparitions and these apparitions were assumed to be exactly what they appeared to be; namely, some sort of physical organism, the double or counterpart of the physical. Even the Epicureans admitted its existence, sometimes calling it the "ethereal organism," but asserting that it perished at death. The idea was a very common one and in modern times is represented by the "astral body" of the Theosophists. They borrowed it from Hindu philosophers who seem never to have wholly lost sight of it. St. Paul simply picked it up from the philosophy of his time, and as he was acquainted with the "sect of the Epicureans" he may have taken it from them and simply affirmed its survival where they denied it.

All these views, however originated at the time that Christianity began to look to a philosophy to defend itself and to abandon the "miracles." After the death of Christ the "miracles" diminished or disappeared and the doctrine of immortality had to depend on something else than the repetition of the alleged resurrection to support it, especially the resurrection of the physical body. It was conceived at first in a scientific manner. Christianity in the person of Christ was not a philosophy nor a theology. It was an appeal to facts and moral precepts. In so far as the "miracles," which were, most of them, "spiritual healing," were concerned it was *an appeal to facts*. It was a scientific movement, not a metaphysical or a theological one. It appealed to facts quite as vehemently as Huxley or Tyndall, and it would have been wiser to have clung to this method instead of turning to Greco-Roman philosophy for its support, though there was no harm in doing this, if only it had remained by its earlier scientific spirit. It might have anticipated the scientific

revival in later times and have escaped the fatal conflict between science and religion which followed the discoveries of Copernicus and Newton. But the reversion to philosophy and the intellectual debauchery with a physical resurrection only helped to create the conflict, and progress lapsed for centuries.

But when Christianity began to face its difficulties, it had St. Paul to suggest a way out of them. His "spiritual body" was in line with the traditions of one school of philosophy and strange to say it was that of the materialists. Materialism or Epicureanism had finally triumphed in the last period of Greek reflective thought. It was not Plato or Aristotle that permeated the age of Christ, but Epicurus, on the one side, and the Neo-Platonists, on the other. The latter were not very intelligible, while the Epicureans were, and the generality of mankind will accept any philosophy that is clear in preference to one that is obscure and unintelligible. The Epicurean philosophy was clear and that sufficed to give it an advantage. It admitted the existence of a soul, but denied its survival. The attack on it was easy. All that its opponents had to do was to point to the fact of the "resurrection," the existence of apparitions which would seem to every man of common sense as a sufficient refutation of the materialistic claim that the soul perished at death.

The Epicureans did not see that they had no clear evidence of this annihilation. They had distinct and sensory evidence that the physical body disappeared at death, but no such evidence that the "spiritual body" was destroyed. Their belief in it was not based upon any sense perception of it during life and hence they had no such evidence of its destruction as they had of the physical body. Hence the believer in survival had only to point to apparitions to disprove the materialist. The only escape from him would be to resolve apparitions into hallucinations, and in later ages he did so.

But at that early time he could not so well press that view of them. The materialist had either to concede immortality or abandon the "spiritual body." He finally chose the latter alternative and regarded consciousness as a function of the physical organism when he could contend logically enough for its perishing at death.

But the moment that philosophy took hold of the problem, the tactics were changed. The "spiritual body" doctrine of St. Paul did not receive as much emphasis or defense as might have been necessary to make it the crucial incident in the system. The wider philosophy of the cosmos came in to predetermine the direction in which thought on this matter should move. Whether justified or not, the mind sought a general scheme of things in which immortality could be inferred as a probability or a necessity, rather than try a special doctrine for insuring it. In one respect this was wise. Any theory of the outcome of nature which does not make its peace with the whole of it will suffer in liabilities. In any case immortality must be consistent with the scheme of the universe, and this was seen very early. The Pauline doctrine, more from its associations than from its real nature, was more closely connected with the alleged miracles to secure support as readily as the general scheme of law in the world. Hence the movement of philosophy to defend immortality was through a view of the cosmos which made survival an inference from it, whether from some hypothetical nature of the soul or as a benign decree of Providence.

Christianity may be conceived as an attack on Materialism. But it could attack it in two ways. (1) It could take the course of the disciples of Christ and of St. Paul. It could appeal to real or alleged facts. In the earliest period it adopted this appeal and only came into contact with Epicureanism in the Pauline

acceptance of the "spiritual body" or "ethereal organism." Here it based its immortality on the materialistic conception of the soul and the indestructibility of matter, and it was only the abandonment by Materialism of its theory of the "ethereal organism" that offered the conflict between "science" and religion any opportunity for continuance. (2) It could adopt a general theory of the world which would necessitate the existence of spirit as its cosmic background and then regard survival as a probable or necessary consequence of this view. It was the later period that adopted this course. This was when the scientific appeal had spent itself. Let us examine the development of this course.

Greek philosophic speculation outside the atomic school had a tendency to suppose that there was only one kind of substance or reality in the world. It distinguished between different degrees of density in it, but it still believed that all reality was one in kind, whether called material or divine. There were, of course, inherent tendencies to dualism or pluralism there in spite of this monistic sympathy and this came out in the atomic doctrine and in Christianity, but before these systems triumphed the dominant tendency was to Monism, Pantheism or the belief that all reality could be reduced to one kind. Just in so far as it conceived this reality as matter and excluded from this any form of regulative intelligence it eliminated the divine from the scheme. Epicurean materialism did this more effectively than any other system. Hence Christianity faced Atheism, whether it accepted Epicureanism or Pantheism, as it saw them. Either form of philosophy was synonymous with Materialism as representing the sole explanation of things. I have shown that it attacked it first by a scientific appeal, but now it comes to the philosophic assault. Its *ad hominem* argument was directed to the Epicurean

"ethereal organism" and the fact of apparitions. But it had another resource, the philosophical one.

Greek philosophic thought had never made earnest with the doctrine of inertia. Its monistic tendencies would not permit it to regard *all* matter as inert. It regarded *some* matter as self-active. This it called living matter, and in the very distinction between "living" and non-living matter it implied inertia, but limited it to a portion of the cosmos. Of such a thing as the absolute universality of inertia as a property of matter it did not dream. If it admitted the existence of the divine this was *in* matter, and thus it only followed the traditions of Animism, the primitive conception of Spiritualism. It did not put the divine outside of the cosmos. The dualism and transcendentalism of Christianity had not yet dawned. Hence it did not require to make all matter inert, if one form of it was capable of self-activity. In the person of Socrates, Plato and Anaxagoras, and to some extent that of Aristotle and the Stoics, it recognized a divine agent as creating the cosmic order. But it did not believe that matter was created. This it regarded as eternal and indestructible, uncreated and imperishable.

When Christianity came to the question it had two courses before it. (1) It might accept the eternity of matter and adopt the ideas of the men named and maintain a divine order in the world, whether you placed this divine outside of matter, transcendental to it, or in it, immanent in matter. It might conceive God as simply co-eternal with matter and directing its changes and cosmic order. (2) It decided to take a more direct course and to cut the Gordian knot more effectively. It affirmed the universality of inertia and the phenomenal or created nature of matter. The atoms, or all material substances, were supposed to be created, as well as the cosmic order. With the supposition that matter was essentially inert and

created, phenomenal and transient, it had to go outside of matter altogether for its creative agency. This it made God and endowed him with self-activity as opposed to the inertia of matter. It was forced by the logic of the situation to regard the divine as spirit and not as matter. Matter was not self-existent, but dependent, and with spirit as thus at the background of all things. There would be no difficulty in protecting the possibility of survival on such a basis as this. It might not prove it to be a fact, but with spirit as the absolute or background of the cosmos it would be natural to think it might respect its own creations, especially if it had implanted in them some measure of hope and moral law.

This philosophy was based upon a sort of dualism. I say "sort of dualism" because it was not so radical as Manichæanism which made two eternal principles in nature. Christianity conceded the existence of matter, but it refused to make it eternal, as did Greek thought. It was a dependent existence that matter had. The eternal was divine and spiritual. With this doctrine it could easily construct its theory of the destruction of the physical world at some date in the future, though it did not stop to consider the inconsistency of this with its doctrine of the physical resurrection. But in the course of its development it unconsciously modified this by maintaining that this physical body was refined and "spiritualized," probably influenced by the Pauline doctrine of the "spiritual body." All this aside, however, the chief thing is its turning the tables on Greek thought by supplanting the dominance of matter by that of spirit. The Greek started with sense perception for determining his idea of the world and though he admitted a transcendental world, he still made it material and like the world of sense in its properties. Its difference from the sensible world was only in density or degree, not in kind. But

its inertia even partly granted left some problems unsolved, as is apparent in the attraction and repulsion of Empedocles and the "swerving" of the atoms in Epicurus. But by setting up a self-active force and making it spiritual, not material, Christianity established a distinction in kind between matter and spirit, accounted for change, and made the dominance of the transcendental the primary doctrine, while it made the material ephemeral and phenomenal. In other words, while it admitted the existence of matter, it set up a reality over it as creative and regulative while it made this reality intelligent. With Greek thought the divine was but regulative and not creative, and also limited in its regulative agency. With Christianity this power was both creative and regulative and with no limitations on its power.

With faith in this power men would have little difficulty in maintaining some doctrine of immortality, whether they obtained evidence for it or not, and so Christianity ruled history for many centuries. But a day of reckoning came with the revival of science. The first revolution to theological system was the discovery of the indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy. It was, of course, Copernican astronomy that marked the rise of the scientific spirit and the crucial attack on the theological cosmogony, but the transcendental philosophy of Christianity was not primarily affected until the indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy were discovered. These completely reversed the tables on religious thought. What had been regarded as created and phenomenal, now became eternal, and with the natural tendencies of the human mind toward a single reality behind all things, "spirit" began to be resolved into a phenomenon of matter. There was a return to the scientific point of view that starts with sensory experience as the basis for judging the nature of reality

and the supersensible remains to prove its claims. These claims are not taken for granted, and when they do not prove their right to recognition, the actual facts of experience, whether physical or mental, were referred to the material for explanation. Consciousness, instead of being a phenomenon of some immaterial substance or reality is explained by regarding it as a phenomenon of matter. Such a thing as a soul was not needed in its scheme, either to explain consciousness or to save such ethics as the physical life might support.

This theory grew with the advance of science. Chemistry, physiology and biology increased the facts in defense of it and abnormal psychology in particular, with its correlation of brain lesions and the variations in the integrity of consciousness, seemed to make materialism invulnerable. Disease, accident, autopsies, insanity and every resource in the field of human observation confirmed the conclusion, until only sophisticated philosophers and the religious mind, which knew little and cared as little about science, still clung to the rejection of materialism, the first class from equivocation and disingenuous thinking and the latter from ignorance of the facts and the problem. It has been the dominant view of science almost ever since its revival.

A large class of men both in science and philosophy still deny materialism, but a little examination of their terms will easily explain that and to this we shall have to give some immediate attention. But these deniers of it cannot deny the fact that historically—except with Tertullian, and he did not accept atomic doctrines as held by the materialists of his age—materialism has always denied survival after death. The atomic doctrine of Epicurus and Democritus did not make this necessary, because it admitted the existence of a soul, or ethereal organism and did not regard consciousness as a function of the grosser physical body. But when

the "spiritual body" or "ethereal organism" was abandoned in philosophy, and when the atomic theory was modified so that consciousness could be made a function of a compound or composite organism, the denial of immortality became a logical necessity, unless the action of Providence was invoked, as it was in the doctrine of the physical resurrection, to restore the physical body and its personality to existence. On any other assumption, survival could not be defended, and materialism became the point of view which implied by necessity that consciousness could not survive. The natural consequence was that all who had to protect themselves against religious hostility found it to their interest to deny materialism. But this class did not always show any special or positive interest in the doctrine of immortality. They could expect the plebs to draw an inference from their denial, which they themselves did not draw, and their own interests were saved the risks of persecution.

But it will be well to call attention here at some length to the sophistication which plays an equivocal role in this subject. If a psychic researcher tells you that materialism is the only theory that can be maintained by science, the philosopher may rise and say that he does not believe that science supports materialism and perhaps that he does not believe in materialism as having any foundation whatever in its support. But he usually evades the question of the survival of personality. He has no missionary zeal for immortality and stigmatizes psychic research as unnecessary for the defense of survival. He may ridicule the psychic researcher for saying a word of apology for materialism or for admitting that materialism has any strength or support whatever. Indeed many a philosopher will speak in confident tones that materialism has long since been refuted and abandoned and perhaps sneer at you

for being ignorant of the history of philosophy and scientific opinion generally.

But this type of mind is easily reduced to silence. It knows where its bread is buttered and that, if it boldly advocated materialism or recognized its strength it would not be wanted in a philosophic chair where the interests of religious faith have to be defended, or at least not antagonized. He can conjure up a meaning of the term which he can deny and save himself the danger of friction with those in authority. The fact is the term "materialism" does service for two totally different conceptions and unless this is recognized, the philosopher will have things all his own way. These two conceptions define or determine two distinct types of materialism. They may be called naive and philosophical materialism. In the controversies of the past no such division has been adopted. Indeed the parties opposing materialism did not dare admit the two types, as it would embarrass them in the concealment of their views on immortality, about which they did not wish to say anything and which they did not dare oppose. They might permit the public to infer what they did not admit or believe, and they wanted to escape any defensive word for the theory.

Now it was *naive* materialism that the philosopher has always denied. He either did not deny philosophic materialism, or he evaded a confession of belief in it for the same reasons that led him to deny the naive form of it. Naive materialism is based upon sensation and the ideas which most men have when forming their ideas of things from it. It is closely related to one form of Realism, presentative Realism as distinct from the hypothetical. Presentative or naive Realism supposes that the external world is exactly as it appears in sensation. It asserts that we see things as they are and does not think that we get our knowledge of reality from inferences or by some internal faculty which is

above sense. It takes the world as it is revealed in sense perception. It is directly opposed to what is called Idealism which is supposed to deny the criterial nature of sensation in the judgments of reality and an external world. That is, Realism and Idealism are the two opposing theories regarding the nature of reality. Idealism is most closely associated with intellectual and non-sensory processes in the judgments of reality while Realism is more closely associated with sensation and sensory processes in those judgments. Realism assumes that the material world is rightly known in sensation and Idealism that it is rightly known only by intellectual and non-sensory processes. The opposition between them is quite radical.

Philosophic materialism, however, is not based upon sensation or any conception of reality dependent on sensation. It is as much based upon the intellectual processes as Idealism. In all its history it has eschewed sensation and sensory criteria for reality. The atoms of both the ancient and modern philosophers were *supersensible*, quite as supersensible as spirit. In that respect philosophic materialism is at one with Idealism and always has been. It would be as distinctly opposed to naive Realism as any form of Idealism.

The fact is that there are two pairs of antitheses here whose definition may clear up the confusion. One is the opposition between Materialism and Spiritualism and the other is that between Realism and Idealism. The first pair are metaphysical theories about the nature of reality; the second pair are epistemological theories about the source of our knowledge of reality. This distinction will mean that a Realist may be either a materialist or a spiritualist, and an idealist in the theory of knowledge may be either a materialist or a spiritualist in metaphysics. But there is no necessary antagonism between philosophical materialism and Idealism as usually held. It is only when a man

equivocates with the term Idealism, especially the historical and accepted meaning of the term, that he can find any opposition between it and philosophic materialism.

It was the result of Kant's reflections that this confusion arose. Kant recognized that it was Materialism and Spiritualism that were opposed to each other. But as his arguments about immortality resulted in an agnostic conclusion, the term Spiritualism was dropped as an unsustainable theory, and the meaning of the term Materialism was changed over to the sensational conception of the situation and Idealism opposed to it. Kant does not talk about Realism. He says little about Materialism other than that it is the correct antithesis to Spiritualism, while his adoption of Idealism and his silence about Realism leaves him with a tacit alteration of the term "materialism" in subsequent thought for an antithesis to Idealism, and that consecrated the naive sensory conception of it as the one which could easily be denied, while the philosopher could remain agnostic or silent on the question of immortality.

In the antithesis between Materialism and Spiritualism, if you deny Materialism, you must affirm Spiritualism and with it survival. If you deny Spiritualism and with it immortality you must affirm Materialism. In the antithesis between Realism and Idealism, the assertion of one denies the other. But considering that naive materialism or Realism and philosophical materialism are not convertible, the denial of naive materialism does not imply the truth of Spiritualism. Nor does it imply the falsity of philosophical materialism. The two theories may be as strictly opposed to each other as the other two antitheses. But it is the interest of the philosopher to deny "materialism" in order to escape the accusation of denying survival, and so he hits upon that conception of it which will save him

the necessity of argument on the latter issue and he can leave the plebs to infer what they please. It is philosophical materialism to which psychic research is opposed and whose strength it frankly concedes, from the standpoint of normal experience, and all scientific results in that field. It may also oppose naive materialism, but not because it fears its denial of immortality, but simply because it is idealistic in its theory of knowledge. The denial of sensational or naive materialism affirms Idealism, but it does not affirm Spiritualism. But the defender of Idealism is quite willing to have the plebs believe that it does affirm it, so that he may escape the duty to give further evidence. It is not naive materialism that the psychic researcher apologizes for, or defends from the standpoint of normal experience, but philosophical materialism and the philosopher who evades this issue is either ignorant of his calling or he is deliberately equivocating.

Nor does the philosopher who opposes materialism, when ignoring or ridiculing psychic research, gain anything by saying that he does so because materialism cannot explain consciousness. He knows that, if he admits consciousness to be a function of the organism, he gains nothing by denying naive materialism, and so he conjures up some way to say that materialism has never reduced consciousness to any equivalent in physical phenomena. He denies the application of the conservation of energy to mental phenomena. He denies the causal nexus, the material causal nexus, between physical and mental phenomena. He asserts with great confidence that physiology, biology, and other sciences have not reduced and cannot reduce consciousness or mental phenomena to any physical equivalent. He expects by this either to prove the existence of soul or to enable him to evade the issue. He never seems to discover that, if you did so reduce it, you would absolutely prove the spiritualistic theory. He does not

see that his own position does not carry survival with it and that he only paves the way for skepticism and agnosticism, which he thinks he has refuted by denying the success of reducing mental to physical phenomena. To make them interconvertible would be to make them identical in terms of the conservation of energy and that would be to make mental phenomena always existent, at least as parallel with physical or as continuous with it. That would be a conclusion which he either opposes or denies where it would be his interest to affirm it.

Now it must be emphasized that philosophical materialism does not depend on proving a nexus of the same kind between physical and mental phenomena. It does not depend on affirming that it can reduce mental phenomena to physical ones. Its problem is not primarily an explanatory one in that sense of the term. It is not "explaining" consciousness in terms of its antecedents. It is concerned with *evidence* for a fact; namely, the dependence of consciousness on the organism for its *existence*, not for its *nature*. The philosophical materialist may not know any more about the nature of consciousness than the opponent of materialism. He is not trying to "explain" consciousness in terms of antecedents or equivalents. He is occupied with an evidential problem. What he contends for is that all the evidence is for the fact that it is a function of the brain, whether he can tell how this is possible or not. It is not *how* it depends on the brain, but the fact of it that concerns him, and he maintains that all the facts and evidence of normal experience favors that view, and he will abide his time in determining *how* this is possible.

The man who asserts that we have not reduced consciousness to its physical equivalent is only equivocating or indulging in subterfuges, if he supposes that this has anything to do with the main question, which

is a question of fact, not of understanding. The modern question is an *evidential* one, and less an *explanatory* problem. "Explanation" has various forms and we cannot pick out one of them, after the analogy of the conservation of energy, and neglect others. It is this equivocal import of the term that has led to the emphasis of evidential problems, or at least encouraged it. In any case, science is primarily interested in the evidence for the genuineness of facts and explanation is secondary in importance. It does not seek *how* anything takes place until it proves that it *does* occur. The first problem of philosophical materialism is the evidence that consciousness is so associated with the organism as to create a presumption or proof that it is a function of that organism, and once that is established evidentially, it awaits refutation. It does not require to understand all the mysteries of mind before defending its thesis as a fact. Its maxim is not, "How can I understand the relation of consciousness to the brain?" but "What is it as a fact." It relies upon a simple set of facts to support its claims. It finds that consciousness is always associated with physical structure and organism and that, when this structure disappears, all evidence in normal life that a particular individual consciousness still exists disappears with it. Barring the consideration of psychic phenomena there is no escape from its contention. You may think and say all you please about the failure to "explain" consciousness. That is not its task or at least not its first task.

Evidence is the first duty of every sane intellectual effort and all philosophic speculations about the nature of consciousness have passed into the limbo of the imagination and illusion. Science has come to dictate terms to philosophy in that respect. It demands that any hope of a surviving consciousness must base itself on facts which prove that the standard of philosophic

materialism is not final in its conclusions. It is right in insisting on the correctness of its method, and this is the uniformity of coexistence and sequence as determinative of what hypothesis shall be entertained in regard to the relation of consciousness and the organism. If you wish to refute philosophical materialism you must isolate an individual consciousness and have evidence that it can act independently of the organism with which it had normally been associated. This is the method of difference or isolation as distinct from that of agreement or association.

All that philosophical materialism can do is to ignore supernormal phenomena—or disprove them—and concentrate the emphasis upon the normal facts of experience which show the association of consciousness with the organism and the absence of normal evidence of its continuity when that association is interrupted by death. It thus conforms to the maxim that regulates all convictions in normal life about everyday affairs, and if it cannot employ the method of difference, or isolation, there is no appeal from its verdict. But psychic research comes in with the proposal to apply the method of collecting facts which prove that this consciousness has continued in existence in a state of dissociation from the physical organism. These facts attest or favor the hypothesis that we get into some form of communication with discarnate consciousness, and while that communication is not the object of the research, it is a part of the conclusion from the facts which can be proved to be indubitably supernormal. But the main point is that philosophical materialism can be challenged only from the point of view of evidence, not from that of explanation.

This evidence consists summarily in supernormal information that constitutes facts in support of the personal identity of the dead. It may require more or less to establish this fact, but it is the type of fact

that I am defining here. The necessity of doing this is that we no longer take the medieval point of view that the existence of soul guarantees the survival of personal identity. Instances of secondary personality among the living, or even ordinary amnesia in normal life, tend to raise the question whether a soul might not survive and yet not retain any memory of its personal identity. The theosophist who accepts reincarnation defends this point of view universally. Hence it is important to ascertain whether the same stream of consciousness with its terrestrial memories survives as determining the only practical interest which any one can have regarding immortality or survival.

It is to this issue that psychic research is devoted, and it challenges philosophical materialism, not in regard to any contention about the nature of either the soul or consciousness, but in regard to the fact of supernormal knowledge and survival. It does not dispute the fact that the evidence in normal life is predominantly for materialism. It only contests its sufficiency. Naive materialism it can ignore, as that is either harmless or has to be transformed into the philosophic type before it can have any interest for intelligent men. That is only a convenient foil to one's cowardice, ignorance, or hypocrisy. It is the basis of ethical materialism which does not dispute survival, though it may dispute the ideals that are supposed to determine salvation in any world whatever, material or spiritual. It is philosophic materialism that constitutes the enemy of spiritualism, and science has so fully determined the method of solving all problems of fact that it demands and must have the evidential problem solved first.

I have said that circumstances make this problem one of personal identity, not the nature or the dignity of consciousness. That personal identity can be proved only by the most trivial facts. It is not to be proved

by learned revelations or fine literature, either really or apparently coming from a transcendental world, but by trivial memories of the discarnate. The case is like evidence in a civil court. It is not a man's style in literary productions that are invoked to prove a crime, but his boot tracks or some mark on his body. The more trivial and exceptional the fact, the better the evidence. It is the same in the proof of survival. We must have the most trivial facts in a man's memory to prove his personal identity, and they must either not coincide with similar facts in the lives of others or they must articulate with a large number of incidents in the life of the individual so that the collective mass of them cannot be duplicated in the life of any other person.

The problem, then, is not the nature of matter nor the nature of consciousness. We may assume consciousness to be anything, if we desire. While we can hardly conceive it to be a mode of motion, we are too ignorant of its nature to deny that possibility, as we cannot conceive such motion in matter as is assumed in the undulatory and corpuscular theories of light, heat and electrical phenomena, though the evidence points to its being a fact. Any attempt to prove a spiritual interpretation of life by appeals to the nature of consciousness is doomed to failure, not because we know that consciousness is something distinct from physical phenomena, but because we have no means of proving that distinction beyond the most superficial appearances. There is no doubt that consciousness does not appear to be a mode of motion and that it does appear to be very different from it, but the naive mind cannot see superficially that sound is a mere mode of motion and this is still more true of light, heat and electricity.

In science we are constantly forced to go beyond appearances and are as constantly in the supersensible world for determining the nature of phenomena and

seek for the explanation of them. For all that we know consciousness may be one of the "occult" physical forces, so that we have to seek the solution of our problem independently of all theories about the nature of it. The problem has become wholly one of its *connections*, and not of its nature. It is evidential, not explanatory primarily in terms of its antecedents. What we know in normal experience is that consciousness is always associated with physical organism and when that physical organism perishes, we lack the evidence in normal experience of its survival or existence independently of the body. The evidence proves connections of a uniform kind and if consciousness is not a function of the body with which it is connected there must be evidence of its dissociation and continued existence, or we must stand by the agnostic doctrine that we do not know, or accept the materialistic hypothesis as the only one on which there is any positive scientific evidence.

The materialism that is based upon sensation and the view that the nature of reality is represented in that sensory phenomenon is totally irrelevant to this issue. In all science and philosophy we transcend sense perception as the criterion of reality, though it is necessarily an intermediary in the determination of it. Hence philosophical materialism may hold good even when sensory materialism is denied, and that is the position under consideration. Philosophical materialism is based upon the *connections* of consciousness regardless both of its nature and of the theory that sensory experience is the measure of reality. The issue has gone far beyond the problems of the nature of anything and rests upon the scientific demand for concrete evidence of a fact. Any phenomena that are provably supernormal and representative of the personal identity of the dead will justify the hypothesis of survival of an individual consciousness, and it is

not concerned with any explanations of how it is possible, but merely with the question whether the facts do not prove the fact of continuance after death. That is, one set of acts is construed as evidence of another fact whether we know its nature or not. For instance, we have evidence that evolution is a fact, though we do not base the admission on any knowledge of the nature of matter.

Again we have evidence as to the shape of the moon, though we have never seen one-half of it. The evidence is for a fact, not for a theory of the nature of that fact. Hence the first step in the present problem is to estimate the evidence for survival as a fact, and we may then enter into speculations as to how it is possible. We can study the nature of a thing only after we admit it to be a fact. It might even be true that survival is the essential feature of the nature of consciousness and that this survival might not be involved in or implied by any other characteristic of it. Hence the first thing to do is always to prove the fact and then we may discuss metaphysical questions.

Now scientific materialism is based upon the proved connections of consciousness, not upon theories of the constitution of matter nor upon theories of the sensible or supersensible nature of reality. It is not concerned with any metaphysical theories of matter or of anything else. It simply asks for evidence of *facts*. Does consciousness depend on material organism for its existence or does it not? What facts have you to prove that it can exist independently of the organism? If we know it only in connection with that organism and have no evidence for its existence in dissociation from that organism, we must at least remain silent in assertion. The materialist will have the first right of way so far as the evidence goes. The idealist cannot, and in fact does not, contend that he has evidence for survival. He only lingers in the limbo

of an extinct metaphysics for a faith in survival, not for evidence. Philosophical materialism still survives after sensational materialism has been abandoned.

Now the evidence for the fact of survival is abundant enough, whether you regard it as scientifically proved or not. For the present writer it is scientifically proved by such abundance of evidence for personal identity that he does not deem it necessary even to enter into a summary of it here. Readers must go to the original records and discussions for this evidence. We have here to consider only the difficulties and objections in accepting that evidence as conclusive. There are just three of these to notice. They are (1) what we mean by *spirit*, (2) the theory of cosmic consciousness, and (3) the place of telepathy or mind reading in the problem.

I take it that one of the difficulties with the spiritistic hypothesis is the conception which many people have of "spirit." The intelligent scientific man and the philosophers ought to have no difficulty with this matter. Unfortunately both classes are as involved in illusions about it as the layman. Or if they are not under illusion about it, they are accusable of intellectual dishonesty about it. They may take either horn of this dilemma that they please. The psychic researcher, where he has any scientific knowledge at all, is not fooled regarding what may be called the nature of spirit. He simply regards it as a stream of consciousness with its earthly memories intact and he may not speculate as to how it may subsist. He simply claims evidence for the fact of its continuity and leaves open all questions as to its ground or basis.

Most people form their ideas of spirits by the pictures of them which artists, newspapers, and periodicals make of them, or from the pictographic representations which their own imaginations make of such things. There is no adequate thinking of them as causal agents

supersensible to their apparent effects on the mind. They think of them in terms of their sensory experiences, precisely as they do in all philosophic matters. It is easier to talk about them in terms of sensory pictures than to recognize the facts. Art, poetry, literature, magazine pictures, stories of apparitions, theosophic representations; that is, sensory thinking and the needs of communications with each other about them, make men imagine that spirits necessarily have the forms with which they are represented, either in the symbolism of the various arts or in the representations of supernormal experiences. Besides these, many alleged communications, and in fact genuine communications about them, represent them in bodily form. The doctrine of the "spiritual body," the "astral body," or the "ethereal organism," represents them as having *quasi*-material form, and it is quite natural for minds, which are not accustomed to think in terms of supersensible or transcendental causes, to think of them as merely realities like physical ones, except that they do not appear to normal sense perception. All this may actually be true, so far as the present writer is concerned. He is not stating the common conception to refute it or to ridicule it, but merely to show that it is the common conception, and then to point out that it does not say the last word in regard to what the causal reality actually is. No doubt the appearance of "spirits" in apparitions and in the representations of communications about them encourages ordinary belief in their *quasi*-material reality and form. But art, imagination and popular pictures add to this until it is almost impossible to make the public see the limitations under which any such ideas can be maintained.

Philosophers who abandon sensation and sensory experience as the criterion of the nature of reality, physical or otherwise; ought not to have any difficulties with the problem. They are always telling us that

“spirit” is not sensible in form; that it is not physical in appearance; that it does not occupy space; and in every way eschewing the sensible representations of it. But when they wish to accuse the psychic researcher of folly, they attack the common mind for its conceptions and do not take the trouble to educate or redeem it from its naive ways of thinking. It suffices for them to employ the antithesis between matter and mind, an antithesis which they may have pushed beyond its legitimate limits, and thus to disqualify the pictorial representations of spirit without making their own clear or tenable. They may be dealt with separately here. We are at present concerned with the common tendency to conceive spirits as they are pictured in the imagination.

Now the present writer makes no such representation of them. He simply conceives “spirit” as a stream of consciousness, or as a group of mental states with a memory. Or if this sounds too much like a so-called phenomenal definition of it, he will say that “spirit” is that which thinks, feels, and wills apart from the physical organism. This definition does not assert or imply the existence of such a thing, but only says that it will be this when found, and the evidence of psychic research sustains the fact that it does exist.

The evidence that it is something is found in the facts which show that the stream of consciousness can exist independently of the organism. It is not necessary to decide *what* a spirit is in terms of comparison with something else as a condition of admitting its existence. All that we require is to know that the evidence points to the continuity of a particular personal stream and its memory apart from the organism and then we may leave to further investigation the determination of its place in the scheme of reality. We may make it some fine form of matter, if we like, as even the Epicurean materialists admitted, or we may

make it some form of "ether" or supersensible reality that does not have the properties of matter. The physicists of the last century had no difficulty in supposing something of this kind in their system of imponderable "fluids." Their ether and corpuscles of to-day only repeat the same general ideas in other terms. They assume a whole system of supersensible realities which are as far from the perception of the senses as any Cartesian "spirit."

It is only the habit of conceiving "spirit" as the negation of matter that has created the real or apparent difficulty with the problem. But physical science has made us so familiar with imponderable "fluids," with ether hypotheses, with inconceivably small corpuscles, with ions and electrons and the like, that there can be no difficulty in imagining something of the kind to explain the attachments of personal consciousness as a function or activity of it. But all these metaphysical hypotheses are not necessary in the scientific problem. We may concede that consciousness may attach to any of the philosophical postulates, and limit ourselves to the accumulation of the evidence that it can exist as a fact independently of the organism. We therefore adopt no other conception of it for our first step in the solution of the problem than the idea that personality is a stream of consciousness, a group of mental states having a memory and center of interest. This does not require us to picture it in the form of an astral or spiritual body, even though there may be such a thing as the condition of that consciousness existing now and hereafter.

This method of approach to the problem simply analyzes it into separate issues. If you may like, one of them is the phenomenal and the other the metaphenomenal or noumenal problem. The first is the scientific and the latter is the metaphysical question. We may or may not regard the latter as either legiti-

mate or soluble. One school of men, those devoted to what is called empirical science, will say that the nature of anything is an insoluble problem and it is not necessary to dispute the issue with them. The other school may feel that it is entirely possible to get an answer to their question, but we do not find it necessary either to affirm or deny this possibility. It is certain that the phenomenal question must first be settled before the metaphysical one can be taken up, if science is to have any word in the solution of it.

In the present age science and its investigation of facts raise the standard of evidence in all problems, and it has to be satisfied before the speculative mind has any rights. The phenomenal problem is simply that which endeavors to ascertain facts that require us to suppose that consciousness is not a function of the physical organism. We have shown that, as long as we know consciousness only in association with the body and as long as we have no evidence for its continued existence after the dissolution of the body, we at least have no evidence for the fact of survival, whatever we may believe about its possibility. To affirm it with any degree of confidence as a fact, not merely as a possibility, requires us to produce facts which necessarily imply that continuity. Science has pressed its claims and evidential problems so far that a pious belief is no longer sufficient to decide the issue even as a working hypothesis. The belief lives on only as an emotional hope, a will to act on its possibility whether we have any assurance, even the slightest, or not. But minds in that condition cannot argue the case with any success. They can only go off into solitude and assert it without proof or evidence. But if we can obtain facts such as veridical apparitions or mediumistic communications that are indubitable evidence of supernormal knowledge and of discarnate personality, we may challenge the dogmatism of materialism with

its insistence on an hypothesis which it never proved, though it had the evidence of normal experience in its support.

What we do is to insist that "spirit" is, or at least implies, the existence of an independent stream of consciousness which we shall not picture to ourselves as a *quasi*-material form, even though we ultimately find such a thing to be a fact. We subscribe to the philosophical conception which always finds that naive sense conceptions are not the final standards of reality.

The phenomena in psychic research which re-inforce this view are those of apparitions and the pictographic phenomena in mediumistic communications. These latter offer the solution of all the perplexities in apparitions. The one thing that invited ridicule in apparitions was the existence of "spirit clothes" and allied phenomena, such as the cigar manufactories, the whisky sodas, and brick houses of Sir Oliver Lodge's son. The same phenomena or conceptions are reported *ad nauseam* in the literature of Spiritualism and have always given the scientific man and the philosopher pause when asked if he believed in such things. But the pictographic process in the phenomena of mediumship is the clue out of this perplexity. It shows, as we shall indicate later, that thoughts in the transcendental or spiritual world, in the process of transmission, become phantasms or hallucinations representing *quasi*-material things, or apparently physical things. The first temptation is to interpret them from the standpoint of naive sense perception and so take them just as they appear to be; that is, to represent "spirit" as a reality exactly like matter in all but its ponderability.

But the examination of them shows indubitably that, whatever the thought may be, its representative in the mind of the living percipient is a phantasm, not a material reality, and that once admitted, we have a clear explanation of apparitions and all *quasi*-material

realities within the domain of psychic experiences. This requires us to think of "spirit" as we would of a physical object which becomes visible only by luminous vibrations which are neither visible themselves nor similar to the object, if the ordinary philosophical and scientific theories be assumed as correct. We abstract from the appearance and interpret it in the light of *causality*, not of *identity* with the phantasmal representation. We can postpone or defer the causal theories until we have more knowledge. We simply have the evidence that the conscious and personal stream of mental states exist still. How they may exist is a secondary question.

I may now take up the second difficulty which seems to harass some minds. It is the cosmic reservoir theory, sometimes also expressed as that of the cosmic consciousness or *anima mundi*. Professor James used the former expression and a number of other people the latter form. The conception which Professor James used evaded all questions of personality in the cosmic basis for explaining mediumistic phenomena purporting to be communications from the dead. The other expression is but a subterfuge for the idea of God. Professor James had picked his idea up from some irresponsible thinkers like Thompson Jay Hudson and a few French writers, and it meant that our mental experiences are impressed or deposited on the cosmic ether or physical Absolute and that mediums are lucky enough to tap that reservoir at the appropriate point to obtain the memories of the right person and read them off as you would the symbols of a phonograph plate.

Now Professor James had no evidence whatever for the existence of any such cosmic reservoir. It was pure imagination, an irresponsible invention without defense or apology for itself, and then relied on analogies which do not apply to the problem. You cannot invent

hypotheses in this or any other field. They must first be shown to be facts in normal life and phenomena before we can appeal to them for explaining these new phenomena, and Professor James produced no reason or facts for assuming such a theory. Grant the existence of it, what evidence had he or any one else for the assumption or assertion that our thoughts were impressed on it? If they were impressed, how could a medium read off the impressions? The analogy of the phonograph record does not hold, and neither does any other physical record of the kind. We have first to agree on the symbolic nature of such a record to make it intelligible to ourselves, much more to others. We might conceive thought or mental states making impressions on sensitive plates, but how could any one else read them when we cannot transmit thoughts to those who understand our own language? We can only transmit mechanical effects and not thoughts. We have to interpret mechanical effects which have first to be agreed upon as symbolical of certain mental effects or sensations. Professor James is thus in an *a priori* wilderness of impenetrable density and complexity, with all sorts of assumptions and analogies without evidence and without intelligibility. There was no scientific excuse whatever for advancing such an hypothesis. It only fools the groundlings and does not deceive intelligent scientific men.

On the other hand, if thoughts are deposited in the ether or in the cosmic reservoir and are directly legible by mediumistic minds, why this selectiveness to stimulate or impersonate the discarnate? Why does not the mind of the medium represent an inextricable confusion of myriads of thoughts deposited from all sorts of people and superposed upon deposits of whole generations of human beings? Had Professor James no sense of humor on this point? Could credulity stretch itself farther? It is the finite selectiveness of the facts

which you have to explain, especially when that is accompanied by phonetic confusions just as we would expect them in any spiritistic efforts to transmit thoughts through an organism having phonetic difficulties like the phonograph. You cannot look at the facts in the most superficial way without seeing the inherent absurdity of such a theory, and it would never have had a moment's consideration, even by laymen, if it had not been for the popularity of Professor James.

Moreover we may go farther. If our thoughts and memories are thus deposited in the cosmic reservoir, so that they can be seen and read by the medium in the selective way that must be assumed to account for them even approximately, what is the difference between that and "spirits?" Any continued existence of my memories in that reservoir is tantamount to my personal identity. That conception must imply or involve my present existence in that reservoir. My present thoughts are mere centers of activity in that reservoir and I have no objection to that view of them. As latent impressions in that deposit reviving them is only a manifestation of memory such as I have now in my thoughts. You cannot set up a reservoir after death without assuming that it is here before it and I either have no evidence for the foreign deposit of my thoughts in that reservoir or I am the same part of it now. This latter view includes my survival as easily as it does my present existence. The same thought will appear in the examination of the second form of the hypothesis and I need not elaborate it further now.

But the critic might say that the thoughts are not impressed upon this etheric or cosmic plate as thoughts, but merely as mechanical signs of them and that they are interpreted by the medium. But I have already answered that conception of the case by demanding that

we produce evidence that consciousness produces any such mechanical effects anywhere, even on the brain. That evidence has to be produced before the hypothesis can be advanced to explain supernormal knowledge. The theory of Professor James would dispense with telepathy of any and all sorts. There is no use to suppose that a medium or any one else is reading a living mind in any instance, but only that he or she is reading the plate in the cosmic reservoir! You explain everything or nothing by such an hypothesis, and I am sure that science will demand some sort of evidence that consciousness produces such impressions on a cosmic receptacle before it will permit its application in the way assumed by Professor James and others.

The hypothesis of cosmic consciousness as a supposed rival of the spiritistic theory is amusing. It differs from the cosmic reservoir theory only in the implication of personal as distinct from impersonal reality as the background of things. It is either identical with one form of the spiritistic theory or it has no relation to it whatever. Dr. Hodgson held the theory of cosmic consciousness and definitely asserted that he preferred to say "spirits" as a more intelligible form of expression for what was expressible in terms of a pantheistic view. This is easily proved. The cosmic reservoir theory has to depend on mechanical impressions on the ether or cosmic receptacle and has its plausibility in the assumption that the deposit is not a mental state while the perception of this impression by the psychic restores the original datum to existence in the mind of the percipient. It was laden with improbabilities and impossibilities, but the cosmic consciousness theory starts with the idea that the Absolute is conscious or is consciousness, and then supposes that our thoughts and memories are deposited in it and tapped by the medium's mind.

But the deposit of any thought or memory other

than its own in the cosmic consciousness either repeats the cosmic reservoir theory with telepathy assumed between the individual and the cosmic mind or it implies that our present mental states are a part of the cosmic consciousness. Either view assumes that we are *now* an expression of that Absolute; that our personality now is a spark of it and to think of it as perishing is impossible. The memory of our present states would be the same thing as continued existence, because that is all we are now. The monistic theory must make our personality a stream in the cosmic mind and that secures the possibility of its continuance. All that we require is to ascertain the facts which show that existence in it and the persistence of it in the memories of the cosmic mind as deposited in it by our being a part of it, a stream of it, now. It is absurd to suppose that a theory of cosmic consciousness establishes any *a priori* argument against survival. The pantheistic theory must inevitably imply that survival.

The whole difficulty at this point was caused by misunderstanding the philosophy of Spinoza. He denied the "personality" of God and the personal immortality of the soul. So far he would seem to be clearly opposed to survival of personality. But you cannot interpret his denials rightly without taking account of his affirmations. He also affirmed that the rational part of man was immortal and that thought or consciousness was an essential attribute of God. Why then did he deny his personality and personal immortality. The answer to this is very simple.

Early Christianity accepted the Pauline doctrine of the spiritual body. It at the same time set up some sort of antithesis between matter and mind. It supposed that matter did not have any of the properties of mind and that mind had none of the properties of matter. But it did not remain entirely consistent with this. Its doctrine of a spiritual body implied that the

spirit occupied space and as long as space was not regarded as a property of matter, it would not discover any inconsistency. But its dualism developed into a radical and absolute antithesis in the philosophy of Descartes. This philosopher maintained that mind and matter had no common attributes whatever. The essential attributes of matter were extension and motion, but without consciousness. The essential attribute of mind was consciousness without either extension or motion. They had no resemblances to each other in any respect whatever. It thus deprived personality of any spatial quality. It could not hold to the doctrine of the spiritual body because that occupied space. As the popular doctrine of personality or a person implied that the mind or soul occupied space, Spinoza, when he adopted the philosophy of Descartes and transformed it from dualism into monism, had to deny the survival of "personality" because he had to deny that it was a spatial datum; namely, he had to deny the doctrine of the spiritual body as held by St. Paul and his followers. In denying "personal" immortality he was only denying the survival of a spatial reality. He was not denying the survival of the stream of consciousness. If he had assumed what some of the philosophers assumed; namely, that "personality" was a stream of consciousness, he would have affirmed personal survival. He actually affirmed the survival of the rational part of man and this rational part was the stream of mental states which were not spatial. It was only a question of terms and of the way we should conceive or represent the soul.

His conception of God can be treated in the same way. In denying his "personality" which was conceived as a "spiritual body" and so human in form he was trying to eliminate the anthropomorphic conception of the divine. Though he admitted that God occupied space and had consciousness as an essential attribute,

he denied his personality only as anthropomorphically conceived while that conception of personality represented in mental states was attributed to him as distinctly and emphatically as any theistic theory. Again it is only a question of terms and their definition.

Now he is said to have said that at death we are absorbed in the Absolute or God just as a drop of water is in the ocean. This simile has been taken as showing how our personality is lost or annihilated. We live a life of individuality and then are absorbed or lost in the infinite. But those who refer to this as indicating how we may be destroyed are only hugging an illusion, and if Spinoza used the analogy he was deceiving himself as well as others; for according to his own philosophy such an annihilation was impossible. It was the spatial form that was absorbed, not necessarily the mental stream. If he wanted to contend for personal annihilation, he should have more distinctly defined his fundamental conceptions or given up the survival of the rational part of man. The analogy of the drop of water is exceedingly illusory. If the drop of water be an indivisible unit, it is not lost in the ocean or the Absolute. It retains its individuality, just as the atoms do in physics and chemistry, or the ions and electrons, assuming that they take the place of the ultimateness of the atoms. A drop of water cannot be lost in the ocean, any more than a shot can be lost in a quart of them, if it have the individuality of a shot.

But the fact is that a drop of water is a divisible and collective whole. When it is put into the ocean, it may divide and there is no discoverable line of demarcation between it and the surrounding environment. If it be indivisible, it may not be distinguishable from its environment by perception, but it will preserve its individuality, just as a drop of oil will do in water. There is no objection to this closer spatial relation

of a drop of water thrown into the ocean than when apart from it, as an analogy for survival. That is, I should no more object to survival on that analogy than on the one that talks so glibly about separateness and "individuality." For individuality is not so much spatial separation as it is indivisibility, even though it is perfectly continuous with its environment. Moreover, if a drop of water be divisible it will not actually divide without interference from external agency. It might be put into the ocean and forever remain as it was, if no disturbance from the surrounding water or other external force acted on it. So we may press the case from either of two points of view.

If we press the analogy between mind and a drop of water we have two conceptions of it. First assume that the drop of water is divisible; that is, complex. It might be absorbed in the ocean and divided into its parts and so lose the individuality that it had as a whole. But this depends absolutely on the existence of an interfering force outside itself. It has no internal tendencies to dissolution. With Spinoza's God as consciousness he would have to show that this external force has any will to destroy either its creations, if that be the description of the facts, or the mental streams which are a part of its functional action. On the other hand, if the drop of water be an integer and indivisible, even the outside force would not divide it, but it would preserve its existence. Apply both suppositions to the soul. If complex, its destruction depends on the will or action of the Absolute. If simple and indivisible, it comes under the head of the indestructibility of substance or God which Spinoza taught. Hence the analogy is exceedingly deceptive.

But this incident of the drop of water does not represent the real position of Spinoza philosophically. It was because of his verbal denial of immortality and the "personality" of God that so much opprobrium

attached to Pantheism. Prior to his time Pantheism lived on friendly terms, or at least often did so, with Theism, and only the phraseology of Spinoza led the church finally to oppose Pantheism. But I know no better position to absolutely prove personal immortality, as we define it. In modern thought personality is not conceived as a spatial datum, but as a connected series of mental events with a memory, and on the pantheistic doctrine we are now a stream in the consciousness of God and there can be no escape from survival, unless we abandon the conservation of energy and make the whole cosmic order dependent upon the whims of the Absolute. On the supposition that the Absolute or cosmic consciousness may destroy us at will, the whole question of survival will depend on matters of fact; that is, on evidence: not on metaphysical theories about the indestructibility of either substance or energy. That is the view already taken in the analysis of the problem.

On the other hand, if we accept the pantheistic theory or that of cosmic consciousness as eternal, we have no escape even in the metaphysics of the case from personal survival, as we are now simply a stream of functional activity in that Absolute. The hypothesis of a cosmic consciousness would prove survival instead of disprove it. It is only the doctrine of a spiritual body that it may question, while that of personality as a stream or connected series of mental states with a memory would secure its persistence without any violence whatever to theories of cosmic consciousness, and in fact would be implied by them.

There is the next objection to the spiritistic theory. It is telepathy. I do not regard it as a relevant objection, but because it has a popular acceptance as such, it has to be considered. I shall not discuss it at length, as I must refer readers to the elaborate dis-

cussions of it which I have given in many other places.* It would take up too much space here to treat it exhaustively. But I may call attention to some things not elaborated before. They are historical considerations.

In the first place scientific men outside of psychic researchers do not admit the existence of telepathy as an explanatory hypothesis. It is used almost exclusively by laymen who are either afraid of it or do not know what it means. It is universally employed to-day as other hypotheses were used in the last generation and abandoned as men were laughed out of court for using them. Pick up any book written for or against Spiritualism during the last fifty years and you are likely to find all sorts of abandoned hypotheses defended in them. Many writers conceived the rival theories as Mesmerism and Spiritualism, or Hypnotism and Spiritualism. Many talked about animal Magnetism as the explanation of the facts. Many resorted to Odylic force. Many explained the phenomena by electricity, usually referring to table tipping and physical phenomena. Some said "psychic force." But all of them avoided "spirits" as setting up the "supernatural," and thought that any irrelevant term would serve to eradicate the simplest and most rational explanation of the facts, though it is true enough that physical phenomena alone are not evidence of spiritual realities or even explicable by them until associated with intelligence. But the mental phenomena were not explicable by Mesmerism, Hypnotism, Odylic force,

* For full discussion of Telepathy readers may consult the following references.

Proceedings, Eng. S. P. R., Vol. XIII, pp. 357-370. Vol. XVI, pp. 124-158. *Proceedings* Am. S. P. R., Vol. IV, pp. 117-144. *Journal* Am. S. P. R., Vol. I, pp. 308-327; Vol. II, pp. 322-331; 338-342; 560-562; Vol. III, pp. 89-108, 255-269; Vol. IV, pp. 441-457, 636-651. Vols. V and XI inclusive, see Index under Telepathy. *Enigmas of Psychic Research*. Chapter V and *Science and a Future Life*, Chapter IX, both by James H. Hyslop.

animal magnetism, or even by "psychic force," unless the definition of it involved "spirit" as it would have to do, if you gave it any intelligible meaning whatever. But all these theories have gone the way of illusion, and no intelligent man would to-day be caught defending them. They never had any real scientific recognition. They were only popular evasions. But telepathy has taken their place and the public throws that in your face, with all the assurance that it had in Mesmerism, electricity and other absurd explanations. You cannot reply to it satisfactorily because those who use it have not scientific intelligence enough to discuss it rationally. It is but a word which is supposed to exclude "spirits" because we find some facts that are not primary evidence of their existence. It is just a shibboleth like all the other ill-advised coinages of terms without explanatory meaning. There is no danger that any really scientific man is going to be deceived by the term. I shall only summarize the points which make it wholly irrelevant to the problem.

1. Telepathy is only a name for facts still to be explained. It is not explanatory of anything whatever. It is but a name for mental coincidences between two living persons that are not due to chance coincidence or normal sense perception and that are not evidence of discarnate spirits. This definition of it begs no questions as to either the directness or indirectness of the connection between minds. It states what we know, all that we know and only what we know. The process for explaining the facts is still to be found.

The conception of it as merely naming the facts prevents it from being logically or scientifically used as a rival theory of phenomena illustrating the personal identity of the dead. Those who apply it so, must show what the process is that is involved and also first settle whether that process is a direct or indirect one.

2. Assuming that telepathy is explanatory and di-

rect between living people, the only evidence for it is based upon present active mental states of the agent and percipient. That is A's present mental state is transferred to B. A is the agent and B the percipient. But that hypothesis will not explain all the facts on record. Many of the supernormal incidents are not present active states of A, the sitter in mediumistic phenomena, so that any use of the term telepathy must extend it to include what A is not thinking of at all. There is no scientific evidence whatever that A's subconscious is tapped. It may be so, but it lacks scientific evidence in its behalf, and until it has this, the hypothesis of telepathy, even in this extended form has no scientific right of application.

3. Again assuming that telepathy can tap the subliminal, many of the facts obtained in mediumistic experiments were never known by the sitter and could not be secured from his subliminal. You would have to extend your telepathy to include tapping the memories of any living person not consciously connected or aware of the work going on at a distance. There is not one iota of scientific evidence for such an hypothesis. It is not any more reasonable than the supposition that the memories and thoughts of all living people, including those who have died prior to the present living generation, though their lives coincided partly with those of the living and partly with a past generation, extending into the indefinite past, are transmitted to the subconscious minds of all other living people and can thus be picked out by the telepathic psychic. Indeed you do not need telepathy on the part of the medium at all in such a case. She is supposedly the repository of all living thoughts and of all the thoughts of the dead, so that she has only to pick out the right incidents to impersonate the discarnate. That is far simpler than your selective telepathy as it applies it to every thought of living people and makes the selec-

tion depend on the mind of the medium working on other minds. But I venture to think that no one is audacious enough to seriously consider such an hypothesis, and the selective telepathy of credulous laymen is no better than that. But you will have to assume it to make any headway against the spiritistic theory. It refutes itself because there is not an iota of evidence for it.

4. Telepathy, as a selective process, has no scientific support whatever. The only evidence for it represents A as active on B. But the conception of it employed to rival the spiritistic theory implies that B is selecting from A his subliminal memories and when it cannot find the appropriate ones there, it hunts up a distant relative or friend and supplements its data from the mind of A by some from the minds of C, D, E and others. Prove that this takes place in incidents which completely reproduce the personal identity of the living, and you may then give the spiritistic theory a bad hour.

5. The conception of telepathy which some writers have accepted and among them more particularly Mrs. Sidgwick that it represents a supersensible process of communication between minds generally (1) between living minds, (2) between the living and the dead, and (3) between the dead themselves, is one that completely annihilates its opposition to the spiritistic hypothesis. You can use it to supplant spirits only by regarding it as exclusively a process of supersensible communication between the living. But grant that spirits exist and that they communicate with the living by means of telepathy and with each other by it, and you have no resource in it for setting aside spirits as an explanation of all the facts.

6. Telepathy is an evidential criterion, not an explanatory process. If we knew the process in it, we might make it explanatory, but as it is only a name

for the facts, it can serve only as an evidential limitation upon the spiritistic hypothesis. That is, telepathy is a name for supernormal information of what is in the mind of the agent and what the percipient receives so that it cannot serve as evidence for the personal identity of the dead. Evidence of this personal identity is absolutely essential to the spiritistic hypothesis and as mental phenomena of the living only are not evidence for survival, any transfer of this purely living knowledge cannot be regarded as evidence for the existence of the discarnate. That is why it is called telepathy, not because the facts are thereby explained, but because they are not *evidence* of spirits. Consequently a mere limitation of the evidence is not an explanation of the facts.

7. Telepathy is not a universal explanation of psychic phenomena. There are whole groups of them to which it cannot be applied even on the utmost extension of it as a process. There are (1) Premonitions, (2) Clairvoyance technically defined, (3) Dow-sing and (4) Telekinetic phenomena either with or without the association of intelligence. In the end we shall require some general explanation of the whole group of psychic phenomena and that cannot be telepathy, even if we conceded that it is explanatory in its nature. If we find spirits necessary to account for premonitions and clairvoyance as conveying information about concealed physical objects whose place of concealment is not known by any living person, we shall have to give up telepathy as in any way relevant to the phenomena representing the personal identity of the dead.

8. There remains one consideration against the use which people make of telepathy as an explanatory solvent, but it is less conclusive than those which have been discussed. It is the reversal of the process of explanation. What if spirits be the general explanation to which telepathy must be subordinated? That

is, instead of explaining all the phenomena by telepathy, why not explain telepathy by spirits? The popular mind extends telepathy to cover all phenomena referred by Spiritualists to foreign beings. But as it is undoubtedly not an explanatory hypothesis at all and spirits are explanatory, may it not be that the latter will explain what telepathy does not account for? The position taken by Mrs. Sidgwick in extending telepathy as a process common to the living and the dead by so much favors this view. It would remain, therefore, to ask and answer the question whether all supernormal interactions between minds, whether incarnate or discarnate, might not be due to the intervention of spirits.

The first and forcible objection to such a view would be that the facts are often so trivial and so lacking in reason that we do not like to think of spirits as engaged in such capricious and meaningless interventions, when if they can intervene at all, they might do better things. For instance, a wife sees a phantasm of her husband's throat bleeding and learns when she sees him that her experience coincided with the fact that he had at the time received a cut in his barber's chair. It was not serious and there was no apparent reason in the situation to make it important enough to have foreign intervention of the kind. Probably most telepathic coincidences are of this kind. Those that are strictly such have no evidential characteristics to suggest either the existence or intervention of spirits and hence it is not easy to assert or believe in the intervention.

But this objection comes from the assumption that we must know *why* the message is transmitted. But we are not concerned with the *purpose* of such events at first. There are two things to be decided first. They are the *fact* and the *causal* agent. Why they occur; that is, the utility served by them is not the first thing to be settled. The very fact that telepathy is not

explanatory and that it is extended into the interactions between all minds, living or dead, shows that we have not limited it as we require to do when making it a rival hypothesis to spirits. The latter explains some things which telepathy between the living does not explain. Why not, then, extend the operation of spirits to cover what is admittedly not explanatory at all, when we know that the spiritistic hypothesis is explanatory?

From the *a priori* point of view spirits can be applied and extended as well as telepathy, and having the advantage of actually being explanatory, there is special excuse for the extension, and then it would only remain to test this hypothesis by ascertaining what the facts are. Our total ignorance of what the process is in telepathy is so much in favor of subordinating it to spirits which, even though we may not know the process, we do know to be legitimate references for the character of causality, and that is fundamental to any hypothesis, prior indeed to any specific process required. The reason *why* the message is transmitted, to repeat, is not the primary issue. It might be important, if we were assured that all telepathy and all spirit communications were *intentional* on the part of the agents. But there is much evidence to prove that many messages from the dead are involuntary and unintentional. Whether they are all so is not tenable as yet. But it is possible that even intentional messages do not come until they become automatic and spontaneous, and the capricious character of many telepathic coincidences favor the same view of them. They are rarer in character and meaning than spirit messages, a fact which favors by so much the view that telepathy between the living has far greater limitations than the believer in it supposes. But leaving that undecided, it is clear that there is no such rationale in either telepathy or spirit messages as would force

us to the acceptance of any specific purpose in all of them. Once concede that some of them are unintentional, due to sporadically occurring conditions which allow of leakage between minds, and we then have the possibility that even when the interaction is really or apparently purposive, it coincides with automatic conditions that conform to the law of involuntary communications. Grant the latter and we have a clear explanation of the triviality and apparently casual character of the messages. The larger field of consciousness, whether in the telepathic or the spiritual agent, so occupies the attention and interest of the agent that only marginal incidents slip through and it may be necessary to get the intentional message into that marginal field of automatism to secure its transmission. The intervention of spirits may not always imply clearly what goes on, though it be complicated with purpose that gets expression only in conditions of automatism which it may be hard to secure. It is all a question of evidence. Let me look at some facts that suggest this reversal of the application of telepathy.

I had a report from one man of a number of good experiences in so-called telepathy and he happened to say nothing whatever of his other experiences. When I inquired into his life and other experiences he was surprised that I would suppose they had anything to do with his telepathy, and I found from him that he always felt that he was assisted in his telepathic experiences, having frequently had an apparition in his life of a woman who acted as a sort of protector or guide. Through Mrs. Smead, a few months after his death, Mr. Podmore, about whom Mrs. Smead knew nothing but his name and the fact that he was skeptical, said that telepathy was due to spirits and that they could carry a message instantly. It was not evidential or verifiable, but the interest lay partly in the fact that

it was put into the mouth of Mr. Podmore who had been such a veteran defender of it and partly in the fact that Mrs. Smead had not speculated about telepathy at all, and might as well have put the statement into the mouth of any other person not so relevant to the situation.

A much more important set of facts was connected with the experiments between Miss Miles and Miss Ramsden. The first set of them was published by the English Society and they contained certain incidents which appeared to support the idea that telepathy might obtain memories and subconscious mental states from the agent, Miss Miles. For many things obtained by Miss Ramsden were events that happened on the same day on which Miss Miles sent her telepathic message and were also not intentionally transmitted by her. This suggested a lot of inquiries by myself and I found that Miss Ramsden had had other experiences than telepathy and that Miss Miles also had had all types of psychic phenomena. She had had apparitions, did automatic writing, was able to produce telekinetic phenomena, and did dowsing—finding water—both by clairvoyance and the use of the divining rod, and what is more important, *could always tell when her telepathic experiments were successful by the raps that she heard indicating the success.* This last phenomenon was not due to telepathy.

Now I had my report on the phenomena of the two ladies in press and in page proof when Mr. Myers purported to communicate through Mrs. Chenoweth and made an allusion to telepathy, remarking that its success depended on the *carrier*. I saw at once the meaning of this and to avoid making suggestions, I simply asked what he meant by the *carrier*, and the reply was that “telepathy is always a message carried by spirits.” This was not verifiable and we cannot refute the belief that it was a subconscious statement

by Mrs. Chenoweth who is tolerant of that view. But the spontaneousness of the allusion and the connection in which it was made favors the possibility that it is genuinely transcendental in its origin.

Another instance is still stronger. Mrs. Verrall who was psychic and a lecturer on Greek and Latin Literature in Newnham College, Cambridge, England, believed in telepathy as an explanation of a large number of her own phenomena and those of Mrs. Piper. She was a member of the American Society and knew my position on the possibility of explaining at least some cases of telepathy by spirit intervention. She died in July, 1916, and early in October purported to communicate through Mrs. Chenoweth. She very soon referred to telepathy and coming back to it a second time said that she was not so certain since her death as she was before it that telepathy explained her phenomena and that my hypothesis of spirit intervention might be true. She said she was investigating it, remarking also what was true; namely, that in life she had thought some things were not due to it. She showed a decided leaning to the possibility of my theory. Mrs. Chenoweth knew nothing about her except that she did automatic writing and that she was dead, having seen the mention of her death in *Light*, the English Spiritualist paper which she takes, or rather the Club to which she belongs. Mrs. Chenoweth knew nothing of her views about telepathy or spirits. Though it may not be proof that foreign intervention is necessary in telepathy between the living, it is interesting to remark that this change of mind characterized two psychic researchers who had died and who had believed in its more general application when living.

I am far from contending for such an hypothesis. I merely regard it as conceivable in spite of the objections applied to it. As we do not know whether telepathy is a direct or an indirect process between

the living, the field is clear for any conjectures we may choose to apply, and I am as tolerant to spirits in the case as I might be toward telepathy. We are too ignorant of the process to deny one any more than the other, and I only await evidence for one or the other hypothesis. All the evidence in certain instances tends toward it and only because it is not conclusive must we await more decisive facts. But we are entitled to urge our ignorance as a reason for not being too cock sure that telepathy does not involve spirit intervention. I am not concerned with the position that science requires us to assume telepathy and to stretch it to the breaking point before applying spirits. This assumption is often stated as the duty to assume the "natural" before applying the "supernatural." But I boldly affirm that science does not require, or even does not permit us to assume telepathy against spirits, except in an argument. When applying scientific theories we are required to assume the explanation that explains and not to make any concessions to the mere skeptic. In an argument with the skeptic designed to convert him, we are obliged to concede all he demands about telepathy and to stretch it to its full length, but this is a policy of conversion, not a policy of explanation. Regardless of skeptical habits of mind science binds us to explanatory hypotheses and so to the testing of them whether we convert any one or not. With a skeptic I might concede possibilities in telepathy, when arguing to convert him, that I would not concede in making scientific explanations. We are doing *ad hominem* work in conversion, but *ad rem* work in explanation, and our duties are different in them. So I feel no obligations to defend my respectability with skeptics by pretending to have assured beliefs where others may have a better scientific foundation, though I may conduct my discussion as if I did.

I should not even plead the consistency of spirit intervention as an explanation, as a defense of it scientifically. We must have more and better evidence, though consistency would suffice, if there was any assured disproof of telepathy as an exclusively living affair. It will require more evidence than I have presented to establish foreign intervention, and I propose it here more as a possibility than as an assuredly tenable position.

If we knew what the process of communicating is and whether space limitations affect it as they do any relations between living people, we might readily determine whether spiritistic agencies solved the whole problem. For we have some evidence that space affects telepathic phenomena between the living, when experimentally tried, and it is as certain that there are a large number of coincidences which are not affected by space limitations. They are often classified under telepathy, but there is no proof that they belong there, while actual experiments, as far as they go, favor the affect of distance to hinder telepathic transmission. Now in real or alleged messages from the dead, we sometimes receive the statement that they can tell what we are thinking or doing simply by turning their *attention* to us. I have noticed the same phenomenon as affecting control. That is, if the subconscious turned its attention to some one seen as an apparition, rapport is apparently established at once with that person and direct control will begin with impersonation in the first person, though I suspect that the subconscious, under the influence of automatism, is producing the whole result with modifications transmitted from the person with whom it is in rapport.

This would suggest the view that space does not affect spirit action and they certainly often show that they disregard it when communicating or exhibit knowledge that has to be obtained at a great distance. They

also claim that their perceptions are extended beyond ours. Now if this be a fact we can well imagine that transmission might overcome space limitations as well as perception. Accepting this fact they might be the instant transmitters of thoughts which they receive from the living either in the vicinity or at a distance, and their success would depend upon the variable conditions affecting the percipient and the question of voluntary and involuntary messages. But in spite of this possibility we have not yet obtained secure evidence that it is the general fact. There is some evidence that it is the fact in certain instances, but we lack a criterion for determining whether the cases not exactly like them come under the same law.

CHAPTER VI

THE POSSIBILITY OF A FUTURE LIFE

“IF a man die shall he live again?” That was the question of Job and we are often told that it has never been answered. A part of it has been answered by all human experience and that is that man dies. But what is death? If we were sure of the answer to that question we could easily say whether he “lived” again. Some tell us that life as we know it is not worth while, but neither they nor those whom they would have adopt that creed have the courage to commit suicide and the riddle remains with us. But what is the problem before our attention?

When people ask whether we shall survive death they do not often indicate what they expect from an affirmative answer. In fact the answer varies with the degree of intelligence which men show. The outline of the different beliefs in the world shows this. The savage takes it very literally often, but not any more so than the believers in a physical resurrection. Others adopt a philosophy which makes the soul so supersensible as to escape all physical tests of its existence and nature, and can thus picture a state of existence which excludes the physical from its representation. The theosophist represents this type of believer. He stands midway between the pure materialist and the believer in the bodily resurrection. But both of them have to contend with the materialist who denies that there is any soul to survive and thus throws the whole burden of proof upon the man who believes in the affirmative.

Now, just to say merely that we survive death carries very simple and imaginative conceptions to most people, but no definite meaning to many others except that it may happen to derive that meaning from the prevailing philosophy of the time. When Plato asserted the immortality of the soul, it was meant in terms of the Platonic philosophy and what that was *not* was clearly indicated by what he called the mythical view of the next life. He could not tell clearly what he meant by it. Christianity adopted a clear view of it when the doctrine of the resurrection was put forward. Its clearness did not make it true, but it did make the belief accord with normal experience regarding the relation between consciousness and the organism. It simply invoked Providence to restore a relation which it saw as a fact. But science and philosophy departed from so crude a view and we were left with Platonic ideas for it, or the acceptance of materialism as the only alternative.

There are just two ways in which we can approach such a subject as survival after death. They can be put in the questions: What are the facts? What is the nature of the soul? The latter ultimately cannot escape dependence on the answer to the first question which is the scientific query and the second is philosophic.

The first broad fact before the human mind is the fact that we "die," whatever we mean by that term. We come into the world at birth, and death removes all visible evidence of our existence. If we are but a physical body with functions we undoubtedly perish. So far as death marks a fact of change there is no question about it. But men have always insisted, when they really refused to accept the manifest appearance of things, that there was something accompanying the body which did not perish with it. In that way they endeavored to limit the meaning of death as a fact

and to cover a belief that something continued to exist after the dissolution of the body. There is the question. Is there anything possible that may survive? Is there adequate reason to believe that we have a soul, something other than the brain, that may survive the dissolution of this brain?

But suppose there is something else than the brain required to explain consciousness, how will that fact help us? Would it follow that a soul continued after death if we had one? Some say it would, some say it would not. The Epicureans and materialists of that day admitted the existence of a soul, an ethereal organism accompanying the body, but they maintained that it perished with the body. But they obtained this view only by virtue of the suppositions (1) that all complex organisms perished and (2) that the soul was a complex organism. But they never claimed to prove that the soul was a complex organism. They simply assumed this *a priori*, affirming this nature of all things except the imperishable atoms. These simple bodies were assumed to be indestructible. Their compounds were assumed to perish. It was an observed fact that organisms which were compounds did dissolve and perish. But this was an empirical observation, not a necessity.

When investigation was set afoot, it was found that all dissolution required its causation. That is to say, complex things did not perish without a cause or reason for it. They, too, might be imperishable, so far as the "necessity" of things was concerned. In fact, conformity to nature would require them to be as imperishable as simple bodies as long as inertia was made the nature or essential attribute of material objects. They could not of themselves change their condition and could be changed only by action from without. So death would not take place without some cause. It was not an inherent attribute of the complex subject. The reason for it was not the law of events, but the

causes which determined the effect. So it was a merely observed fact, not a necessity that complex organisms perished. Where no causes acted to dissolve them they remained imperishable. For instance, the human body left to its normal condition, as we understand that term, after death soon dissolved into its elements. But when embalmed it may still exist after many centuries still undissolved. Certain rocks left to the inclemencies of the weather, heat and cold, will dissolve. But free from all disturbing influences they may be immortal, though complex, as that term goes. It is not complexity, therefore, that insures death, but the causes which act on the subject destined to perish, if I may use such a phrase as "destined" in this connection.

Hence the Epicurean materialists simply set up as a necessity what was only an empirically observed fact and that not universally observed. Besides there was no reason to assure them that the causes which dissolved the physical body also dissolved the soul whose existence they admitted. It might still persist when the body had perished. It was pure speculation that led them to deny survival and this is proved by their attitude when Christianity came forward with an alleged fact to prove survival. Christianity called attention to a case of resurrection, and it makes no difference for us whether that resurrection be regarded as physical or ethereal, the revival of the body, or the observation of the ethereal organism. The materialists, instead of admitting that they were worsted about immortality, gave up the hypothesis of the ethereal organism, and stood by the denial of immortality by making consciousness a function of the physical organism instead of being a function of the ethereal organism. Materialism admitted it was worsted in the matter of a soul, but rather than admit survival, it yielded on the existence of a soul. There were moral reasons for this. It did not wish to believe in survival

and if the admission of a soul required this, it would rather yield the soul.

It is a law of complex organisms that they dissolve, but this law is not the cause of the fact. It is merely the observed fact itself and hence, if the soul be a complex organism, we should naturally expect it to come under a law which is so common to our experience. But as that law itself does not apply with the same uniformity to all compounds, some lasting for only a few hours, or perhaps minutes, and others for incalculable periods of time, and perhaps some may be as imperishable as the elements, if only left alone. We have nothing but observed fact as the meaning of this law. Consequently, it was incumbent upon the materialists, and is still, where they remain by the Epicurean philosophy regarding a soul, to give us the observed facts about it after it leaves the body. *A priori* assertion denying survival, when you admit a soul existing, is as illegitimate as *a priori* affirmation of it. The only way to defend materialism is to maintain that consciousness is a function of the brain, and not to admit an ethereal organism other than the brain. Then you may place consciousness alongside the other functions of the organism which admittedly perish. If you concede a soul other than the physical body, you will have to give further evidence than death, than the dissolution of the gross physical body, to justify the denial of immortality or survival. For its perishable nature can not be inferred from the mere fact that it is a complex organism, but from the view that it is a resultant or function of such and disappears with it.

Now it was the indestructibility of substance that gave force to the belief in survival. When men insisted that substance was imperishable, just as the Epicurean materialists asserted their atoms were, it would be natural for them to assert or prove that the soul was

a substance. When you have the major premise asserting indestrucibility of substance, the proof of your minor premise that the soul is a substance carries the conclusion inevitably, as the merest tyro in logic will understand. Now that was the course of human thought on this subject. It maintained that the soul was a substance and brought under the law of substance. Whether it was correct or not makes no difference for our present exposition. It was logical and had an eye to the function of argument in taking this position. It was a keen insight into this situation that induced Tertullian to maintain that the soul must be an atom and a material atom at that. He saw that he had only to maintain that the soul belongs to the class of eternal things to vindicate its claim to indestructibility. So he made the soul a material atom. This was at the time when destructibility and divisibility were convertible conceptions, or at least mutually implicative. Whether he gave evidence for this view is another question and one not affecting the controversy with the materialist, as he gave no evidence for the destructibility of the ethereal organism, and perhaps could not do it without admitting the fact of survival! He could get it only by communication with the dead. Not having this or daring to try it he could only assert his position *a priori*. This before a scientific body of men is absurd. The only *a priori* course that is legitimate is the deduction of a conclusion from given premises. When they are admitted the conclusion may be assured. Otherwise we are left to study the premises.

All these are methods designed to infer survival or non-survival, the one from certain general principles or from the nature and persistence of substance and the other from the laws of composition. They are not appeals to facts which necessarily imply it, but appeals to deductive as distinct from inductive evidence. They

are conclusive enough if we are sure of our premises. But it is just this instability of our premises that keeps the spectre of skepticism before the human mind. The conclusion will never be more certain than the premises and the moment they collapse the conclusion collapses.

When matter was supposed to be a created substance it was easy to maintain some sort of theistic interpretation of the cosmos, as the very conception of creation implied something else than matter at the basis of all things and if that be regarded as intelligence, whether finite or infinite, and whether after the image of man or man after the image of it, there would be at least the possibility that man's intelligence would share in the law of persistence as long as that primary intelligence willed it. This was the direction of human speculation after the earlier stage of Christianity when the endeavor was to define God so as to make it inconsistent with his character that he should destroy human hopes. But as men could not appeal to the fact of survival in proof of that character they had to seek it in other evidence, good or bad, and then infer the probabilities *a priori*.

From what I have already said there are two general ways in which we can try to show survival possible, the philosophical and the scientific. But both of these methods are subject to what we mean by survival and that has not been explained. Were it not for the fact of death we should not use the term survival at all. But death puts an end to the phenomena of life as we know them. There is and can be no dispute or discussion about that. What man seeks, therefore, is whether something in addition to the body may not exist and therefore persist after death. To guarantee this possibility men have asserted, with or without good reasons, that man is or has a soul and thus brought its destiny under the persistence or continuity of sub-

stance. A substance, as we have seen, remains in the same condition or mode of action unless it is modified by another agent. This is so universal a fact of experience or knowledge that we can safely predict upon it, and it is true regardless of the question whether the substance be simple or complex. The consequence of this is that any fact which proves the brain cannot account for consciousness and that there is a soul has in its favor the whole force of the indestructibility of substance, but nothing more. If we should at any time give up this indestructibility the case would be lost, and it is apparent in the more modern theory of matter; namely, that it is created out of the ether and not the simple reality which the atomic doctrine assumed, that we cannot guarantee immortality, even if we do grant a period of survival after death. On the other hand materialism can secure it only by contriving a method that will prevent death as we know it. But this is so improbable on the basis of experience that it would seem hopeless to encourage a prospect.

But what do we mean again by survival? We have not yet explained it. If death did not occur as a fact, I have said we should not use the term "survival" at all. There would be no question raised except that which would be suggested by the general laws of nature. That is, the bodily organism would be subject to the fate of the world or cosmos generally. But then if death did not occur, there would be no reason to suppose that the cosmos would otherwise remain the same. Death is but a phenomenon under the general law of change and decomposition, and to eliminate death would be to eliminate other and connected changes, as the law is the same for all compounds. Survival, then, obtains its meaning from the assumption that death is a fact and death means that the organism perishes. Does anything else remain is the question which interests mankind.

The answer is that what we want is personal consciousness and memory. These are supposed either to be the soul or to imply it. Strictly speaking they imply it and do not constitute it, but when the interest in the subject is brought to its real meaning it is for the persistence of consciousness whether we have any metaphysics about a soul or not. If consciousness be a functional activity, it must have a subject or ground and that we would call the soul. If that survived without the consciousness we should not be especially interested in it, as it is personal life and memory which determines or constitutes the object of real interest to any one when raising the question of survival, just as it is consciousness in the present existence that makes our interest in its retention and persistence. We want that to survive if an after life is to have any meaning for us. But when we say that it is the continuance of consciousness that we desire we may not be clear as to what is implied by it. With most people the term consciousness defines or denotes a stream of action more or less divested of its material associations and we may think of it as without the concrete points of interest and conception that the bodily life represents in connection with consciousness, and so not be interested in so abstract and lifeless a thing.

This feeling gives rise to the demand to have it related as we experience it in life where we suppose that the bodily organism is its condition. To normal life the area of consciousness seems larger than its definition by the philosopher as a stream with a memory. It is constituted by present perceptions and panoramic visions of reality. It is richer in content than the abstract conception of it as a group of inner states with a memory. This suggests an embodiment of some kind and the effort, conscious or unconscious, to conceive the conditions under which such a consciousness might exist apart from the body. Hence the demand for the

nature of the life and conditions under which consciousness supposedly survives. The various systems of belief about the nature of the after life are the answers to that query and it is not necessary to review them here. That they should be different from each other would be a natural corollary of the differences in human intelligence and experience. For us here it is the way in which the tendency gives rise to different philosophies that interest us. It determines the way in which we should defend or deny the possibility of survival. Whether the continuance of consciousness is possible or not will depend on what we expect to go with it or upon what relation we think it sustains to the physical body. If it be a function of the physical organism and this organism perishes it is as impossible for consciousness to survive as it would be for digestion or circulation to continue after death. Hence some other view of the nature of consciousness would be necessary as a precondition of entertaining the conceivability of continuance after the dissolution of the body.

1. The first answer to the human query would be that of Metchnikoff. He starts with the hypothesis of materialism which makes consciousness a function of the organism and endeavors to prevent death. Physiologists tell us that, so far as physiology is concerned, there is no reason why we should die at all. The laws of chemistry are such that it is only a question of keeping up the equilibrium between assimilation and dissipation of energy, between waste and repair. Metchnikoff proposes the protection of the digestive tract as a measure of preventing the survival of those destructive agents that cause death, and hence his conception of immortality is to get rid of death, to preserve consciousness with the body, not apart from it. This is certainly a new point of view, whether feasible or not. But it attacks the problem very dif-

ferently from those who accepted death as a final and unpreventable fact. Mankind, assuming that death is as much a law of nature as waste and repair, has insisted on preserving consciousness in spite of the apparent disappearance of it and so have constructed their philosophic theories to suit the demand. But Metchnikoff takes the bull by the horns and endeavors or proposes to preserve the existing condition of things, accepting the materialistic theory of the world.

But many minds would not be satisfied with any such order. Men would divide on the desirability of such a regime. Some would prefer annihilation to any such system. Others no doubt would prefer the continuance of the material existence to any spiritual life that might be conceived. Besides, Metchnikoff would have to show some probability that death could be set aside and that it was not a law of nature before much attention could be paid to his proposal. We must accept this law and make our peace with it, with or without a future life, and if we can find reasons to believe that life continues in spite of death we must form some conception of consciousness and its conditions different from the materialistic one. The materialist will get his answer only by denying the possibility of survival or by preserving life along with the body. He can affirm continuance only by preserving the present order and eradicating the fact of death.

2. The second answer to the question was made by the believers in the doctrine of a physical resurrection. Their solution differed little from that of Metchnikoff. They, however, while admitting that consciousness was a function of the body also admitted that death was unescapable, and sought to overcome it by a system of causes, the act of God, for restoring that consciousness to its bodily possession and so fixed a time when the body should be raised from the dead.

I suspect, however, men would differ regarding the

desirability of such a thing as they would about the perpetual earthly existence, whether rightly or wrongly. At any rate, whatever attractions it might have for the lovers of life, our present knowledge makes such a thing so improbable or impossible that hopes cannot be founded upon it. We have to look elsewhere for salvation or reconcile ourselves with the prospect of eternal death. The physical resurrection of the body would seem a more improbable or impossible thing than the scheme of Metchnikoff and perhaps just as undesirable. Of course our desires have nothing to do with the matter, but they determine for us the persistence of the problem.

3. The third system for protecting survival is the supposition of the Pauline "spiritual body," the theosophists "astral body," and it might have been the Epicurean "ethereal organism," if that system had not denied survival in spite of admitting that there was a "soul."

The advantage of the Pauline and theosophic doctrine is that they preserve the ordinary demand for a "ground" for consciousness, a basis for its persistence as a function. It answers the question as to *how* we may survive rather than the fact of it. It also provides a basis for conceiving the after life in accordance with the ordinary feeling of men that consciousness does not exist apart from conditions; that, if it be a function instead of a thing, it must have a subject or "body" of some kind of which it is the function. Besides these schools can set up a cosmos repeating the analogies of the physical world without being physical in our ordinary sense of the term.

But both of these systems depend for their protection upon proving that there is such a "body." Their philosophy seems to have been contrived merely to render survival possible, not to prove it a fact. It is true enough that survival would be probable or certain,

if we were assured of an organism other than the brain as a subject for consciousness. The ordinary materialism would be set aside and the inferences from its conception of the relation between consciousness and the organism would not be valid. But it may be as difficult to prove the existence of a spiritual body as to prove survival, and even when you did prove its existence you would still have to prove that consciousness was a function of it to be assured that personality continued after the separation of the spiritual body from the physical organism.

4. The next doctrine cannot be summarized in a word. It represents what I may call the Cartesian point of view, the doctrine that the soul does not occupy space. It holds the belief that there is a soul but that space is not one of its attributes. Descartes maintained that there were only two substances or things in the world, mind and matter. The essential attribute of mind was consciousness without extension. The essential properties of matter were space and motion. He could get their independence of each other by insisting on this radical distinction. The consequence was the doctrine of Leibnitz; namely, that the soul was a spaceless point of force and that consciousness was a stream of activity connected with this spaceless thing. Whether true or not makes no difference for the statement of the doctrine. I do not care whether it be thought conceivable or not. It was an effort to save consciousness from extinction and to do it by denying any affinity with the phenomena of matter and it ruled philosophy for a long period of time. It was the beginning of idealism which eliminated all sense conceptions from the nature of the soul and would make a future life a stream of inner activity, a constructive function of the mind in the creation of its own world, so to speak, as in day dreaming or poetry and imagination, a function more realistically

exercised in dreams and subconscious actions generally, as in deliria and hallucinations, though it is the intention that such functions would be rationalized. Its main point was that it refused to regard consciousness as a function of the physical organism. But it had to contend against a double difficulty; namely, the paradoxical conception of the soul as spaceless and the problem of evidence. It is not easy to make any such theory of the soul intelligible and the view that consciousness is so different from physical events as to require another subject than the body is not an empirically proved fact. The whole system was, therefore, a speculation, legitimate and even possibly true, but a speculation nevertheless and lacking in the evidence which science produces for its claims.

5. There is a theory defending the possible survival of human consciousness which was presented by Professor James. He called it the transmission theory. It meant that, even though consciousness might be a function of the organism, it might be transmitted to some other reality. This, in effect, might be similar or identical with either the resurrection or reincarnation, but he meant neither of these views by his theory. He conceived it after the analogy of the transmission of motion in mechanics. He recognized the law of transmission of motion and thought consciousness might conceivably be transferred in a similar way from the physical body to some other subject. He gave neither evidence nor illustration of what such a subject would be, and it seems to me he could not have done so without importing into the theory the facts of psychical research in favor of some spiritual or ethereal body. He made no mention of such a possibility, and even if he had, it may be questioned whether the doctrine has as much possibility as either reincarnation or the physical resurrection, which he did not advocate and perhaps would not venture to do. Besides he did not

see that, in the transmission of motion from subject to subject, there is no retention of identity, and unless, in the transmission of consciousness, personal identity is retained, no one cares a picayune for that kind of survival, any more than he would care for reincarnation or annihilation. It may be remarked too that some philosophers question the real transmission of motion even in mechanics.

But I shall not urge skepticism at this point. It is not necessary. Granting the transmission, nothing is clearer to science than the fact that this motion is either divisible into all sorts of effects or does not retain its identity when it is not divided. Then to this difficulty is added the need of being sure that there is a subject to which it might be transmissible. Spiritualism and theosophy have held that there is now an organism of which consciousness is the function and that instead of transmitting the consciousness to another this organism simply survives the body at death. This is a perfectly simple and conceivable view of the phenomena, whether true or not. But Professor James's difficulty came (1) from his having denied that psychology needed a soul to explain mental phenomena and (2) from his acceptance of the materialistic view that consciousness was a function of the brain or organism. Hence whatever sympathy he had with survival had to be indicated in a theory of transmission which seems to the present writer rank nonsense.

Nor is he helped any by the distinction between productive and transmissive functions. Productive functions are initiating activities by the subject of them. Transmissive functions are activities that are passed from subject to subject, as motion from one billiard ball to another. Now Professor James conceded for the sake of argument that consciousness was a function of the brain in which conception it was conceived as productive, then assumed its transmissibility which was

a flat contradiction of the first assumption; for a function cannot be both productive and transmissive according to his own division of them, unless he changes his conception of "function." If the brain is only a transmitter of function it is not the original subject of it and that conception of the case displaces the assumption which he admitted as the materialistic basis contradicting the idea that it was transmissive. That is, in assuming that consciousness was a function of the brain he assumed that it was not transmissive and then to suppose that it was transmissive in spite of its being a function of the brain was begging the question, when he should have undertaken to prove the materialistic conception false. The whole trouble was that he had denied the necessity for a soul of any kind in the problems of psychology and then tried to defend the possibility of survival on a theory which directly denied it and which could not by any possibility concede the retention of personal identity on any theory of transmission with which we were familiar in mechanics.

There are various modifications or combinations of these points of view which it is not necessary to examine or state. They are all attempts to set up some substance or reality as the condition of saving a future life, and all of them are more or less based upon desire to save a hope or to explain the existence and possible survival of personal consciousness. They are not scientific efforts to collect facts, and though they may not wholly ignore evidence, such as they use are the mere result of *a priori* ideas about the nature of consciousness. There can be no doubt that any one of them would establish the possibility of survival, provided we had good reasons to believe in the basis of the systems. The reasons given may be good ones and they may not. That will depend on the evidence produced for the systems. I do not mean to contend

here that they have no foundation whatever. There is no doubt that consciousness or mental activity is a peculiar phenomenon. There are no superficial resemblances to physical events in it. This is at least true for the physical events that are objects of sense perception. But there are physical events which sense perception does not reveal and we have no introspective power to determine the ultimate nature of consciousness, if it may happen to have any ultimate nature beyond what we know of it as a fact. In any case we are not in a position to deny some occult or supersensible characteristic of consciousness which would identify it with the phenomena of motion or other material properties. If it be such it might be as identifiable in kind with the functions that we know perish with the body as are digestion, circulation, etc. On that supposition the destiny of mental action is easily determinable and it would not be in favor of survival.

I do not think any doctrine based on the nature of consciousness can be any more certain than our views of its nature, and those views are not at all assured. There is no doubt that consciousness does not manifest any of the grosser resemblances to physical phenomena. It is not matter, as that is known to sense perception. But no one has the hardihood to claim that it is, even though our real ignorance of its nature might open the way to an hypothesis that it is actually supersensible matter. Nor does it indicate any identity with the ordinary properties and functions of matter, such as color, weight, density, mass, motion, etc. But it may be that we cannot introspectively determine its real nature any more than we could introspectively determine through sense perception that light and sound were not modes of motion. Physical science showed us that sense perception could not decide that fact and that light and sound were modes of motion, or so probably this, that it is not questioned in

the case of sound, and few question it in the case of light. Hence, so far as we can directly decide, consciousness might be a mode of motion, though not appearing as that. But until we can be assured that it is not a mode of motion, and until we can be assured that all the properties of matter are not reducible to motion the whole case for another subject than the brain for consciousness is an open issue.

This last remark would indicate that it is not necessary to reduce consciousness to a mode of motion in order to classify it with physical phenomena, and doubles the difficulties of a theory which would assert or suppose a soul on the ground of the distinction between mental and physical phenomena. Consciousness is either a mode of motion or it is not. If it be a mode of motion and if all the properties of matter are reducible to modes of motion, the demand for another subject is not necessary. We could assume that it was explicable or referable to the organism without violating any of the postulates of science or logic. On the other hand, if matter may have properties that are not modes of motion, there is no necessity again for making a point of any difference between consciousness and physical events and qualities. In either case, the attempt to decide the case on the nature of consciousness makes the matter uncertain. We may not require a soul, just as Professor James affirmed, and unless we could defend a transmission theory as he did, after accepting materialism, we should have no ground to look favorably on survival, and I do not think the theory of transmission has one iota of evidence or philosophic argument in its support.

There are three ways in which the possibility of survival after death can be defended on philosophic grounds. (1) On the hypothesis that there is a "spiritual body," an "astral body" or an "ethereal organism," of which consciousness is supposedly a function

rather than of the brain. (2) On the hypothesis that consciousness is a functional stream of the Absolute or God and not of the physical organism. (3) On the hypothesis that consciousness is a function of a spaceless point of force, the virtual view of Leibnitz and Boscovitch. The last two are doctrines that maintain the existence of a soul, the one conceiving the soul as occupying space and the other as not occupying space, or at least as not having extension as does matter.

Now outside of spiritistic phenomena and theosophic speculations we have no evidence for a "spiritual body" or its synonymous conceptions. The supposition of them, when not made from the evidence of psychic phenomena, is a mere metaphysical hypothesis made to save a hope, not to explain a proved fact. Any possibility of survival, in such a case, must depend on another possibility than that of a "spiritual body" which is not a proved fact apart from psychic research evidence.

When it comes to the second theory, that of making consciousness a function or stream of activity in the Absolute or God, while, if true, it guarantees, with assurance, the possibility of survival, it is subject to the skepticism that may exist about an Absolute, unless we make this Absolute convertible with either a pluralistic or a monistic theory of things. Usually the Absolute or God has been the single and ultimate reality at the basis of all other things, and to make consciousness a functional incident in its existence would assure the possibility of continuance after the dissolution of the body. But if we do not admit such an Absolute, consciousness would have to be regarded as a functional phenomenon either of the organism, a supposition assuring its demise, or of the ultimate units of that organism, in which case it might survive as the properties of the atoms are supposed to survive the decomposition of compounds. But, on the one

hand, there is dispute about the unity of the Absolute and, on the other hand, there is no evidence that consciousness is a functional property of the atoms and there is no need of supposing it unless we have evidence of its survival.

In regard to the third supposition, we can only say that the spaceless nature of the soul is so paradoxical or so difficult for most people to conceive that they would probably doubt survival that had to depend on it. In that hypothesis we are making suppositions so violent and so incapable of proof that we can either not argue about it at all or will not be interested in any survival depending on the assertion of it. It is like those hypotheses which are sometimes advanced to get out of a difficulty and that throw the problem into a sphere where it cannot be discussed at all. An illustration of such an hypothesis is that one regarding the origin of life on the earth by supposing that it was carried to the earth by a meteor or meteors. Assuming such a thing possible we could not discuss such a question because (1) we do not know whether there is any life on meteors or not; (2) we have no way of ascertaining; it is pure speculation, and (3) perhaps another objection would be that the same question can be asked about the origin of life on meteors, to say nothing of the consequence to it on entering the earth's atmosphere. The immense heat created would annihilate all life on such bodies. To set up a spaceless soul as a condition of supposing it at all and of preserving the continuance of consciousness is to propose a theory about as inaccessible to investigation or proof as the theory of the origin of life just mentioned and whatever possibility of survival is maintained by it is so vacuous and remote that it is not worth much consideration.

I repeat, then, that all these attempts to protect survival are metaphysical theories meaning more than

the facts contain or implying an assurance that the facts do not supply. I do not reject metaphysical arguments or hypotheses absolutely. They are legitimate enough when they do not express more meaning or assurance than the facts. What we want to-day is more assurance than metaphysical theories supply. Were it not for the strength of the materialistic theory of the cosmos metaphysical theories of the soul would have more weight. But physics, chemistry, and biology have done so much to extend the real or possible explanatory powers of matter and its functions, if they go beyond description at all, that the old metaphysical hypotheses seem to be either untenable or to be no more assured than the facts they are assumed to explain, and these facts are often thought not to be what they have been supposed to be. Hence while the possibility of survival may remain as an abstract possibility, it has only the assurance of our ignorance about what it really is.

It is the materialistic theory that weakens the old philosophies. It rests primarily upon the constant association of consciousness with the bodily organism and, barring psychic phenomena, the absence of all traces of surviving consciousness when the body perishes. It falls back on the *evidential*, not on the *explanatory* problem or assumptions as to the nature of mental phenomena. It is not concerned with philosophy but facts, and even its own metaphysics, which, in fact, it does not need, is only an incident in its conception of things, which is primarily one of facts and laws, and not of metaphysical explanations. The fact of association between consciousness and the organism and the absence of all evidence of survival, when ignoring the claims of psychic research, leaves nothing in behalf of the metaphysical theories and no evidence for what they maintain.

Moreover, ever since the revival of scientific method

which first observes and classifies facts, there has been a different method for ascertaining the truth. Philosophy got the name of being *a priori*, and the discredit of that method, from the fact that its hypothesis contained more than its facts, or more than the evidence appealed to would support. Science suspends judgment on explanations, until it ascertains the facts and accepts no new explanations until the facts demanding them are certified. Science does not try to explain consciousness before ascertaining, not what it is, but whether its connections are as assumed. It is not primarily concerned in finding a subject for consciousness, but whether it necessarily belongs to the connections which it appears to have in normal experience. It happens that the metaphysical instinct is so strong that even those who suppose or assert that consciousness has no other, and can have no other, connections than with the physical body, try to explain it by making it a function of the organism. But it is not necessary for agnosticism to take such a position. It may leave explanations alone and show that the antecedents and consequences are limited to the organism and not independent of it, and this regardless of the question of metaphysical grounds about functions and properties. Science may limit itself to the determination of the laws of events and may pay no attention to their grounds or causes. It is that fact which brings it back ultimately to the plain maxim of present knowledge that we know consciousness to be always associated with physical organisms and we have no trace of its existence after bodily dissolution, unless mediumistic phenomena support the contrary. In normal experience, however, this maxim holds good. Hence the evidential question, if it does not disprove survival, leaves us ignorant of it, unless psychic research can supply that desideratum.

Now it is precisely the facts (1) that we do not

know the nature of consciousness and (2) that we do not know positively that it can have no other connections than the body that makes it possible to investigate for survival and to hold to the possibility of that survival itself. The utmost that agnostic science can say is that we have no evidence for survival. It cannot assert that we do not survive. That is a negative which it cannot prove. All that it can know, barring psychic phenomena, as I always do in such assertions, is that consciousness so far as we know it is associated with the body and that its integrity normally is related to its variable conditions. But it cannot say that it cannot possibly exist in any other condition. It cannot assert that we have no soul or no "spiritual body." It can only demand evidence from the man who believes or asserts it. Hence our ignorance of both its nature and the limitations of its connections opens the way to the consideration of facts; that is, leaves open the question for survival. If we knew absolutely that consciousness was a function of the organism survival would be impossible. But precisely the fact which vitiates metaphysical hypotheses for the soul does the same for metaphysical theories against it. It forces the issue into the field of scientific evidence and away from mere metaphysics.

Again, if we knew that consciousness did not have any other connection or association than the bodily organism, that, too, would settle the matter. It would disappear with the body. But it is precisely our ignorance at this point that makes the scientific problem possible. We do not know the nature of consciousness and we do not know positively that it is a function of the organism. The ultimate that we do know in normal experience is that it is always associated with a physical structure and when that perishes we have no evidence in this normal life that it survives. We do not know that it does not survive. We simply know

that, barring the allegations of psychic researchers, there is no evidence of the persistence of individual consciousness after death. It might exist but have no means of proving its continuance by an influence within the ken of the living. Unless we can prove that consciousness is a function of the body like digestion, circulation, etc.—and we can prove it only by showing that it is the same in nature as they—we cannot adopt dogmatic materialism and assert the annihilation of consciousness. Hence our ignorance indicates an open field for further investigation into the possibilities of survival, even though we may never be able to prove it.

There are two ways in which we can approach the question whether survival after death is possible, and by this survival I mean the continuance of personal consciousness without the bodily organism. They have been implied in the previous discussion and may be respectively called the philosophic or metaphysical and the scientific method. The former relies upon the study of the nature of consciousness as far as known. This method, however, only results in the establishing of our ignorance and not our knowledge. The scientific method consists of examining first the assumptions and the actual conclusions of physical science and the collection of facts within the field of psychology. I shall briefly note the first of these.

I begin with the fundamental assumptions of materialism from the earliest times. In order to eliminate the supposition of spirit from the cosmos, the Epicureans and materialists set up the existence of indestructible atoms to explain things. They were regarded as matter and not spirit of any kind. But they also made sense perception the standard of knowledge. They had never seen atoms and the senses were not able to perceive them. They were thus gratuitous assumptions, possibly true if you like, but gratuitous and for the purpose of undermining the belief in

spirit, whose methods had been quite as gratuitous as materialism. But in making sense perception the standard of knowledge, these Epicureans set up a supersensible world, in their atoms and the processes necessary to explain the cosmos, quite as transcendental to their theory of knowledge as spiritualism had ever been in its claims. Had it limited all knowledge of the material world to sense data and questioned the existence of atoms it would have had a powerful leverage on any philosophy which assumed anything beyond this. But in assuming the existence of atoms that transcended sense perception, it supposed a supersensible world and cut itself away from denying the possibility of spirit.

With spiritualism spirit is primarily distinguished only by its inaccessibility to sense perception regardless of what you call it otherwise, and many of that type of believers have held that spirit was a fine form of matter, just as the Greeks did to save the unity of the world. A supersensible world once admitted simply opens the way to the evidence for any form of it and spirit becomes as possible as atoms. It will be only a question of evidence. The Epicurean materialist did not stop to think that there was the same antithesis between his physical atoms and the physical world of sense as there could possibly be between matter and spirit. But he made the mistake of supposing that calling the atoms matter got rid of the idea of spirit, when even in his own time spirit was but the fine form of matter which even the Epicurean supposed a soul to be, admitting as a fact that there was such a finer material organism as the basis of consciousness. Hence he had no ground for denying the possibility of survival or the existence of atoms that might not be "physical" at all. Besides as they were dealing with the supersensible and that was assumed to be physical they might have seen that all that had been

meant by spirit could come within the conception of physical atoms, and Tertullian later saw this fact and used it effectively as an *ad hominem* argument.

Now when it comes to examining the problem from the point of view of physical science the materialistic work for three centuries makes it difficult to approach it. Physical science bases its philosophy upon the indestructible atoms, save so far as it has modified the atomic theory by its hypothesis of ions and electrons. It explains all organic beings and all inorganic compounds by the composition of these atoms in various quantitative relations and makes the resultant properties or activities products of that composition. Consciousness and mental states are among the functional activities of the organism in that hypothesis. Psychic research must meet that with fact, and fact of a kind that cannot be referred to the special compound with which consciousness was once associated. But that has nothing to do with establishing the possibility of a soul and survival. The belief in a soul is primarily based, so far as conceivability is concerned, upon the assured existence of something transcending sense and that is not matter as we ordinarily know it. Is there any such thing?

I shall say nothing of space and time which are neither matter nor properties of matter, because they are so closely related to sensory perception that we cannot apply the criterion we have set up. But the very atoms themselves are supersensible and it is only pure imagination that ascribes material properties to them. They may have them. That I shall not deny because I do not know enough about them to say what their properties are. Even the best of physicists say that the term means only quantity of energy and they do not pretend to define their properties. It will not do to say that they have form or shape, because no atom has ever been seen by naked eye or microscope.

Nor will it do to say that they have weight, because no atom has ever been weighed. Professor More of the University of Cincinnati has said in *The Hibbert Journal* that all this talk about atoms, ions, electrons, protons, corpuscles, etc. is pure metaphysics and imagination. He means to discredit such speculations. But I would not go so far as to say or imply that metaphysics and imagination may not be correct. But it is a gain to recognize that they are not data of sensory knowledge. There is no evidence that they have the properties of matter, except the *a priori* assumption that the constituent elements of matter as known to sense perception have the same properties as the compounds. The fact is that in many, if not in all compounds, the elements *do not* possess the same properties as the compounds. Oxygen and hydrogen when separated from each other have quite opposite properties from water which they form as a compound. This general principle runs throughout chemical compounds. It may apply to the atoms which have never revealed themselves to the senses.

I do not advance this possibility for any purpose except to indicate just what our ignorance is in the matter. I am not sure also that the physicist has any evidence for their existence when he says that they stand for quantity of energy, in as much as the term etymologically denotes the indivisible and quantity is always divisible. We may study the composition of the elements in compounds without raising the question of their having atoms. Quantity of any element is all that is wanted to study proportional relations in compounds and the idea of atoms beyond that of quantity is not necessary. But I shall not quarrel with the idea. Let the physicist give any conception to it he wishes; it is not a sensory fact and that is all we require to indicate its resemblance in one important feature of it to what had been called spirit from time

immemorial; namely, that it transcended sense perception.

But let us farther concede that atoms are matter, even though supersensible, there is the hypothesis of the ether which now so far dominates physical science, and it does not give evidence of the fundamental properties of matter. The essential qualities of matter are gravity, inertia, and impenetrability. The ether is universally distributed through space, is not subject to gravity, is perfectly penetrable and apparently not inert. There is nothing here that identifies it with matter. If we insist on calling it by the name "matter" this term has so changed its meaning that what we have called its essential properties are not essential to it at all and we might call it anything we pleased. If the term matter is to stand for clear thinking at all, it must imply the presence of gravity, inertia, and impenetrability. Otherwise we cannot argue with it. It must be definite in its conception or it is useless in the study of any problem. To make it definite is to represent it as having the essential properties named, and that excludes ether from it. If any reality exists in this universe with the properties ascribed to the ether and these the opposite of what we understand by matter, it is not hard to conceive the existence of an energy that thinks and it may be that the ether is this energy. At least the possibility of such a thing cannot be denied after conceding that matter is not the only thing in the cosmos.

Now all this does not prove the fact of spirit. It only shows that dogmatic denial of its possibility is not justified. We have not exhausted the liabilities of the universe, and physical science, after its theories of the ether and its ions and electrons, must not sneer at the possibility of spirit, though it has a right to demand evidence for the assertion of it. It must concede that the question is an open one and subject to

the laws of evidence, and by spirit we do not need to go farther than to suppose some energy that thinks apart from the physical organism with which it is usually associated, or always associated as we know it normally. The existence of all the radio-active processes beyond sense shows us distinctly that the agencies in it extend beyond sense perception and we do not know the limits of such agencies. That is all there is to it, and as long as we do not know what possibly lies in store for discovery the question of a soul is an open one.

There is another argument of much force which the scientific mind will have to respect as long as he interprets the conservation of energy as implying the persistence of the antecedent in the consequent of the causal series which he studies. The physicist assumes that there is a causal nexus between physical and mental phenomena and this, too, either way we consider the terms. Physical action he also interprets as involving sameness of kind or identity between causes and effects, when interpreted as the transmission of energy from one point to another, or from one subject to another. Thus in a machine shop the expansibility of steam is the physical cause of the work done in the shop, and it is always assumed, even as proved, that the energy expressed in the pressure of the steam on the head of the piston rod in the engine, or of water against the water wheel, is the same in kind as well as amount as that which is distributed about the machine shop and does the ultimate work.

Now if he assumes the same sort of causal relation between mental and physical phenomena, he must assume that they are identical in kind and in some cases they do this, calling the mental phenomena modes of motion and thinking that they have eradicated intelligence from them. But this is an illusion. When the consequent is the same in kind as the antecedent, the

latter has to be interpreted as much by the consequent as the consequent by the antecedent. That is, the identity works both ways. You cannot say that the effect, consciousness, is a mode of motion without assuming also that the antecedent motion is also consciousness, or your conservation of energy does not hold good. The conservation of energy that will assume a causal nexus between physical and mental phenomena, and at the same time assumes that the two terms are qualitatively the same, must admit that one of the terms is just as permanent as the other, and the doctrine of survival would be a necessity from the very nature of the case. It will not do to say that the conservation of energy means only that it is the *quantity* of energy remains the same in all the changes through which it passes; for a quantitative comparison is impossible unless there is a qualitative identity between antecedent and consequent. The whole doctrine of the conservation of energy depends on this identity to justify asserting the identity of quantity in the terms of the series.

Hence the only escape which the physicist has, who interprets causality in terms of conservation, is to deny a causal nexus between physical and mental phenomena, and to deny that distinctly opens the way to supposing that there is something else than physical phenomena and their accidents in the world. Besides he has to face evidence for some causal nexus which is as overwhelming as any evidence for causal nexus between different physical phenomena. Hence the conservation of energy interpreted as material causation; that is, the transmission of force from subject to subject and identical in quality or quantity must yield the doctrine of survival, whether we assume a soul or not.

The consequence of this is that survival after death would be absolutely assured on any such view as is usually held of conservation and the only escape from

it would be either to question the truth of the conservation of energy or to deny the causal relation between physical and mental phenomena. It was the latter alternative which Leibnitz took, denying that there were "any windows in the soul" by which the external world could be transmitted into it. He admitted what he called "occasional causes" which may be called efficient causes, meaning that the antecedent may instigate the consequent without being transmitted, or transformed into it. But, as previously remarked this is to open the way to a sort of dualism which the physicist does not wish to admit. However, as long as he conceives causation after the idea of transmission of motion and assumes that physical and mental events may interchangeably cause each other, he must concede as much immortality to consciousness as he claims for motion. Nor can he appeal to the evidence of nature to show that mental phenomena have not, as a fact, been permanent. He could be forced to accept it against appearances, because the logic of his doctrine makes it inevitable and any doubt that he entertains about the conclusion must redound upon his premises.

It is only the doubt about the conservation of energy, or the conception of it which physicists so often present, that throws doubt upon survival after death. Physical science needs to make clearer what it really means by this doctrine and to determine accurately whether it means the identity of kind between antecedent and consequent or mere correlation in the way of uniform laws and hence *proportional* relations between incommensurable terms.

This argument, of course, is *ad hominem*. It applies only to the man who interprets causality between mental and physical phenomena as being after the type of identity between antecedent and consequent and so in terms of the conservation of energy as defined. The man who does not regard the conservation of energy

as the universal type of causation may escape the toils of this logic, but no other can do it. This is a curious position in which to place physical science. It must affirm immortality on any theory of the universe or give up the conservation of energy. Of course, that depends on a certain construction of the principle of causality and as long as it clings to the conservation of energy qualitatively conceived and makes it the typical embodiment of causation, its materialism, Epicurean or otherwise, is futile as an antagonist of a future life. Hence it must either revise its doctrine of causality and conservation, or yield the battle of spiritualism, and to revise them is to open the way to possibilities it now denies.

As a corollary to the physicists making the conservation of energy the interpreter of causality and the qualitative identity of antecedent and consequent, there would be a reconciliation of the mechanical and the teleological theories of nature. Ever since materialism was presented as a theory of the cosmos, the mechanical conception of it was simply convertible with it and the mechanical conception of nature supposedly excluded intelligence. But the moment that you apply this mechanical theory to the relation between physical and mental phenomena and also apply the conservation of energy to them at the same time, you make the mechanical and the intelligent convertible, the antecedent being as much consciousness as mechanical and the consequent mechanical as well as mental. Motion and consciousness become identical and without consciousness being lost, so that the widest application of the mechanical in the universe would carry with it the concomitance of the intelligent with it.

Coinciding with this is the fact that the evidence for proving intelligence in the cosmos, the teleological argument, is not coterminous with the nature of that intelligence. That is, the mechanical order is uniform,

or supposedly so and thus taken to exclude intelligence which was supposed to indicate variation from a fixed order. Hence miracles or exceptions to uniformity were the evidence of intelligence. But we must not forget that the exceptional does not determine the *ratio essendi* of intelligence. It can be no more than its *ratio cognoscendi*. The distinction is between the nature and the evidence of intelligence. The exceptional may be the evidence, *ratio cognoscendi*, but not the nature or *ratio essendi*. Much the same can be said of the mechanical. The uniform and invariable is not necessarily the nature of the mechanical, though it may be the evidence of it.

It is the doctrine of inertia that determines where and when the mechanical begins and that law establishes uniformity, so that when the mechanical is once initiated it appears as uniform and invariable. Then to find uniformity is to suspect that the phenomena are mechanical. But if the cause initiating the mechanical order be in any way variable, there will be variability in the mechanical, so that we can suppose intelligence to be the initiating cause and so coterminous with the mechanical. Moreover, we know that the rational mind is constant and uniform in its conduct, so that the uniform cannot be regarded as the essential difference between mind and matter. The essentia of mind may as well be fixed as not, so far as its relation to the mechanical is concerned, and variation is only the evidence that the uniformity is not what the mechanical was supposed to be. The mechanical can be antithetic only as the inert to the self-active, not as the fixed opposed to the capricious. The mechanical and the intelligent alike may be either uniform or variable, while their evidence is not the same. The exception will be the evidence of the intelligent where we suppose a mechanical system cannot admit the variable, and the constant will be the evidence

of the mechanical where we suppose that intelligence is necessarily capricious.

There is another way to approach the problem. In all the previous discussion I have disregarded the psychological point of view and conceded the physicist's conception of matter. I have assumed what some would call the realistic point of view, as the physicist is supposed to do. But we may take the psychological or what may be called the idealistic point of view. In physical problems we accept the dicta of sense perception in some form, and matter is for us something in connection with which we may ignore the correlate of consciousness which asserts its existence. We do not question the data of knowledge or analyze what is meant by "matter" from the standpoint of consciousness. We take it as a clear fact and undertake to study the events connected with what we call by that name. Consciousness, especially since the time of Descartes, is taken as a fact apart and as having nothing to do with the nature of matter or with the conceptions of it which are the assumptions of physical science. As many philosophers say, the philosopher abstracts matter from the relation in which it is always found and then treats of it as if it had no such relation. I do not question the right to do so, especially when we are obliged to accept the metaphysical idea of it which our own thinking imposes on us, if we are to do anything with it at all. But we must not forget at the same time that, whatever matter is, its relation to consciousness in knowledge is a fact that must not be lost sight of when we come to reckon with the ultimate meaning of things. This relation of consciousness to matter in knowledge is one fact that undoubtedly makes a difference in our estimate of consciousness when trying to compare it with physical phenomena and trying to reduce it to motion or other physical events.

Physical events do not know each other, but consciousness knows itself and physical events, whether it knows *what* they are or not, and in that fact establishes an important difference between itself and objective facts. The difference may not be ultimate. In fact the very circumstance that we thus always find them correlated in knowledge easily suggests that the previous possible identification of the mechanical and mental through the assumed causal nexus between them and the application of the doctrine of conservation of energy to them may be correct. At least this perpetual association of the two in knowledge coincides with this view of them, and whatever permanence we give to one may hold good of the other when separated from its material accompaniment, whether we regard them as the same in kind, as different, or as merely associated facts. But this is not our main point here. What I wish to emphasize now is the logical prius of consciousness to matter as known. I do not say that it is the temporal prius to the existence of matter, but that its existence *means* nothing unless known by consciousness and it is known through that agency, and physical phenomena have ultimately to be studied in the relation in which they are *known* as well as in that in which they are supposed to exist apart from knowledge. That fact gives consciousness or mental phenomena a standing which they would not have in a system which subordinated them logically and temporally to matter, as the materialistic hypotheses does.

Of course, we have to admit that matter exists prior to our individual consciousness, so far as we know it at all, and it is that fact which makes the materialistic theory strong, especially when we are governed by monistic tendencies in our philosophy. That is, as long as we assume that the Absolute is one form of reality, and that matter is the indestructible thing in the world we must naturally suspect from the temporal succession

of consciousness to matter that matter is the prior cause of all things. But when we find that we can conceive matter only as it is known and that consciousness is the judge of what it is, we are inevitably thrown back upon the fact that matter out of relation to consciousness may not be like what it is in that relation, but the negation of sense appearances, and so possibly convertible with mind as the subject of consciousness, and then again the mechanical and the mental would either be identical or the two sides of the same shield, a double faced unity, as some call them, perpetual correlates of each other, so that the question of dependence is an open one, and as long as it is open, the existence of soul and its survival as a consequence of its existence and relation to the indestructibility of substance is a possible fact.

This argument I shall not develop fully, as there is neither space nor time for it here, and I do not regard it as so conclusive as to emphasize it for more than it is worth. It is merely a weapon for suggesting skepticism where materialism is dogmatic, and I turn to other problems.

The approach to the problem may first be made through physical science and then through certain facts in psychology. I shall devote a little space to both of these methods.

The first thing to note in physical science is the atomic theory. I do not mean that the fact of the existence, or the hypothetical existence, of atoms is in any way favorable directly to any doctrine of the existence of a soul or of its survival. I mean to call attention to certain things about that theory which show that it is more nearly allied to the metaphysics which atomic materialism usually ridicules. I refer particularly to the interesting fact that the materialist's atomic world is not only metaphysical, but it is a purely supersensible world. The materialist usually

laughs at all philosophies and metaphysics which abstract from sensation for their ideas. The materialist boasts of a reliance upon sensation and the ideas obtained from sensation for his conception of the world. But he fails to see that his atomic theories as much defy sensory conception as any medieval theology. He has never been able to see or weigh his atoms any more than the theologian has ever seen a soul or God.

The whole atomic world is quite as supersensible as ever a world of spirits could be and it has not responded in a single case to the tests by which he assures us of his other facts. And the important thing is that he makes this supersensible basis the cause and basis of the sensible world, its creator, if I may use that expression here in connection with materialism. He ought then to see that there can be no *a priori* objection to the possibility of a world beyond sense in which consciousness might have a supersensible existence, especially that it is not itself a sensible fact in the physical world. All that he can contend for is that there is no evidence for it or that such evidence as we have of its connections associated it with an organism which perishes. But the absence of evidence for its survival is not evidence of its absence from existence. That ought to be clear. Of course, it is no evidence for its survival. That is freely conceded and also that we must have positive evidence before believing it. But this has nothing to do with the question whether his logic is sound or not, when he argues against the impossibility of survival. The very fact that he goes to a supersensible reality to explain the sensible makes it imperative to ask whether he can turn round and use the sensible as a basis for denying or questioning the possibility of the supersensible in connection with consciousness which is never a sensible fact at all. The survival of it ought to have as many possibilities as atoms, especially when it would explain certain facts

just as atoms are supposed to do in the physical world.

The next suggestive fact in nature is radio-active phenomena. It is not that they are evidence of spirit in any sense whatever, but that they represent facts that are supersensible to ordinary perception. They are not detected in ordinary experience, but require special means for their discovery and illustration. The phenomena of Roentgen rays do the same. They illustrate the existence and action of occult physical agencies where normal sense perception would not suspect or discover them. These with all radio-active phenomena show how plentiful supersensible activities are which sense does not reveal and in breaking up the older dogmatic limits of matter they open the way to possibilities which physical science cannot deny, though it may legitimately enough ask for evidence, whenever any specific claim is made for the extension of the occult, whether it be physical or mental. But the fact indicates that physical science has not assigned any definite limits to the existence of supersensible agencies in the world.

The *a priori* argument on the part of physical science is futile. If such realities as ions and electrons exist and supplant the atomic theory, it is not difficult to suppose the possibility of spiritual agencies which would effectually conceal their existence from the ordinary, or even extraordinary tests of physical science. It is only a matter of evidence, not of impossibilities based upon dogmatic limits to our conception of reality. Of course this is no argument for the fact of mind or spirit. To suppose that it is would be to mistake the purpose of the discussion and to mistake the facts also. There may be no mind or spirit as a fact, but all these occult physical forces are so much in favor of possibilities which justify keeping an eye out for facts. They show unmistakably that there are pos-

sibilities of which the older physical science did not dream, and that suffices to keep the question open.

The hypothesis of ether points in the same direction and it does so with much more effectiveness than radio-active and other phenomena. Atoms, Roentgen rays, and radio-active agencies still represent matter, but the ether is not so clearly this. The fundamental conception of matter is that its essential properties are inertia, impenetrability and gravity. Anything without these properties would not be regarded as matter by any man who was clear and consistent in his conceptions and use of terms. Now the ether exhibits no such properties, whatever you choose to call it. The ether is penetrable, or penetrates all matter, is not subject to the law of gravity, and is apparently self-active or the source of activity in the cosmos. These facts raise the question whether we have any right to call it "matter." We have only to discover that it is the basis of intelligence to distinguish it more definitely from matter with which consciousness is not a necessary associate. Certain it is that the ether is not matter as we know it in the laboratory and common experience. Its properties of penetrability and universal distribution through space and the absence of gravity in it, though its strain or stress may be the cause of gravity in matter, suggest that the basis of things is to be found outside of matter, just as the older philosophy placed it, and this is to open wide the field for experiment and observation for the existence of consciousness beyond the pale of physical organism.

It is true that the ether hypothesis is not so well established as to make it a safe basis for speculation. The corpuscular theory would set it aside, but this new point of view would not alter our position, because it is not a question of words in the case. The reference to ether here is only an *ad hominem* argument. It

appeals to those who accept it and who define matter as indicated. Any alteration in the conception of matter, excluding inertia, impenetrability and gravity from it as essential properties, opens the field as fully as the other view, because it breaks down the antithesis between matter and spirit which possibly should never have been assumed. I am here only showing that the older conceptions do not contain the ideas which men are using all the time. For me it is not a question of philosophic argument, but of discovered facts that will settle the problem. Hence it is a scientific problem, not one of testing the consistency or inconsistency of conceptions and definitions. But the failure of any special conception to cover the facts necessitates the recognition of another one as opposed to the old as one species is to another, in order to make the outside field intelligible. But whatever the issue is, the theories of the ether so thoroughly refine matter, if you call it matter, or assume something immaterial, that the possibility of "spirit" in some sense of the term is so evident that denial of it is irrational and the mind can only await evidence for its being a fact.

I turn then to the psychological situation. We find consciousness associated with a perishable organism and all the facts of normal psychology show this association to be so uniform and the integrity of this consciousness apparently so dependent on the organism that, with the disappearance of the evidence of its continuance when the body perishes, barring the phenomena of psychic research, that we seem to have nothing to support either the possibility or the fact of survival. But there is one important fact which requires the subject to be kept open. *It is the distinction between the conditions for the proof of consciousness and the conditions for its existence.* Let me make this clear.

We know directly that we are ourselves conscious and hence that consciousness exists. But we do not

directly know the conditions of its existence. We do not know our own body as we know that of others. It does not appear to be an objective thing to us in the same way as do other bodies. We directly perceive our sensations and mental states and our bodies are the reflex of these sensations and states. But when it comes to knowing others we do not have any direct knowledge that they have mental states. We perceive only their bodies and have to infer from their physical conduct and behavior that consciousness accompanies them. We have no immediate knowledge of their mental states. Some form of motor action on their part is the sole evidence that consciousness exists in them at all. That consciousness might lie dormant, so to speak, and this means without producing any motor effect in the body, so that we might not know that consciousness existed there. This is apparent in catalepsy and paralysis and there are cases where we suppose the person dead or consciousness no longer existent, but recovery shows that it was present and active all the time. This situation is indubitable proof that there may be a radical difference between the ordinary *evidence* for the existence of consciousness and the conditions of that existence. We rely entirely upon motor action of some kind to ascertain that consciousness exists outside ourselves, and that motor action may not be a condition of its *existence* but only a condition of its physical *manifestation*. Consciousness may exist without being able to manifest its existence, as we see in the cases of catalepsy and paralysis. It is clear in such instances, and we only await evidence of some kind that this existence is not limited to its physical and motor manifestations.

Now I make the bold statement that we have no evidence or better, perhaps, proof, that the existence of consciousness depends on organic structure. This will seem an unwarranted statement in the fact of the

results of physiology in which we find that consciousness is always associated with physical structure and we have no normal traces of its independent existence when that structure disappears. But in making this strong statement I am conceding that we have the clear and positive proof that the physical structure or organism is the condition of its manifestation to others. Motor action is absolutely proved to be the evidence for its existence, but it is not the evidence for the condition of that existence. That is perfectly clear in the cases of catalepsy and paralysis. Hence physiologists and psychologists have confused the conditions for its manifestation with the conditions of its existence.

It may be that we have no evidence for its existence apart from physical structure. I am not contending that we have. Certainly if the phenomena of apparitions and mediumistic statements are to be barred, there is no evidence of its independence that can be anything like scientific proof. But that has nothing to do with the question about the distinction between the conditions of *proving* its existence and the conditions of that existence. All I am insisting on here is that the phenomena of physiology, with all their uniformity, prove only that the physical *manifestations* of consciousness depend on the organism and do not prove that the existence of it depends on the organism. The existence may depend on that structure, but the facts do not prove it. We may not have any right, apart from apparitions and mediumistic phenomena, to suppose any other condition, and I concede that apart from these residual phenomena the only rational hypothesis for science is that of dependence. But it is only a working hypothesis and is far from being proved. It is quite possible that what is the condition of its physical manifestations is not at all the condition of its existence, and as long as that is true the possibility exists that

we may find facts suggesting its existence apart from physical manifestation in the normal way.

Perhaps a point can be made of the causal influence of consciousness on the organism, though materialism has either tacitly admitted or ignored it within its system. If we concede that consciousness can act as a cause it must be with the admission that it is unique in this respect. The true conception of materialism makes consciousness a function of the organism and this implies that it is an effect and nothing is provided in that view which would assume or make it a cause of anything. But in the series of events which comprise stimulus, molecular action on the way to brain centers, sensation, consciousness, molecular action and motion along motor paths, we have a series of events in which consciousness seems to be an effect of its antecedent, stimulus, and in turn the antecedent or cause of motor action. The observed series appears to have the same character as an observed series of physical events alone.

But there is one thing of interest here that usually passes unnoticed. It is that, in the course of our experience, education or development, our habits show more direct paths of reaction to stimulus and they are without the accompaniment of consciousness, or without its causal action, so that it seems to be, when it exists, a parallel concomitant of purely physical phenomena. Reflex actions are those which I have in mind particularly. They are responses to stimuli with which consciousness has nothing to do. We may be conscious of their occurrence after the fact, but not before it, and the latter would be necessary in order even to suspect a causal relation. In that group, therefore consciousness is not the antecedent cause, but terminates the series in so far as any such influence is concerned, and is either unaware of the reflex act or independent of it.

But in the field of voluntary action it appears very

distinctly that consciousness is a cause of motor movements. As it stands in a series between stimulus and reaction, it obtains the appearance at least of being both an effect and a cause, as C would be between A and D in a physical series. But as a cause there is something unique about it that distinguishes it from a mechanical cause. I do not refer to its teleological character, that is a decided difference and is a vantage ground to which we may return at any time in estimating its nature. I refer to the peculiar form of its assumed causal action. In a mechanical series the causal action is in a direct line. Force is promulgated in the direction from which impact comes. Transmission is the law of mechanical action. There is nothing reflex about it. We do speak of action and reaction and of their being equal but this does not mean that the motion involved in the causal action of the antecedent moving body is turned backward in the direction from which it came, but merely that it ceases in that antecedent subject and is assumed in the subject of impact. The series of events involve no return of the motion in the direction of the impelling body.

But in the phenomena of consciousness, or even in reflex actions, no such law obtains. Reflex actions are "mechanical" in their uniformity and the absence of mental accompaniments. But we leave them out of account here. Conscious acts show adaptability to directions which are wholly unlike both mechanical and reflex actions. The causal action can as well be in the direction from which the stimulus comes as in the opposite. In this fundamental respect it is wholly different from any causal agency we observe in the material world, and besides it may act on its own spontaneity without awaiting stimuli at all. As a cause, it thus stands out in an exceptional manner. It is unique, even when it appears to be a term in a

series. That series, though it is such, is also more than a series. It represents a term which may assume any directive function in determining what the consequents may be. This is not true of the mechanical series. Hence when we give consciousness a causal function it is not as a passive effect in a series, but as an initiating agency which may exercise a directive power and act in a direction the opposite of that which mechanical laws require.

Just so far, then, as consciousness is a unique causal agent in the series, now appearing as if it were an independent unit and at others as if it were not, it must seem to represent something non-mechanical. That is, in so far as consciousness can determine whether it shall be a passive fact or an active one in the series, and in this active agency deciding the direction of its influence, it must appear to be an initiating and originating agent, and that places it outside the mechanical series at the same time that it appears to be in it. Such a conception of it suggests its independence and once concede it to be an independent causal agent and you have the possibility that it is not a transient or phenomenal event.

It is not my intention to discuss the evidence for survival. We are occupied here only with the possibility of it in so far as the normal facts of life support it. They do not prove it. They simply show that the materialistic hypothesis is not proved. I concede that all the evidence of normal life, so far as scientific method is concerned, favors materialism and if we have no other evidence, materialism is the only theory the intelligent man can hold, but he has not proved it beyond this agreement of the facts with it. He has not offered such proof as he demands in his laboratory for the non-existence of a particular element or phenomenon. So far as his facts go they leave it possible,

that consciousness may exist apart from the physical organism, though we may have no evidence that it is a fact. Whether it is a fact is not the topic of discussion here. That remains for another chapter.

CHAPTER VII

DIFFICULTIES OF THE PROBLEM

WE shall have to give illustrations of statements regarding the nature of another life, but we cannot do so without first warning readers of the difficulties under which we labor in determining their value. We have not expressed any certain conviction as to the nature of a spiritual world and its life; while we did indicate indifference to what it might be as long as it had no definite relation to our ethical obligations in this life. If rational at all, it must have some such relations, but they remain still to be determined. We have made only slight progress as yet in regard to the questions involved, except that of mere survival. The public forgets or is ignorant of what the great problems are, and so assumes that it is enough if we prove survival to carry with it any idea it pleases about the nature of the life which makes it possible. It has not discriminated between two wholly distinct problems, and the different methods involved in solving them.

The two problems are (1) that of survival and (2) that of the nature of the world in which we survive. The first of these is very easy of solution compared with the second, and from the painfully slow progress before the public of the first problem, we can imagine what the second will be. The solution of the first of the problems is effected by satisfying three requirements. (*a*) The exclusion of fraud and secondary personality from the facts which claim to be

communication from the dead. (b) The acquisition of supernormal information bearing upon the personal identity of the dead. (c) The exclusion of the telepathic hypothesis in explanation. Now I regard it as a comparatively easy task to satisfy each and all of these conditions. Those who have not investigated the subject live in the blissful illusion that it is extremely difficult to satisfy any one or all of these conditions. But this illusion grows out of ignorance and indolence. If they knew in the least how to experiment, they would find it a very easy thing to exclude every condition tending to discredit the facts. It is respectability only that enables the skeptical attitude to linger and persist in its difficulties. I regard it as perfectly easy to prove survival and I shall here take it as proved with sufficient clearness to justify ignoring the objectors to it. The evidence is clear and conclusive, and indeed so overwhelmingly plentiful that concession to ignorance and skepticism is no longer justifiable.

But when it comes to the second problem I would express a calmer judgment. That is not so easy. It involves complications which the other does not have. Had the means been supplied for experiment in this field the second problem would not be so hard as it seems. The difficulty in getting the public to see what it is and what the funds needed for it are is a greater problem apparently than that of experiment. It would be an easy task to perform had the experimenter the means and the help to carry out the necessary experiments, but most people, scientific men as well as laymen, expect the case to be decided over night and by accepting the messages in accordance with the ordinary interpretations of language, and so approve or disapprove of the "revelations" according to their prejudices for or against the case. This is another inexcusable delusion on the part of both sides.

Now let us examine something of the method involved

in settling whether personal consciousness survives death. We start with the assumptions which the materialists teach us; namely, that consciousness is a function of the brain and that all knowledge is derived by normal sense perception. Now telepathy negatives the latter and shows that some knowledge can come to us independently of normal sense perception. But it does not prove survival. We must obtain intelligent messages bearing on the personal identity of deceased persons not known to the percipient or subject through whom such messages come.

Now it is perfectly easy to obtain conditions under which all normal knowledge of particular persons has been excluded. All that we have to do is to take a total stranger to a psychic and make a verbatim and complete record of what is said or occurs there, and then determine whether the contents are possibly due to guessing or chance coincidence, whether conscious or subconscious, and whether they articulately represent facts once known to the alleged deceased person. That is perfectly easy to do and it is just as easy to exclude any known telepathy from the explanation. But in securing this evidence of personal survival we do not require to raise any questions regarding the conditions for communicating the messages. It suffices to know that they represent supernormal information, after excluding all possible sources of normal explanation. We do not require to know anything about even the physiological conditions that affect the result, any more than we require to know anything about the spiritual processes by which the result is produced. It is the facts that exclude normal explanations which decide the case, provided the incidents relate to the personal identity of the dead. The subconscious of the medium may color them as much as you please or bury them up in its own chaff, provided only that they are evidently not of its own creation and give

evidence that they are not such. We do not need to know how the thing is done. The facts when supernatural demand an extraneous source, whatever their relation to processes by which they are produced.

But when it comes to accepting statements about the nature of a spiritual world it is a different matter. We have then to understand something about the conditions under which information about it comes to us. This general principle is even true about intercourse between the living about the material world, though the difficulties are not so numerous or so perplexing to overcome. When a man tells us that he has made a new discovery in science we require to know *how* he did it and to ascertain whether the conditions under which he announces the discovery make it truthful or not. And this in a world where we have a tolerably easy command over things. But when it comes to telling us about a transcendental world it is not so easy. (It is not enough to get statements about it. We have to confirm them and to know something of the conditions by which they get to us.) In proving personal identity it does not make any difference whether communications are distorted or not, so we can recognize that they are not primarily products of the living mind. We are trying, in deciding that issue, only to ascertain whether personality in some way survives, and we do not require to know whether this personality requires a bodily connection of any kind or not. It may be anything you please in so far as that limited issue is concerned. But when we ask whether personality has a spiritual body or not; whether it is a functional stream in the universal energy of the cosmos, or whether it is an attachment of a spaceless point of force, we have a very different situation confronting us.

The difficulties which we encounter in the endeavor to ascertain the nature of a spiritual world manifest themselves even in proving survival; for the messages

are not all of them evidential. They are, many of them, not only non-evidential, but so clearly subconscious that we have to accept the evidential matter under the handicap of subliminal coloring. (I have never known a spirit message to come without this coloring.) The language and limitations of the medium are always apparent in the best of material. This liability is conceded by spiritualists themselves, but they rarely if ever reckon with it in their treatment of the facts. Besides they do not adequately distinguish in most cases between evidential incidents and subliminal chaff that can make no pretense whatever of spiritistic origin. The conditions may not wholly prevent transmission, but they serve in most cases as a restriction on free communication. What they are we do not know as yet and can only conjecture them along the broadest lines. We can imagine that the analogies of normal experience may enter into them. Thus the individual has to begin at birth to gradually acquire power to move his own organism and after years of patient endeavor to obtain such facility in it as we observe in normal experience. When an accident to the body occurs, like paralysis or illness of any kind that weakens control of the organism, even the living have gradually to recover that power. This is a fact so familiar to all of us that it does not require discussion. Now it is conceivable that a discarnate intelligence, having severed its connection with its own body would encounter tenfold, perhaps a thousandfold, greater difficulties in acquiring power to control a new organism, with other connections and experiences belonging to a living soul, than it would have with its own organism, and these were great enough there, especially when the normal conditions were affected by accident or disease.

Now if we will only add to this difficulty the next one; namely, the necessity, perhaps, that all messages

must either come through the mind of the psychic or be affected by the mental, physical, and moral habits of the psychic, and as a consequence be affected by these conditions, we shall see that we must always have a source of confirmation for our facts. In the study of personal identity, we have the testimony of the living to determine for us whether the communications are true or not, and our own experience in the physical world enables us to interpret their meaning. We find, too, that even the best messages are extremely fragmentary and confused, so that they are not testimony to the total material that was probably sent on its journey to the living. But subconscious coloring and contributions add immensely to the data that passes for spirit messages and we have to select from the mass those incidents which are clearly not subconscious fabrications, but which are verifiable by the living as supernormal information in spite of distortion by the mediumistic mind or organism through which they come. The fact of distortion suggests that all messages are subject to such influences and that proper discount has to be made for messages reporting the nature of a transcendental world.

It is not necessary to suppose that any purpose exists to distort them. It is inevitable, just as it is inevitable that any mind reporting impressions and narratives must act in accordance with its past experience and habits and express its conceptions in the mold of these prejudices, which we may call them. A bell always rings its own tone, no matter with what it is struck. A piece of wood gives its own sound in response to impact. It is the same with any physical object. A mirror reflects images according to the nature of its surface. A bell will not produce an opera; a piece of wood will not ring curfew; a mirror will not sing a song. Each object acts and reacts according to its own nature, and the human mind is no exception

to this law. It must act along the line of its structure and habits. The amount of knowledge which it possesses determines the limits of its power to receive and express ideas. A mind which knows nothing but the commonest sensations cannot be made the vehicle for impressive oratory. It takes a mind of some intelligence to do this. A mediumistic mind must have some qualifications for expressing what comes to it from a transcendental world and its communications with such a world will be limited to its abilities and its experience as a vehicle for ideas of any kind.

If the spiritual world be only a replica of the physical and so expressible in the terms that are intelligible to us in the physical world, the main obstacle will be in getting communications at all. They might be self-explanatory, if that world could be described in our terms. But suppose it be quite different. The whole process will then encounter difficulties of which people little dream. Some would even go so far as to say that no possible conception of a transcendental world could be obtained, unless it had some points in common with the physical life, and this contention would be hard to refute. Let us take a good analogy.

Suppose that a man born blind but having hearing tried to tell his auditory experiences to a man who had lost his hearing, but retained his vision intact. How would such a person describe his experiences to the blind man? It would be in fact absolutely impossible for him to communicate any intelligible idea of his auditory experiences. There is nothing in common between the sensations of sight and hearing. All that the blind man could say about his auditory sensations, or the deaf man about his visual sensations would convey nothing to the friend who had not the sense which the communicator retained. The only common element in such experiences might be the emotions which each had in his own experience. The visual experiences of

the one might have the same kind of emotions accompanying his visual sensations that the other's hearing had in connection with audition. They could communicate with each other intelligibly only in terms of common emotions. The sensations and their meaning would be wholly absent for each of them, so far as common knowledge is concerned.

The process of communicating anything at all between the living is much the same. We have to possess a common language or we are much isolated from each other as spirits can be supposed to be from the living. Signs, where language does not exist, are no exception to this statement. Language is only an auditory sign as mimicry and imitation are to vision. We have to agree on symbols beforehand in order to communicate at all. Language in that way, combined with imitation on the part of the younger generation, builds up a vast system of symbols of common experiences, where we assume that we are alike in constitution and experiences, and thus we come to be able to symbolize what we know, and the person hearing the symbols can use his own experience for understanding what we mean.

This means that, naturally or normally we cannot communicate with each other at all, even among the living, and that we have had to develop an arbitrary and conventional system of symbols for social and other purposes. And all this is true in spite of the advantages which we enjoy in the possession of a physical organism and sensory relations which do not subsist between the living and the dead. But when a spirit is bodiless, as we know bodies, and without the conditions for producing on the living the same impressions as a living organism and its speech can do, how much more difficult it must be for the dead to communicate with us. It is quite natural to believe it absolutely impossible, but any such belief would be based upon assumptions that might not be true, though we are not familiar

with anything in normal experience to make it impossible. How can a disembodied reality exercise any influence on an embodied one? I do not ask this question to imply a negative answer, but to suggest the difficulty of the problem which the alleged fact of communication creates. But it is certain that the difficulties must be greater than between the living, where we regard it is *naturally* impossible and achievable only by conventional means.

Now if the transcendental world be totally different from the physical in its essential characteristics, how can we expect any ready commerce of ideas between it and us? Suppose it be a mental world altogether, how can we expect our sensory ideas to represent it? Assuming it to be a purely mental world, we should encounter at least the same difficulties that we meet in our physical life when we try to tell each other what we mean by mental phenomena. Indeed we cannot do it in sensory terms and we have to rely upon symbols of common sensory experiences with the hope that common mental events may become intelligible to each other by association with the sensory. Uniformities of coexistence and sequence between mental and sensory may enable us to suggest to each other what we mean by our mental states, and indeed it has been this very antithesis between the mental and the physical that has given rise to a dualistic philosophy and shown the difficulty of making our inner life intelligible in sensory symbols.

Let me illustrate what I have said. First a man familiar with steam engines could not make clear to an Esquimau what such an engine is, even by the use of the English language, so far as an Esquimau would know it, much less if the Esquimau did not know any English. He might call it a horse with wheels for legs and fire for power, but this would not convey to him a correct conception of it. He might convey some

idea of its motion by comparing this motion with that with which the Esquimau was familiar, by saying for instance, that in so many degrees of movement of the sun it went such and such a distance with which the Esquimau was familiar in his own movements. He would find that the engine had an incredible velocity compared with his own, but this would not help him to any clear conception of what the engine was. It would only give some analogy of its behavior compared with his own. It would not give him a mental picture of what the engine was.

It should be clear therefore, what the difficulties are in trying to form a conception of a transcendental world. If it were completely analogous to the physical world the same language would describe it that describes the physical. But conceding its resemblance to this life, with nothing but the supersensible to distinguish it from our sensory ideas, we should encounter all the difficulties in the process of communication in our effort to obtain a clear idea of it. These difficulties represent or are represented in the fragmentary and confused nature of the messages coming from its inhabitants, in the limitations imposed by subconscious conditions through which the messages have to come, constituted by the experience and prejudices of the medium, and perhaps many other obstacles. Then in addition they lack, at present, the confirmation we desire.

But now suppose that the spiritual world is wholly different from the physical. Suppose that supersensible means more than merely inaccessible to sense perception, though like it in form. Suppose it means a purely mental world in which the forms of time and space, as perceived by sense, do not participate. What probability is there that we can form any intelligible conception of what it is like, even if communication were perfectly easy? Here we would seem to have

conditions under which adequate ideas would be impossible, though we might have reason to believe that the stream of consciousness survived.

Now in addition to the possibly radical difference between a physical and transphysical world, let us suppose what is also possible, that there may be either or both of the following conditions associated with communications from the transcendental. (1) That communicators are in an abnormal mental condition when communicating. (2) That the method of communication is by telepathic hallucinations produced in the living by the dead.

It was Dr. Hodgson that advanced the first of these hypotheses and I defended it after him for a long time. But much occurred to make me pause in my allegiance to it. The work of recent years showed me that the "mental picture" method undoubtedly prevailed in certain psychics and certain conditions, probably, of all psychics. It explained so much that the first hypothesis seemed to be unnecessary or untrue. But, while I am convinced that the terms "trance" and "dream state" do not correctly describe the condition of the communicator, there is still much to suggest and to sustain the theory of some mental condition not normal as we might understand the term.

It is possible that two other conceptions of the condition may describe it and explain the similarity of the situation to that described by "trance" or "dream state." I refer to the "Apparent Analogies with Aphasia" and the "Associates of Constrained Attention," both of which have been discussed elsewhere at great length. It is possible that the situation may be fully explained by either one of these without the other. But either of them does much to explain the similarity of the results to what would occur in a trance or dream state. They would both of them represent some sort of abnormal mental condition, though having analogies

with the relation between voluntary and spontaneous thinking with the living and the differences of effect on the organism. But this aside for the moment, the main point is that the relation of a discarnate spirit to a new organism not its own and when severed from such a relation as the soul had when living, might prevent any such causal action on a living organism as it had been accustomed to when living. Analogies with aphasia might readily occur in that situation without involving any internally abnormal mental condition for the spirit. But it would be some sort of an abnormal condition even if not mental and if only in the physical condition of the psychic and the physical relation of the organism to the communicating spirit. Though that does not confirm any theory of abnormal mental conditions in the spirit, it does indicate important difficulties in the way of giving us adequate knowledge of what a spiritual world is.

Again, suppose this hypothesis of abnormal mental conditions in the spirit be untrue, it is pretty clear that the process of communicating by mental pictures is a common one. This would seem to imply that the spiritual world was a mental one and that thoughts are transmitted from the mind of the spirit in the form of "pictures" or hallucinations adapted to any sense and so seem to represent that world as like our own in all its external characteristics. Apparitions representing spirits in their earthly clothing, and objects exactly as known among the living convey the impression to the living that the transcendental world is exactly like our own in its form with no difference but inaccessibility to the physical senses. Ethereal organisms and senses are supposed. This is the reason that the layman has always accepted these phenomena with their superficial interpretation. But a critical study of large masses of phenomena and the perplexing problem of "spirit clothes" tend to show that what

we take for reality is a telepathic hallucination produced by the dead in the minds of the living, and so prevents our forming any such conception of that world as the phenomena seem superficially to imply. So long as we do not attribute form to thoughts, such apparitions would only reflect the form of action or product of the mind on which the discarnate thought had acted, and we should still be left in the dark as to the real nature of a spiritual world, except that it might be one of "pure thought," whatever that expression may mean.

It is quite conceivable that the transcendental world should have the same character as the physical in respect of space properties and yet this "mental picture" method be the only way to reveal its existence. This is actually the situation in our present existence, according to the idealists. We do not require to suppose the antithesis to be what it seems in some of our phenomena of sense perception. In spite of the idealistic interpretation of knowledge and mental phenomena we conceive the world to be what we call physical, and sensations are "mental pictures," so that the nature of a transcendental or spiritual reality may remain, in relation to the method of revealing it to us, just what the physical world is to sensory knowledge. But the difficulties and perplexities in the process of learning what it is may yet be as great as I have indicated.

There is one more difficulty of very considerable importance which seldom or never receives notice. It is the liability to differences of opinion about the spiritual world on the part of its inhabitants. We never think of this, or we ignore it if we do think of it. It is the habit to assume that a message from the spiritual world tells the facts about it, and we forget to suppose that it may be nothing more than the communicator's opinion about it. That opinion may be good or bad according to the person's equipment to tell about it. Now if we add to this situation the hypothesis that the

spiritual world is a purely mental one the differences of opinion about it will be extraordinarily great. And we find them so in reports about it. Let us see the actual situation about the physical world among the living.

Two people can hardly describe a physical object in the same way. One will mark features that the other does not notice and the description as a whole will not be the same in the two instances. Then if one of the two is an educated person and the other ignorant the accounts will differ so much often as not to recognizably refer to the same thing. Then if the description in any respect depends on opinions about it instead of mere observation of facts in sense perception, the differences will vary out of all calculation. Suppose a common peasant is asked to describe the moon. Compare his account of it with that of a learned astronomer and we should not imagine that the two were describing the same thing unless they both used the word "Moon." The astronomer's account would be mixed up with his theories about it and would not be based on the limited observations of the peasant. His theories about it would be a part of the description. It is the same with every object of existence. The scientific man's account of it would be quite different from that of the common man.

Now when we allow for differences of sensory natures the two might differ radically from each other in describing what they see or feel. (The color blind person will not see what the color perceiver can see.) Training and education of the senses may enable one man to see what another cannot see, or even make the same person see at one time what he could not see at another. In each and all experience and various interpretations of sense perception may introduce opinions into our ideas of reality and instead of reporting what we see we will inevitably report the results of what

we believe about an object rather than what we actually see. There is no uniformity of conception of the physical world and people's accounts of it vary as much as do the accounts of a spiritual world. But we do not sufficiently reckon with this circumstance in estimating the revelations of a spiritual world. We get into the habit of accepting without question what is reported of that world on the ground that it comes from a spirit, after we have removed our skepticism of their existence. We think spirits are to be believed because they are spirits and we do not practise critical ways as we would regarding the statements of the living. People who read fiction and the newspapers do it for amusement, not for instruction or study. We have been taught to believe that a spiritual existence is such that only the truth can come from its inhabitants. But there is no scientific reason for believing this of that world, while the facts we get tend to prove the very opposite, namely, that the statements are more unreliable than anything we obtain from the living about their own earthly existence.

Even if the transcendental world were like the physical world in its formal characteristics, or in all others save their non-sensory influence, we might expect the accounts of it to be imperfect and varying. We find it so with the living, as I have remarked. If its inhabitants are in any way abnormal in their mental life, the effect of that on their communications would have to be expected. I do not assert or assume that they are so, but we know so little opposed to this hypothesis, and so much in accord with it, that we have to allow for its possibility. But if it be a purely mental world, we may imagine that the differences in opinion about it would be as great as the differences of opinion among the living. Add to this the possibility that the cranks among the living still retain their ideas and identity and may be those who are more interested

in communicating than the better developed, and we can imagine what a chaos of ideas would be communicated about that life. Make it a dream life, for that type at least, and what unity could we expect in the accounts of different communicators. Then add to all this the fact that all communications are fragmentary and many are confused, and we again have a situation justifying the utmost reservations on the messages about that life. We might well suppose it impossible to obtain any clear idea about it at all. But after centuries of work we might construct some intelligent conception of it, after the manner in which astronomers have outlined the stars and their relations, or the physiologists the human organism and its functions under the aid of the microscope and the scalpel. But each communication, possibly affected by all these limitations added to those of the psychic through which they come, and nothing can be accepted until verified, and that verification is a task whose magnitude can hardly be measured as yet.

All that we can do at present is to compare the casual results of personal experience in communications or alleged communications until we can ascertain a unity that is not the effect of collusion between the parties or of common education. When we have the means and the men to carry on experiments for a long period of time we may make some advance on the problem. But the messages cannot be accepted as an unquestioned revelation in any instance. The material has to be treated as we would any statement of a living man. It must be subjected to critical study and comparison for a long period of time and from various psychics. In ordinary life, our own experience is an effective guide for measuring statements about things. We have to determine the probabilities of any man's account of some distant region by its relation to our own experience, according as that is wide or narrow,

and we can safely assume sufficient common elements to estimate the probabilities to some extent.

But when it comes to estimating the probabilities of what is said about a spiritual world, the normal man has no criterion to go by in his ordinary experience. Only the few can even claim the right to speak, and what they say has to be discounted for the influence of the subconscious and the prejudices established by normal experience, for the differences of opinion on the part of communicators, for the possibility that the conditions of communicating are sufficiently abnormal to affect the messages, for the certainty that messages are fragmentary, for the fact that they are often confused, for the possibility that different levels of spiritual development may affect the nature of communications, and for other possible limitations, so that we have before us one of the most perplexing problems science ever attacked, when we try to ascertain what such a spiritual world is like. Critical habits of mind, far beyond those usual with the people most interested, will have to be cultivated and practised, if any intelligible conception of the matter be possible. There are common elements in many of the messages from different sources, but there are also differences which are intelligible on the theory that it is a mental world, but they do not yet make us able to estimate its nature with any assurance.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PROCESS OF COMMUNICATING

THE discussion of the difficulties of communicating with discarnate spirits implied some conception of what the process was, and especially in what was said of the pictographic method. But I did not go into detail in that matter. It is time to take up that subject more fully, more especially for removing misunderstandings about the whole problem as it appears to the psychic researcher.

There are few greater illusions about the spiritistic theory than those centering about the process of communicating and the nature of the evidence. We who have defended the hypothesis for twenty-five years have still to contend with perfectly inexcusable delusions about the whole problem. The only semblance of excuse is ignorance on the part of both the public and *soi disant* scientific men. We have gone on defending the theory with the belief that our facts could be appreciated, but the very elements of the problem seem to be unknown by those who claim to pass judgment on the subject. Too many people assume a supercilious and arrogant attitude whenever the evidence is mentioned, and, on the slightest interrogation of their reasons for it, they turn out to be literary and æsthetic objections to the triviality of the facts and the absence of great ethical and other revelations. This makes it necessary to take up the problem in detail and show such objectors that the subject is much more complex than they have suspected.

In the first place, when we say to the average man that we can communicate with the dead, or that we have obtained through apparitions or mediumistic phenomena facts which prove survival, they see that we are implying communication as well as survival of the discarnate, and with it they assume that the process of communication is as simple as our ordinary social intercourse. They read the records which we present as if they were merely jotted down conversations with the dead conducted very much as we talk with each other. They make no effort to investigate the complexity of the process, but take the phenomena at their face value and ask no scientific questions. They read an alleged message as they would a telegram or an essay. They make no account of the conditions under which the message is transmitted when it claims to come from another world, but recognize exactly what the conditions are in the physical world. If a telegraph operator makes a mistake, they do not laugh at the assertion that it is a telegram. They accept the mistake as natural. They may find fault with the operator, but they do not treat the message skeptically. If a message, however, claims to come from the dead, they set up objections as if they knew exactly what the conditions are for the receipt and delivery of the communication. There is, after twenty-five years of work on the problem by scientific men, absolutely no excuse for such conduct or ignorance.

Let me expand this situation somewhat. The average man, and I am sorry to say most alleged scientific men, read the data presented to them, as having an origin in spirits, as if there were no complications in their delivery. They pay not the slightest attention to the limitations under which the psychic researcher accepts the facts. They picture to themselves the direct communication of a spirit as if it were talking or writing precisely in the same way that a living person

would do. They do not try to understand the *modus operandi* as scientifically described. They wholly disregard the conditions which the inquirer allows for in his theory. They read the message as they would the morning news and if it pleases their fancy or prejudices, they listen to it. If it is fragmentary and confused, they utter a laugh and run away from the subject. If it were a spoiled telegram they would ask it to be repeated, but no allowance is to be made for the limitations under which the transcendental world has to work in sending a communication to the living. It is more convenient to laugh than it is to make an effort to ascertain the truth.

It is true that many reporters of psychic phenomena are no better than their critics. The average Spiritualist interprets his facts in the same manner as the skeptic. The only difference between him and the skeptic is that the Spiritualist believes the message to come from another world and the skeptic does not. But both have the same conception of the problem and the results. Both are wrong. The real process is a thousandfold more complicated than either of them assumes. We do not communicate directly with the dead. All that the spiritistic hypothesis claims is that the origin of the message is a spirit and not that the message comes to us with the integrity it had when it started. It is modified and distorted, often even when it is true. But the psychic researcher urges this in vain against the preconceived ideas of those who never studied the problem. The critic still persists in reading the material as he would a work on history or philosophy. He reads it exclusively in terms of his normal beliefs instead of testing the facts by their complex origin and causes. In reading a telegram I can disregard the mechanical means for its delivery, provided there is no mistake or confusion in the contents. But I can do nothing of the kind with spiritistic messages. I either

do not know what the conditions are for the receipt of them, or I do not reckon with the fact that the conditions are wholly different from those in which a telegram is received. If we did not know what the mechanical process for producing telegrams is, we should be more cautious about believing them. We have learned in the course of experience that a telegraph wire reproduces the symbols at one end exactly as they were at the other and there is no process of interpretation in the transmission. The errors are committed either by the sender or the receiver. The intermediate process is infallible and only produces physical signs. Their conversion into language and an intelligible message is by the receiver of the telegram. But if we had no means of verifying the sending of the message we should either have to contrive such or we would be more skeptical about the origin of the telegram. This analogy with the telegraph will be pressed throughout the discussion.

But now what are the conditions affecting spirit messages? The answer to this question is not simple. The average man thinks that it is. The reports of spiritualists for a century has so familiarized him with the doctrines of apparitions, with "materializations," with automatic speech or writing, as if the spirit were repeating the acts of normal processes, and various other methods which are supposed to be either understandable or ignorable, that he reads the results as he would his friend's books. But all this is an illusion and no headway will be made with the scientific problem until this illusion is effectively exposed.

Even in normal life the process of intercommunication of ideas is exceedingly complex. We do not transmit our thoughts to each other. This is absolutely impossible. We only make noises or graphic signs and symbols and the listener interprets them. We are insulated from each other in respect of direct communica-

tion, as a telegraph wire is from its environment, and can only interpret physical effects previously agreed upon as having a certain specific meaning. But we learn to disregard the mechanism of the so-called normal "communications" and intercourse. It is material and does not transmit the thought and does not err in the transmission of the mechanical symbol.

But in spiritistic messages your medium of transmission is not a physical one. It is a *mind* plus a complicated mechanical machine, somewhat deranged or disturbed by the dissociation of functions involved in the *rapport* with a transcendental world of minds. In psychic research you are dealing with mind as the primary medium, not matter, and especially not inorganic matter, unless telekinesis is to be reckoned as one of the possibilities of transcendental communication. In most cases, however, it is certain that telekinesis is not involved, and in addition we are dealing with biological as well as psychological conditions. These introduce into the problem all the complications of physiology and psychology and in addition the abnormal, or unusual, conditions of both of them. There is no excuse, therefore, for the failure to deal with these complications in the interpretation of the communications purporting to come from spirits.

In our intercourse with each other in normal life there is no medium whatever of a living kind. If we speak or think of a "medium" at all, it is the atmosphere or some physical agency, like a telegraph or telephone wire, that is concerned, and we can largely eliminate their consideration, so that we directly communicate with each other, allowing for the qualifications just mentioned in our use of the term "directly." But in spiritistic communications, we add a *tertium quid*, a third something to ourselves. There is the mind of the medium, when we are not the medium ourselves. This latter form will come up again for consideration.

But usually there has to be the third party intermediate between the spirit and the person receiving the message as experimenter. This third party is the medium as he or she is always called. This medium is a mind, not a wire or purely mechanical agent, and so subject to all the influences which a mind will exercise upon a message transmitted through it plus the effects of a biological organism not far removed from a mechanical agent, and acting under abnormal and dissociated functions. Under these conditions you must expect all sorts of modifications, physical and mental. The records show that this is a fact and Dr. Hodgson as well as myself discussed them at great length and care. But it is impossible to get any scientific man to show patience enough to reckon with these facts, to say nothing of the hypotheses which the facts justify.

It matters not whether the medium is in a trance or not. The trance has value only as characterized by amnesia which merely cuts off the normal consciousness from knowledge of what is going on, and it impresses laymen as giving the facts more value. This assumed value of the trance is not *necessarily* true. We may suppose that the subconscious exercises the same functions as the normal consciousness, and most students of psychology make that supposition, though they have not investigated the subject enough to assert it with absolute assurance. But it is a most convenient weapon to silence believers in the supernormal and to protect their own authority, which is not half so great as they wish to have believed. They know less about the subconscious than they wish known. But this aside, we have, in our ignorance of the limits of the subconscious action of the mind, to concede every possibility except the acquisition of supernormal information, and so all the normal powers of acquisition and interpretation either of ordinary stimuli or of spontaneous memories

have to be assumed as going on in spite of the suspense of the normal sensory knowledge.

The trance is therefore unimportant except for the impression that it creates upon laymen. The messages might as well come through the normal functions of the mind. If they represent information that the medium had never acquired normally, that suffices to determine the attitude of the psychologist toward it. There are in fact mediums who do all their work in a normal state, and there are others representing any degree of modified personality between the normal state and the deepest trance. The only question is whether the normal mind had any knowledge of the facts before delivering them as messages from the dead. If it did, then they can be explained either by fraud or by subliminal recall. Whether one or the other will depend on the result of investigation in each individual case. But in either case the mind of the medium is a factor in the result and the student or reader who ignores that fact is sure to labor under complete illusion as to the nature of the messages.

The careful psychic researcher always admits that the message, whatever its origin, comes through the mind of the medium and is colored by it in the transmission, whether by interpretation, conscious or subconscious, or by the habits of the organism itself. He always expects the theory of their origin to be qualified by these influences. When he says "spirits" are the source of the messages he expects all these limitations and conditions to be taken account of by the reader and student. He does not expect any intelligent person to read the facts as if they were living conversation or telegrams. He expects of the reader some intelligence above a savage in the examination of the facts.

Now the matter is far more complicated than this. I have here asserted nothing more than the fact that a medium must be interposed between the spirit and

the living friend or "sitter." In ordinary life the process of intercourse is limited to two personalities, A and B. There is no other living intermediary. Any conditions involving an intermediary are artificial and they, too, involve liabilities of confusion and error such as we have remarked in mediumistic messages. But ordinarily there are but two involved and fewer disturbances to intercourse. But add the medium to the situation and you complicate it, at least as much as the third party in normal life, and indeed much more because the conditions are not only abnormal, but are complicated by methods of transmission evidently quite distinct from the mechanical means of sense perception. But in psychic research we cannot stop with the medium alone, nor with abnormal conditions in the medium. We have to reckon with what is always called the *control*, or the "guide," as it is sometimes called. We must remember also that the guide and control may be different personalities. They are not always, if ever the same personality. It depends on circumstances. If you regard this control as a secondary state of the medium, you have all the complications of secondary personality in the case, serving as a medium besides the automatic machinery of the living organism in the suspense of the control of the normal consciousness over it. But if you assume that the control is a spirit, as is more evidently the case for all who have intelligently investigated the problem, you have another mind beside that of the medium with which to deal in the problem. There is not only the third mind which we have called the medium, but the fourth one complicating all its influence with those already complicated enough to make us wonder that we get any message at all from the dead.

There are, then, at least two minds besides the spirit and the living "sitter," the control and the sub-conscious of the medium and sometimes also the normal

consciousness of the medium in addition. What must be the difficulties in such a situation? Could messages be pure? What do we get when a message or statement is transmitted through three or four persons to a friend? All should remember the parlor game in which a few words are whispered into the ear of the one near you and from him to a third and a fourth person, and so on, to find at the end that there is no resemblance to what was started. The same fact is likely to take place in spirit messages. The control must put the message through and it will take the color of his or her mind. Then it is doubly colored by the subconscious, sometimes by the normal consciousness of the medium as well. The fact that the incidents prove the personal identity of a deceased person and are not known by the medium suffices to justify the spiritistic hypothesis, though this origin does not prove the purity of the message, or that it came from the communicator directly. It may have been subjected to all sorts of modifications, phonetic, visual, or interpretative. (Any man who does not make allowance for this is not fit to talk about the problem.)

But the problem is still more complex. Besides the control, which is a name only for the person necessary to put any message through a medium and additional to the mind of the medium, there is the guide. This is the permanent attendant of the medium and perhaps of all living people, whether mediums or not. The guide is the Angelos or angel, messenger, of the New Testament, the Malachi of the Old Testament, the daimon of Socrates, the "genius" of Plato. In many cases there is no apparent evidence of the guide. The control seems to be the personality most distinctly revealed in most situations. But even the control does not always manifest his or her presence. Often, always in undeveloped mediumship, the only personality apparently present is the communicator, the deceased

friend of the sitter. But nevertheless the control is present and absolutely necessary for getting the communication through. Only in fully developed mediumship do we get the clear evidence for the presence and constant assistance of the control and this (1) by the style of the language always apparent with all communicators and (2) by the interruptions and admissions of the control, now to act as intermediary by indirect methods and not to communicate on his or her own responsibility. But with it all goes the guide who may or may not act regularly as a control.

And still further complications are found. There are often others besides the regular control and the guide. There may be a whole group of personalities complicated with messages. This was perfectly manifest in the Piper case where the personalities called themselves Emperor, Rector, Doctor, Mentor and others and had done so before in the case of Stainton Moses. The same group figure in the work of Mrs. Chenoweth and gave some evidence of themselves in the work of Mrs. Smead, Mrs. Verrall and others. It is only in well developed mediumship that groups of them will easily manifest. Their product in communication might be a joint one and their several personalities indistinguishable, but in well developed mediumship, at least after some practise, each individual personality can give evidence of himself.

We shall see later how these things still more complicate the character of the communications when we come to study the actual process of communicating. But it ought to be apparent that the more minds you have to reckon with in the messages the more impure they will be, in spite of characteristics enough to determine their origin in the mind of a specific person in the transcendental world. But it is clear for all careful students of the phenomena that messages reflect the influence of more than the mind of the com-

municator. In my experiments with Mrs. Chenoweth after Professor James communicated, there was a double control. One of them called it "driving tandem." This process had an analogy with the system of relays in the transmission of electrical currents. It meant that the messages had to come through two simultaneous controls. The effect of this was apparent in two ways. (1) In the handwriting and (2) in the psychological contents of the messages.

The two controls were Jennie P, or Whirlwind as she called herself, and George Pelham who died in 1892, and afterward through Mrs. Piper convinced Dr. Hodgson that he was a spirit. This double control by the personalities named was not with Mrs. Piper, but as said just above, through Mrs. Chenoweth. Each of them had controlled separately before, but they tried this experiment of double control and succeeded in giving much better messages. But the important circumstance to remark here is the fact of a remarkable influence on the writing and the message. In single control, G. P., or George Pelham, had a style of writing that was easily legible and distinctive. I could always recognize his presence by the writing alone, whether he gave his name or not. Jennie P or Whirlwind also had a distinctive handwriting very different from G. P.'s and very difficult to read. It was rapid and heavy. The letters were very large and covered five or six times as many pages, only a few words to the page, as the writing of G. P. or any other personality. But when Jennie P and G. P. "drove tandem" the writing was much more legible than Jennie P's and less legible than G. P.'s. It was a perfectly recognizable fusion of both their handwritings. Sometimes, the writing would begin with the dominant characteristics of Jennie P and gradually change into the average or fusion of both hers and G. P.'s and before the end of the sitting it was dominantly characteristic of G. P., or *vice versa*.

Usually it was the fusion of both all the way through. All the while, however, the handwriting had the fundamental and distinctive characteristics of the normal handwriting of Mrs. Chenoweth. There were differences, as there are always differences with different communicators, but there is also always the main technical characteristics of her normal writing, and only on very rare occasions did I ever find any definite resemblance to the handwriting of a communicator when living and this not enough to justify emphasis upon it. But in the double control you had three distinct styles of writing fused into one with the various characteristics of each one in the product. I could also at times recognize the mental contents and style of the controls in such messages. Always the language is colored by the normal linguistic habits of Mrs. Chenoweth and only rarely did distinctive verbal contents of communicators' language get through. The results both graphically and mentally was a compound and subject (1) to the limitations of the medium's mind and (2) to the limitations under which a message had to be transmitted through intermundane conditions to the control for further transmission through the medium to the sitter.

Long after I had worked out the theory of interfusion of personalities in the communications and without ever having hinted to the psychic that I had such a theory, the communications of Edmund Gurney confirmed it in the following manner, though I translate his statement from its symbolic imagery to save space. Edmund Gurney was a prominent member of the English Society and died in 1888. I was endeavoring to secure the contents of a posthumous letter from a lady who had left one. There was much difficulty in getting the messages through and Edmund Gurney purported to communicate and said that she had "fused with the personality of the medium of expression" and remarked

that this might not be the living psychic alone, but that other personalities among the dead who might be anxious to communicate were also media and that the particular communicator might have her thoughts so interfused with theirs, the process being more "mechanical" than we ordinarily dream of, and perhaps with analogies in crossed wires of the telephone, so that success would depend upon the domination of her own mind in the situation. The trance of the living medium more or less excludes her own mind or thoughts from intermingling with or dominating the messages. That is the object of the trance. But it is not a stable condition. It may at any moment intrude its own activity into the process and distort impressions or messages beyond recognition. I have witnessed this in a hundred instances.

But the case is not a mere competition between medium and communicator, but also between the communicator and those on the other side helping the communicator. The message is always composite and we do not know how many personalities enter into its composition. Mr. Gurney compared the media to a cable made of many strands and thus indicated clearly enough, on the assumption that the cable consisted of various personalities, how the interfusion would affect the effort to transmit any specific message.

On the next day the same communicator, after the experiment to maintain a stable condition in the medium, Mrs. Chenoweth, explained what the trance was and what had to be done to make it possible to eliminate its influence as far as possible upon the transmission of messages. He said that the "soul or ego moves from one state of consciousness to another with rapidity and ease and grasps many memories and at the following instant moves to future possibilities with rapidity unsurpassed by etheric waves and to keep the ego at a prescribed point for a time and let the normal faculty

of vision (pictographic process) work may help the concentrative powers and give expression in speech or writing." That is the consciousness of the psychic must be arrested in its transitions from one state to another and concentrated on the business at hand to get any message at all through. The subconscious has to be trained to concentrate as the normal consciousness does in attention, and this is no easy task.

He then spontaneously added that in the use of anæsthetics, the reason that subjects sometimes get glimpses in vision of the transcendental was that the mind "stood for a moment on the threshold before passing into the spiritual realm" and in this way could utter some expression of its vision. On being asked if this was not the reason the best messages sometimes came through in the transitional stage of the subliminal recovery of normal consciousness, he replied: "Precisely. It is in a familiar atmosphere and easily recognizes signs by which one knows another, words written or spoken, or appearances of places or friends." Here there is the tacit admission that in the transcendental world proper, beyond the threshold, the mental states and symbols of the borderland and normal life do not hold and that messages depend on the lucky retention of the borderland condition for their transmission and intelligibility. The vastness of the problem here ought to be apparent. The confusion that we witness in the work becomes perfectly intelligible on such a conception of the complicated conditions affecting communication.

A further statement by one well known in the work of psychic phenomena who died in 1892 shows the complications of the subject and confirms an explanation of the process which I had already conjectured some years ago from the occurrence of certain phenomena. Speaking of the development of conditions for securing more specific evidence and uncontaminated

messages he said, that they had to select for the medium on the other side a personality with whom the psychic on this side might become familiar, because she was more likely, in the trance, to pay attention to a familiar person and not to notice the desired communicator. That is, with a surrounding number of persons who came to communicate, or to even witness what was going on, her subconscious was likely to turn attention to one already known and this act of attention put her into rapport with the thoughts of that person and his or her thoughts would be delivered accordingly. That is, communication is a matter of rapport with the thoughts of a particular spirit and rapport with that spirit is a matter of *attention*. Every one is familiar with this law in a social circle. We hear the conversation of those to whom we pay attention and do not hear that to which we do not attend. We may be talking with a friend and get tired of the conversation and turning the ear to another while we still look our friend in the face, but hear nothing of what he says, but hear what the other person says. Here perception is a matter of attention and rapport produced by it. It is the same with the psychic. If she happens to give attention to a given spirit that spirit communicates by virtue of the fact that his stream of consciousness is tapped and others are not, and the conditions must be so managed that intruding invaders are not known or noticed and that the attention be attracted to the right personality. I have witnessed this phenomenon in more than one instance with Mrs. Chenoweth. It occurred with Mrs. Piper under the Phinuit regime. The Imperator group developed conditions so as to prevent this sort of invasion too frequently and got them so organized they did not interfere with the pertinence and evidential character of the messages for the sitter. Stability of attention is the pre-requisite of the best mediumship.

All this will clearly explain why messages are rarely characteristic of communicators in style, a demand usually made by the uninformed as a condition of admitting the spiritistic hypothesis. But if they had made any intelligent investigation of the subject they would never make such a demand, or present the absence of such characteristics as an objection to the theory of their origin. The modification would be exceedingly great under such circumstances and readers who study the records, if they could also see the accompanying handwriting, could not escape the conclusion of interfusion of personality in both writing and messages.

We have then nothing direct in the process of communicating. There are now two persons, the spirit and the sitter, but in addition there are the medium, the control and often a whole group of personalities to reckon with in the influences on the mind of the medium. That fact ought to imbue our objectors with some humility in the study of the phenomena. But they only laugh and dispense ridicule and we must expect them to do this until it becomes respectable to investigate the subject seriously and scientifically. In the meantime the duty of the few that are interested and working is to accumulate more and more facts until the public and the scientists are forced by the strength of evidence to yield their prejudices.

The next point is the *modus operandi* of the communications themselves. This appears to the layman and others as if it were simply talking or writing through the medium as we are supposed to talk and write through our own organisms. There is no doubt that superficial examination of mediumship naturally suggests this view of the process, but the slightest critical study of the facts, as well as such phenomena as I have just described, will easily prove that there is no such process. The investigation of details will

prove beyond question that the process, whatever resemblances it may have to the influence of the living mind on the organism, is very different in its character. That once conceded most of the perplexities will vanish as difficulties or objections as quickly as a morning mist before the sun. The method of communication, however, may not be the same in all cases. It certainly does not appear to be so, but appearances are not an infallible guide in such matters. The study of the complications may show that one general process underlies all the various methods, but it will not be necessary to urge this here in order to show what the complications are in communicating.

Take the simplest situation we can imagine, that of the medium getting her own messages and not getting them for others. We have in that supposition only two personalities involved, the spirit and the medium. There is reason to believe that, even in this situation, there are other persons involved than the one assumed to be the chief communicator, and these as necessary helpers in getting a message through. If the medium is in a trance he or she will not know anything about it. The subconscious will be the only recipient of the message. But if the medium is not in a trance the communicator has to overcome the dissociation between the subconscious and the normal consciousness of the medium, and what comes may be as fragmentary as in the usual work which we have published. If then the message be transmitted in symbols, as is often the case, they have to be interpreted by the normal mind and as the symbols may involve much more remote analogies than ordinary language the message is exposed to all sorts of mistake and misinterpretation. That ought to be apparent to the veriest tyro in the subject. The symbols are not the same in different mediums and much will also depend on the experience of the mind in interpreting symbols which it will often have to guess

at, even when the symbol represents an exact memory picture of the communicator's earthly experience.

But the case is still more complicated when we have a medium intermediating between the spirit and the "sitter" or living person. The medium is usually an intermediary between spirit and sitter. One of the methods of communication, as I have already shown in a previous chapter, is what I call the pictographic method. It is that the thoughts of the spirit become mental pictures to the control or to the medium and have to be interpreted by one or the other of these personalities. The spirit does not talk or write directly, but these have to be done either by the control or by the subconscious of the medium or by the two jointly. The spirit simply thinks. This fact has been stated through more than one psychic who had never known anything about the process in any form. The phenomena indicate it apart from the statements of the medium. The spirit simply thinks and those thoughts become visible or audible to the control or to the subconscious of the medium. If those thoughts take the form of a panoramic picture of sensory memories of the earthly life, as they often do, they will constitute a series of symbols which will have either to be described or interpreted or both. Many circumstances cause the panorama to be blurred and indistinct, so that description or interpretation may often be erroneous. But even when not so, the medium or the control may not know what they mean at all, but reports them as received and the sitter must decipher their meaning by ascertaining whether they represent events in the past and terrestrial life of the communicator. If they do, and stand for facts not known to the medium, they prove the personal identity of the communicator.

Readers may imagine for themselves the vicissitudes of messages under such conditions. If the communicator cannot control his mental imagery rightly, errors

of all sorts will creep in, though the control and the subliminal of the medium report correctly what they received. On the other hand conditions intervening between spirit and control, or medium, may distort the picture and then description and interpretation are liable to mistake. Then crowding of pictures or thoughts may enable the control or subliminal to catch only fragments of the messages and then add to these the complications of misinterpretation and you have liabilities that may be called legion. The so-called direct method which appears to dispense with pictographic imagery may involve other difficulties, but there is some evidence that pictographic processes are not excluded by this and hence that the selection and transmission of the images will depend more distinctly on the communicator who has not had the experience of the control in managing the organic machinery of expression and thus motor difficulties and complications are added to all the others. It may affect the selection of incidents that penetrate the veil. That is, the communicator may have less power to determine what thought will be transmitted by the use of the motor system than the control who is accustomed to it.

Now with these complications of the process increasing as the number of personalities associated with the work increase, we can to-day only imagine what may take place in the effort to communicate. Experience and practise are necessary to enable any one to communicate intelligibly, and even then the whole matter depends on the developed character of the medium. In addition to this it is one thing to develop power to transmit one's own thoughts and a very distinct thing to be able to transmit for others. In many a medium the control or guide, whichever it may be, can communicate only for himself. He finds it difficult or impossible to receive messages from others and others find it impossible to dislodge him from control. In such

cases the control knows little of the process and cannot produce such phenomena as have been illustrated wherever the Imperator group secure control. Adumbrations of this fact are apparent in the work of Mrs. Chenoweth. A control can communicate easily for himself when he or she has had sufficient experience and practise. But this same personality immediately after communicating very clearly for himself or herself will commit all sorts of error in trying to receive and transmit the thoughts of other spirits.

The dissociation of the spirit from the physical order involves some intermundane obstacles to transmission, obstacles which are greater than the many difficulties of transmission under the conditions of control apart from them. That is, when the control is working on his own responsibility alone he has troubles enough, not having the same relation to the organism that a living soul has, and then he adds to these immensely the obstacles of receiving and transmitting messages from others on his side. Jennie P in the Chenoweth case can always keep clear of superposition in the writing when she is communicating for herself, but let her undertake to receive and transmit messages from others and I have to watch the hand and pad to prevent superposition of messages until they would become illegible. Her attention has to be given to the communicator and the interpretation of the pictographic images, and the writing in lines has to be neglected and left to my guidance.

Now we must remember that a medium is what the controls often call an "open door" through which any one can come unless that door is guarded. When systematic work has to be done the guide or control has to keep others away from that door or in a situation in which their thoughts will not interfere with the process of communicating. If this were not done you would have a telephone open to any one or a hundred

in the immediate vicinity. What would be the result of half a dozen people talking near the receiver of a telephone? Readers can imagine the answer for themselves. It is the business of the controls and all the group of personalities in charge of a medium to keep others away from speaking connections with the telephone, so to speak. And their function even goes further. They have to keep different channels of the nervous system from transmitting different thoughts at the same time. They claimed through Mrs. Piper, Mrs. Chenoweth and Mrs. Smead that they could influence different nerve centers, and obsession shows this to be a fact. In that case they have to learn in the control of a medium to avoid influencing one center while another is working. I have known different thoughts to come through Mrs. Chenoweth's vocal organs from those that were being written. I have also known the vocal organs to transmit a part of the thought that was coming in the writing while another part was coming by the latter process. Often as the automatic writing stops at the end of a sitting, the subliminal recovery will begin a message at once that may either be an attempt to finish the one interrupted by the stopping of the writing or may be an entirely new incident or a name not directly associated with the message that was being delivered through writing. In all this we have evidence of action upon different nerve centers in the process, and the control, in order to have the messages systematic and rational, must inhibit the interfusion of messages through different centers at the same time.

Now Dr. Hodgson said in one message that they could "not inhibit the transmission of their thoughts." He was, of course, speaking of the process when controlling and communicating. He was not denying that this inhibition could be effected by others whose function it was to do this. He had in life always main-

tained that the primary function of Rector, the control in Mrs. Piper's work, was to inhibit certain thoughts from coming through. Those thoughts might be those of communicators in the vicinity, so to speak, who either wished to send messages or could not hinder their passage, if any attention was paid to them.

The telephonic analogy is especially apropos here. The telephone wire cannot prevent the carriage of whatever voice is used near it and a communicator in rapport with the "open door" or organism that serves as a telegraph or telephone wire will inevitably transmit his thoughts and it requires some one or more personalities to prevent this, or to prevent the irrelevant thoughts of a given communicator from going through. Every nerve center might act as a medium in a purely mechanical manner unless some one can prevent it. Either the communicator or the control has to inhibit this tendency, and probably it is most frequent that others have to perform this function while the control and the communicator manage to convey only the right thoughts of one trying to transmit messages.

This rapport of which I speak may consist in the medium's attention to a given personality. I had a sitter present with Mrs. Chenoweth. All at once a certain personality began to make love at a great rate to the sitter, if I may interpret affectional messages in this manner. I thought it might be some deceased lover of the lady present, as I knew her husband was living and at home only a few blocks away. The medium did not know who was present. I remained silent and let things take their own course. At the end of the sitting the pet name of the man who was communicating came as he signed it to his living wife, and I saw who it was, as he had been a communicator before. He was a well known man. I asked the sitter if it was relevant and she said it had no meaning whatever to her and did not know who it was. I did not

tell her, but wrote to the communicator's wife and found that all the incidents mentioned by him were correct and good evidence of his identity. I afterward learned that he had been an intimate friend in the family of the sitter, so that his appearance was relevant. But what he said was wholly irrelevant to the sitter, though relevant to his wife and characteristic of previous messages. The next week I asked the control, Jennie P, why this person was communicating, and her answer was that he had not communicated, but was "in the room" looking on. She said the sitter's father and mother were communicating. I told her that not a word had come from them, but that this well known person not only gave his pet name but told incidents in proof of his identity. The situation surprised the control and she said they did not know this on their side at all, but thought that the father and mother were communicating.

Before explaining this take another incident. I was trying to get the contents of a sealed letter. Mrs. Chenoweth started into the trance and was only in the subliminal stage of it when she saw and named the lady who had left the sealed letter, an absolute and unknown stranger to her, and then she remarked that she saw Dr. Hodgson standing by her and giving her directions as to how to proceed with her message, repeating the words she thought or heard Dr. Hodgson saying. Suddenly she finished the sentence with a sort of jerk, having repeated it very slowly, and reached for the pencil, and Dr. Hodgson began with the automatic writing, saying that "here he was writing, though he had not intended to do it."

Now what took place probably in both these incidents was this. The subliminal saw, on the one occasion, the well known man mentioned, and on the other Dr. Hodgson, and simply turned her attention to them. This put her in rapport with them and their thoughts

and her automatic machinery began to write out their thoughts. If we are talking to a friend in social group, but turn the attention of the hearing to another, though we still avoid betraying our action to the friend with whom we are talking, we will hear the talk of the person we are listening to and not that of the person we are looking at. We have in the two incidents a psychological law exactly that which I have indicated in the conversation with a friend. Attention is the cause of rapport. Once that rapport is established, the automatic machinery of the medium will reproduce the thought which its attention has enabled it to receive.

Now it is the prevention of such anomalies that the control must cause. Or, if not the control, other personalities associated with him or her. The automatic machinery is such that it must respond like a telephone wire to the current. The whole process must be organized and protected in an intelligent way to make systematic communications possible. Then they must at the same time prevent the occurrence of hysteria and obsession. Their work must be done between the two extremes of getting through no message at all and causing insanity to the medium. Any one can indulge his imagination as he pleases on the complications of such a situation. But the process is not one controlled as easily as we control our own speech. It suffers from liabilities of all kinds and this is no place to analyze or develop them fully, either with or without the facts. I can only indicate that twenty-five years of records have produced the facts on which this outline is based.

When the pictographic process is added to this we have still greater complications. The control receives the communicator's thought in the form of phantasms or hallucinations and has to interpret them. The accuracy of the interpretation will depend on the extent to which the mental imagery of the communicator is reported to the control in correct form or in remote

symbols. If the symbols are remote, they will cause all sorts of error in the interpretation. I have witnessed instances in which the medium had great difficulty in finding out what the meaning was of very clear phantasms, and often the sitter or person for whom they were intended could not suspect their meaning until further imagery was transmitted and the message translated by the medium in various ways, often not altogether clear to him.

Now imagine how this would be complicated in the double control, or "driving tandem" as we have called it. A double distortion might take place before the phantasm came to the subconscious of the medium. The communicator's thought becomes a phantasm to Jennie P and she transmits this to G. P. who describes what he sees, though he must do this with the subconscious mechanism of the medium and have his ideas modified by the transmission. How do we ever get anything accurate at all? But this matter of accuracy aside, the main thing of interest is that the process of communicating is not like our own, but the transmission of symbolic phantasms, perhaps by a telepathic process, through two or more minds before it reaches the sitter, and perhaps often through half a dozen or more minds. No physical or neural machinery is employed until the message reaches the subliminal of the medium and we may assume that from that point on the process is like our own. But its initial stage has no resemblance to anything we know except the phantasms which sometimes occur in telepathic phenomena.

Let me briefly summarize the conditions affecting the process of communications between the dead and the living, and in connection with them the main elements of the process, so far as they are known. We, in fact, know very little of them, and such as we do know are barely general outlines of a process which is not especially familiar to normal life.

1. There is a state of dissociation in the medium, some interruption of the normal relation of his or her own consciousness with the organism.

2. Rapport with a transcendental world, whether that be of incarnate or discarnate consciousness. In hypnosis and secondary personality this rapport is usually with the physical world.

3. In some cases a trance on the part of the medium, shutting off the influence of normal consciousness upon the machinery of expression.

4. In some cases the retention of normal consciousness, but the establishment of rapport with the transcendental so that messages may be received and interpreted and then expressed normally.

5. In some cases the interpretation of symbolic messages and consequent liability to distortion and misinterpretation on the part of either medium or control.

6. The existence of a control or guide through whose intervention all messages have to be effected. This control may be single or plural.

7. The existence of pictographic imagery representing the transformation or transmission of the communicator's thoughts into phantasms in the mind of control or medium.

8. The description or interpretation of these phantasms by the control so as to make them intelligible, when they are not self-interpretable, to the sitter.

9. The action of the control on the automatic machinery of the medium either by virtue of echolalia or through the intelligence, conscious or subconscious, of the medium.

10. The inhibition of intruding agencies in order to make the communications systematic and rational.

All these facts show how different the process is from that which we imagine it to be. There are no superficial resemblances or analogies to the intercourse and expression of normal life. If we then add to this

the idea that the spiritual life is a mental one and possibly with no resemblances to the present physical life except what the phantasms represent, we will have decided limits to our knowledge of it, and this also even if we find that the reality of that world resembles the representation as much as a photograph or a retinal image does the actual object from which it is taken. At least we can be certain that the phantasms which characterize the pictographic process do not assure us *per se* of the reality which they adumbrate. Whatever else that world may be than a mental one will have to be determined by further investigation, but the connection between it and the physical life must be through these mental processes which are based upon memory and the phantasms which it produces and transmits.

CHAPTER IX

THE NATURE OF A FUTURE LIFE

I DO not propose here to discuss the evidence for a life beyond the grave. The possibility of it was discussed because I wished to remove the usual philosophical objections to it in order to refer merely to the evidence for its being a fact. That evidence consists of two classes of facts. (1) The uniform experience of the race from the earliest times which has given rise to its religions and belief in another life. (2) The recorded results of observation and experiment by the various Societies for Psychical Research. It is the latter facts which have given credibility to human experience and tradition generally, after eliminating the influence of the imagination and superstition that had attached itself to these legends. Tylor's *Primitive Culture* shows that the universal existence of the same ideas among savages widely distributed and separated from each other and without any possible connections points unmistakably to experiences which the Societies for psychical research have verified as unquestionable facts. I have published in *Science and a Future Life*, and in *Psychic Research and the Resurrection* summaries of the scientific evidence for survival after death, and Mr. Frederic W. H. Myers in his *Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death* has collected a mass of evidence pointing in the same direction. Hence with the accumulated evidence of survival I shall not produce any quantity of it in this volume. I shall treat the hypothesis of survival as scientifically proved.

I here make no concessions whatever to the skeptic. He shall be treated as so far behind the times that he can safely be ignored.

But when it comes to the problem of the nature of a future life the question is very different. We may have evidence that personal consciousness survives and yet have very inadequate evidence regarding to the conditions under which it continues its existence. What we know of its bodily associations does not afford any clear indication of what it shall be apart from them. We have to assume that, if consciousness survives at all, it may do so in at least three possible conditions. (1) As a function of an "astral" or Pauline spiritual body, the Epicurean "ethereal" organism. (2) As a functional stream in the Absolute, as it may be now supposed to be in this life. (3) As a functional stream in connection with some point of force or atom. Any one of these is conceivable, and when it is freed from the body, we must seek evidence of which it is. Very few people, however, will understand any of these conceptions, unless they are acquainted with the philosophic points of view which they summarize. The first is the Pantheistic or monistic, the second the Epicurean, Christian, and Theosophic, and the third the Cartesian as developed in the philosophy of Leibnitz and Boscovitch. Now it would take too much space to discuss these systems here and they would either be unintelligible to the layman when discussed, or would have no interest to him, if intelligible, since it is something else that he seeks than summarized conditions of survival.

The proper way to clear up the matter is to ascertain what people expect or want in the case and then see if their view is rational. The philosopher and the layman are usually wide apart and the latter has no understanding of the former, while the former, if he understands the latter, has little patience with him. But whatever the layman may wish or think, and

whether it be right or wrong, he determines the way the problem has to be discussed.

To the uneducated mind the very phrases "future world," "life after death," "immortality" are likely to convey a misconception of the problem. "World," "life," and any term referring to existence are construable to most people only in terms of normal experience and that is sensation. Few have done enough thinking to make themselves independent of sensory ideas in what they believe of things either here or hereafter. A "world" is a physical thing perceived by the senses, and even if we go so far as to represent it as immaterial, we are perpetually imagining it in the forms of sense perception. Life is appreciable as a place for the enjoyment of sensation, and any attempt to represent its conditions as non-sensory is to take all its attractions from us. Heaven, for the majority of the race, is a world of unimpeded and insatiable sensation. To say that a future life has no resemblance to this life and that it is an abstract stream of consciousness is to rob it of all its real interest, and the average man would consider such an existence, perhaps, as the worst possible sort of hell. We are so accustomed to think in terms of our sense experience and to measure all the joys and pains of existence by sensations, that we can hardly imagine any form of existence that would be either intelligible or pleasurable to us, unless it represented what we know and appreciate.

The layman has not been accustomed to analyze his ordinary experience into sensations and inner consciousness. Sensation is the central point of interest, or at least the one fact by which he endeavors to represent what he means by a world, especially when he has to talk about it. States of consciousness going on in one's head and not representable by sensations will have to be found and appreciated by each man himself. But sensations can be talked about and easily made

intelligible. Hence all language about a future life for those who have done no philosophic thinking conveys ideas that they interpret in terms of their sensory life. They expect the future existence to be like this; not necessarily like it in its pains and struggles, but like it in its appearance, as they construe it to the imagination, and with unlimited sources of happiness, and this usually without work. An examination of all the popular religions and their conceptions of the after life will show how they clothed it in sensuous imagery. They were only reflecting the more or less necessary habits of mind in which we all live. We may use the term "spiritual" all we like, the majority of mankind, when it refers to a future life, conceive it as a place which repeats the conceptions of the earthly life in all its essential aspects except what they would call the physical. The pearly gates and golden streets of Revelation illustrate this. That is, they think of it as a world of light and form and as a complete replica of the physical world. They take Milton and Dante realistically. When they use the term for any mental experience, they mean to exclude sensation from it, and most probably refer to what the psychologist would classify as the emotions, the elations of the human mind in which they feel happiest. I usually find these to represent the idea of the spiritual so far as it is an earthly experience. The distinction is that between the sensations and the emotions. But in application to another life it is conceived as a place duplicating at least the forms of the present existence.

Now it is not my purpose in thus stating the matter to controvert it nor to approve of it. I am only calling attention to the limitations under which most people think in this subject. The most philosophical are not wholly exempt from them. They cannot talk about anything to others except in terms of sensory symbols. An advanced civilization may have refined them, but

each individual in the course of his education must pass through the process of refining these conceptions and a slow process it is. All our common and clear knowledge is expressible only in sensory imagery. We can indicate the meaning of terms in the last analysis only by pointing to the physical objects which they denote, and if our experiences associated with them are also common we may seize the connected meaning of things in that way. An object may become a symbol of a feeling and so language may grow to express non-sensuous mental states to those who have passed through the experience of them and their association with the sensory object. Thus to the savage, religion may be only fear of his fetish or the supposed deity in it. The word would have no other meaning for him. But if he advanced to the highest stage of civilization, it might mean a more refined mental attitude and would not be directed to a physical object at all, but to some supersensible reality which he would not fear but reverence. The term would thus denote an experience which the savage might not have, but which the civilized man would understand from its association with the whole group of ideas that have grown up in connection with all the problems of philosophy and theology. It thus becomes, not the sensuous objects that he has in mind when he speaks and thinks of the spiritual, but the states of mind which his development has associated with them, though he may still use the same old words for denominating them.

The antagonism between the reflective and the unreflective mind is this. The reflective mind tries to think of things as having some sort of existence apart from the way sensation represents them. The unreflective mind accepts his sensations as correctly reporting the nature of things. The reflective mind, for example, when it looks at a lamp thinks that the sensation is a subjective product of his own mind reacting against

undulations of light which have no resemblance to the lamp, and hence that he does not really see the lamp itself or "in itself," to employ a familiar phrase of philosophers. He supposes, or at least thinks he supposes, that the real lamp is different from its appearance and that the mind is the important factor in making that appearance. The object or lamp is not known beyond that apparition, to use a term that helps to distinguish between appearance and reality.

On the other hand, the unreflective mind draws no such distinctions. It assumes that we see things as they are. The lamp is *seen* and the sensation or mind has nothing to do with making it what it is or appears to be. It does not have to think the lamp away, so to speak, in order to understand the situation. It does not even reckon with sensation. It becomes a reflective mind the moment that it admits that there is a sensation as a means of knowing the lamp. It may not even suppose there is a sensation or any peculiar process for knowing that the lamp is there. It is the object that interests it and this is seen as it is. A distinction between the lamp and the appearance is not drawn and in fact the "appearance" is not recognized as a factor in the problem. The situation is not analyzed by it into separate elements; namely, the lamp, undulations of light, impression on the retina, molecular action in the nerves transmitted to brain centers, reaction at these centers, sensation, perception, judgment, etc. These are the products of the reflective mind and they give rise to the idea that the object "in itself" is not seen, but that the mind produces the appearance and that the lamp *per se* is not known or perceived. We may have to infer something there as a cause to account for the mind's reaction, but it is not seen as it is.

Now this opposition between the reflective and the unreflective mind has never been wholly set aside. One

concentrates interest and attention upon the object of knowledge and cares nothing about the process and intermediate steps to it. The other fixes attention on these intermediate steps and eliminates the object from consideration. The distinction between the two types of minds is much supported by the phenomena of illusions and hallucinations, where we clearly see the difference between appearance and reality, whenever we discover that the phenomena are illusions or hallucinations. In these phenomena we find clear illustrations of things taken for real, but which turn out to be products of the imagination or the brain, so to speak. They help us to reinforce the distinction between objects and their appearance. An illusion or an hallucination may be taken as representing a real external thing, and this so firmly in a disordered mind that the conviction cannot be shaken. But the normal mind discovers that the phenomenon is only a product of his own mind. It has all the characteristics of the real thing except confirmation by another sense than the one affected. Applying the same principles to normal sense perception the reflective mind here supposes that all sensations are subjective phenomena and it tends to interpret them as indicating only the uniformity of events, not representing their nature objectively. He may accept their corrective influence on each other, but not as representing the nature of the things themselves. He will call that an illusion or hallucination which will not have an associate of the proper sort in another sense. He may resort to touch to test whether his vision may be associated with another sensation, or is an illusion or a hallucination, but he will not regard the touch as expressing anything more of the nature of the thing than sight. He will construe experiences as uniformities of events, not as correctly representing the nature of things.

Now it is clear from this that the reflective mind

gets into the habit of thinking something away, so to speak, when it tries to think or speak of things. The real world becomes to it something that is not revealed in sensation or sense perception. That is, not revealed in its nature. He thinks of it as the *negative* of sensation; it is not as it is seen, touched, heard, tasted, etc. Hence it is sometimes called an *intellectual* world, meaning that it has to be thought rather than sensed, though that mode of expression does not make it any clearer to the unreflective mind. The reflective mind tends to some form of idealism on this account. The unreflective mind tends to materialism in so far as that is expressed by sensory conceptions. The idealist means to abstract from sensory ideas; the materialist is a realist in some sense of the term. But the complications between the various schools are not so simple as that. This is owing to differences of interest and should be briefly explained.

The reflective mind, I have said, tends to think of the world as the negative of what sensation seems to reveal. Whether he shall call it spiritual or not depends on his definition of the term "spiritual." If "spiritual" be the negative of sensory and does not imply consciousness, then his world, the physical world, in its essential and non-sensory nature, would be regarded as immaterial in the ancient sense of the term. But if "spiritual" meant a conscious reality, then the negation of sense would not imply this and there would be an immaterial world that is not "spiritual." But the confusion incident to the use of the terms "spiritual" and "immaterial" with their uncertain and equivocal meaning is too great to attempt to wholly unravel it here. Suffice it to say that we may clear up the question in another way. I have here appealed to the terms merely to suggest, without developing, the relation of the problem to ancient points of view.

To return to the difference between the reflective

and the unreflective mind. The unreflective mind, as remarked, thinks of external reality as correctly represented in sensation. It would be wholly materialistic but for other influences to interest it in something immaterial. This interest induces it almost always to believe in a spiritual world which it has in some way to distinguish from the material world. Hence it thinks of it as non-physical and physically non-sensory, but as like the sensory world in appearances and forms. Such a mind does not try to conceive it as constituted like internal consciousness. It duplicates the physical world in its conceptual appearance and forms but not in its substance. Hence the tendency to construe all phenomena purporting to be evidence of such a world as acceptable, if acceptable at all, at their face value. The "spiritual" world to him is like the physical world, except that it is not really physical. He negates sensation, but only partly so in his conception of the "spiritual" world. He does not think of it as a stream of inner mental states and emotions without body or form. He thinks of it as repeating the physical forms of existence without physical substance.

On the other hand the reflective mind takes a different course. He has to perform a double act of abstraction to determine his views. He has one for determining the supersensible nature of the physical world of sense and one for the nature of spirit. He does not accept sensation as the measure of existence and so thinks away from it to determine what the real nature of reality is. But he does not necessarily substitute consciousness for it. He makes matter in its real nature supersensible, as in the atoms and all realities that do not affect the senses in any direct way. For him the "spiritual" would have to be something that had non-sensory states of consciousness, whether here or hereafter. When he supposes a "spiritual" world hereafter, he means a world of souls that can think

and are conscious, having cast aside the physically sensory states and perhaps all sensory states whatsoever, not assuming ethereal organisms and sensory processes. That is to say he must abstract from both the physical and the sensory to get his idea of "spirit." The unreflective mind assumes something analogous to sensory processes in such a world and when reduced to technical terms, it would be an ethereal organism carrying on mental and sensory processes analogous to the physical life. But the reflective mind tends to think away all sensory analogies and equivalents and all material things also, whether supersensible or not, when he tries to conceive a "spiritual" world. This forces him to make it a world of inner consciousness, the mental states and emotions which we have apart from sensations. He would perhaps call it a world of "pure spirit," whatever that may mean. But whether he applied such an adjective as "pure" to it or not, he thinks of it as a life of consciousness independent of sense and free from all analogies with the physical world. His "spiritual" world would thus be one of mind living in its own activity and divested of every resemblance to the sense and physical world.

This difference of conception is not easy to clear up by showing what the facts are. There are abundant facts, but we have not been able to estimate their value. The effort to estimate them is complicated with the controversy between the two schools about the nature of the physical world to which both have the same access. If they differ as to the nature of matter which affects the senses, they are likely to differ much more regarding a "spiritual" world which either does not affect the senses or reveals itself so rarely as to have its revelations doubted by virtue of the unfavorable comparison of its influences with those of sensational experience. That is to say, the real or alleged evidence of a "spiritual" world is so infrequent, compared with

that for the physical world, that it is exposed to a skepticism which physical science does not feel. We may then summarize the possible views to be taken of an after life.

1. There is that which was based upon the doctrine of a physical resurrection. This view simply repeated the physical life after a period of non-existence or "sleep" in the grave. This conception made the "spiritual" world a physical one. No intelligent person holds this view any longer.

2. There is the view that conceives it as analogous with the physical world, but not physical. This point of view makes the "spiritual" ethereal in some sense and reproduces processes perfectly analogous with our physical sense perception. It is the Theosophical view and that of many Spiritualists. It involves no abstractions except from physical sensation. It simply "etherializes" the forms of sense, to appropriate a phrase used against Platonic idealism by Aristotle. It satisfies the imagination and the mind that does its thinking in the forms of sensation.

3. The third view thinks of a "spiritual" world as purely mental and without the forms of sensation. It thinks of "spirit" as essentially what is involved in the inner consciousness, as in meditation and reflection, reasoning and all internal states. It conceives mind as unrelated to space and so does not require the "spiritual body" theory to support it. The doctrine is the logical development of Cartesian and Leibnitzian theories. It thinks of "pure" consciousness as an activity without sensation and so believes that another life would be without both the physical and the ethereal as a replica of the physical, though not itself physical. In other words, it denies the existence of a sensory organism such as the Theosophist and many Spiritualists assume.

The first of these views has been wholly abandoned

by all thinking classes and lingers only among those unreflecting minds that cannot eradicate the authority of tradition or traditional language. It is not a view which requires consideration here. But the decision between the other two conceptions is not so easy to make. To the scientific man it may not be necessary to make the choice, and morally I do not think it would make any difference to any one whether one or the other conception was true, provided consciousness was preserved in some form with its memories and capacities of "spiritual" development. For this reason—and it is only the ethical question that is of importance—it is not necessary to decide between them. We may only use the two conceptions for estimating such facts as come to us.

The division is between those who think that the future life must involve a world with the main features of the present one, except that they are not accessible to the physical senses, including a mechanism which shall perform functions analogous to those of perception, and those who make it purely mental and either ignore the sensory aspects of it or minimize them to such an extent that they do not figure importantly in the life of "spirit." It is possible that both views may be combined. They are not necessarily contradictory. In fact, they are combined in the life of the present physical world. We have a life of sensation or external perception, and a life of internal consciousness and reflection which may go on independently or parallel with the sensory. There is no reason why the same process should not be repeated in a "spiritual" world, with whatever variation of their order of dominance might be possible or probable. This is only a matter of evidence. It is not to be decided one way or the other by *a priori* methods.

Now for the first of these two theories there is much evidence that is at least superficially apparent. The

claim is constant in the literature of Spiritualism. The only difficulty is to determine its value. For instance, George Pelham through Mrs. Piper claimed that spirits had "an astral *fac simile* of the physical organism." Since George Pelham gave so much evidence of personal identity in the same system of messages, it is natural to attach some weight to the claim here made. But we are confronted with the uncertainty as to where the subliminal influence of Mrs. Piper's mind may enter. We merely suppose that those incidents which are unequivocally supernatural require external intelligence to account for them, and it is the verification of the statements as facts of the communicator's earthly life that compels the hypothesis of an outside agency to account for them. But statements not verifiable will have to be received with less assurance when the claim is made that they represent facts in a transcendental world.

We know that the subconscious is a factor in all the phenomena and it still remains to determine the boundaries between its work and that of spirits. Where the facts are not verifiable by living testimony we have not yet been able to assure ourselves of the boundary between external and internal influences. We do not yet know enough of the subconscious to assign its limitations exactly and hence we have to submit to the possibility that it may fabricate much that is closely associated with the facts that are evidence of the supernatural and so of external agency. From what we know of the normal knowledge and beliefs of Mrs. Piper and her education we might not naturally infer that the subconscious would probably invent such a view as the "astral *fac simile* of the physical organism." Still when we consider that the tendency of such minds as hers, which was uncritical, especially when its religious opinions were formed, to conceive the spiritual world in the naive way, and that the subconscious exer-

cises the same functions as the normal mind, we may well suppose that the mental pictures which constantly came to it in the process of communication would easily suggest to it just that idea and the subconscious might thus interpret it as indicating something about that world. Nor can we resort to the work of Mrs. Chenoweth to prove the case, though it does confirm the idea of an ethereal organism. For some incidents of Mrs. Chenoweth show rather clearly that what is taken for an "*astral fac simile*" may be only a "mental picture."

Take the incidents commented on in my Report of the case. In one, two churns and a dog with a dog churn were mentioned and described as if realities. The dog was said to be present. But Mrs. Chenoweth believes that animals as well as human beings have souls, and so, instead of supposing that she was seeing a mental picture as was the case in the instances of the churns, tacitly admitted by the subconscious itself, she supposes the dog is actually present, when there is no more reason for supposing that presence than supposing that of the churns. Phantasms produced on the subconscious of the living by external intelligence accounts for the facts, and considering that the subconscious would naturally take these phantasms for reality, as it does in dreams, deliria, and hallucinations, we may hesitate to regard the matter as proved by any isolated incident. The vision of my grandmother as a "little wrinkled old woman" and at the same time of seeing her "standing by laughing" points in the same direction. This view of it would not have been apparent but for the evidence at the same time that it was my father communicating and that the picture of the wrinkled grandmother was a memory or mental picture of my father conveyed to the subconscious of the medium. Hence whatever evidence we have of the ethereal body or "*astral fac simile*" is subject to criticism from the mental picture method of communicating.

But there is a consensus of statement on this matter from many sources. It seems to be quite a uniform conception of the next life and this without any probability that the subconscious of so many people would be agreed. In fact, it comes through those who seem never to have thought of it normally or to have had any previous theories about it. In this respect I think the evidence is not to be despised. The agreement among communicators is so general in all ages that it will take a very extensive proof that the mental picture process of communicating is the only one to set it aside. I do not think we are prepared to decide this matter positively at present. The matter must be held in abeyance for a while.

On the other hand, there is much to suggest the view that the spiritual life after death is mentally creative, so to speak, and hence that the analogies with the earthly life are not sensory in respect to stimulus, but mental and creative. In the first place, all are agreed that we must get rid of the sensory life as we know it and this leaves us with the internal mental faculties as our furniture. It is the inner life that survives and not the physical. Hence it would be the memory, imagination, self-consciousness and all the functional activities connected with the dream life, hallucination and deliria that would survive. These functions might not be disorderly or irrational as in hallucinations, dreams and deliria. They might be as rationally organized as in normal physical life. Dreams, deliria and hallucinations are phenomena that are best adapted to proving the existence of such functions without constituting their nature. Now all of these functions make their own world so to speak. They do not represent the nature of the stimulus, but the organic nature of the subject which manifests them. They create their ideas, even when definitely related to stimulus. Their relation to reality is in imitating it

in appearance without our right to make that reality other than a direct creation of the mental. It is this process that is operative in the mental picture method of communicating. The thoughts of the communicator are seen as realities, probably what may best be described as hallucinations to both sender and mediumistic receiver. Assuming this to be the regular procedure the evidence would be strong for an idealistic as distinct from a realistic world with its accompaniment of stimulus and perception after physical analogies.

There is a fact that points toward this view of the case. It is the frequent occurrence of the statement that some spirits do not know they are dead. This is an incident that occurs in all sorts of persons as mediums. I have known it to come through cases where the idea was repugnant to all previous beliefs of the subject. It suggests that the deceased is in a dream state, in which we know hallucinations are the form in which the thoughts of the subject appear, and in the dream life we do not know our condition at the time and while not aware of any body, we assume that the world is the same physical world which we appreciate in sensation. Now if a person released from the body should simply continue for a period, more or less extended, to exercise the functions of the subconscious on his memories, as we do in normal dreams, he would not know he was dead and he would not distinguish his apparent world from the physical one of his normal life. If the spiritual existence only gets this process organized into an orderly and rational one, the subject might discover that he was dead, but he would find the spiritual world to be unlike the physical both in respect of its causal relation to mental states and in respect of its nature. The basis for the whole spiritual world would thus be in the phenomena of mental pictures and, assuming that they are creations of the subject, it

would be conceivable that an objective ethereal world with sensory organisms to meet the wants of knowledge might not be necessary, especially if telepathy were the process of communicating between spirits. For them all existence might be purely mental.

Such a view would seem to be confirmed by that curious phenomenon so general in communications. I refer to the constant reproduction of long past memories which seem to have no rational meaning but to suggest or establish the identity of the person from whom they really or apparently come. But this is not at all conclusive. We do not know enough of the conditions and the process of communicating to urge this interpretation of them. They rather show the extent to which past experience may continue to haunt the mind of the discarnate, if the communication is not an unconscious influence by the spirit and not at all indicative of its real condition.

There is one objection to this hypothesis that it is the subjective powers and memories that dominate the spiritual life to the exclusion of an acquisitive life after the manner of sensory perception. It is that life after death would not seem to be progressive and would only repeat in mental form the stories of Sisyphus and Ixion. The mind would be living only in its past, for ever repeating its past and making no new acquisitions, a dream life which only incessantly goes over its earthly existence, like the heroes of Valhalla who are forever hewing down shadows which only rise up again to renew their ceaseless and bloodless contest. Assuming this view of the situation we could only feel awed by the moral condemnation under which we should live in such a system. We should be unable to escape the past and equally unable to make progress. We should be confronted with the situation described by the Christian doctrine—one school at least—that there is only one probation for men and that is the present life. His

eternal happiness or punishment would be made here once for all and no opportunity beyond the grave for reform or salvation.

There is no doubt that many of the real or alleged communications with the transcendental world suggest this interpretation. But it may be only a superficial one. We do not yet know the exact conditions under which these phenomena occur. For all that we know the conditions under which communications are possible tend to confine messages to memories of the past, at least to bring out such memories as suggest this interpretation of nature. Besides the view has to face the constant claim of communicators that it is a life of progress, which it would not seem to be if it be only a dream life based upon the contents of past experience. The law of progress and evolution in the present life would involve or suggest a similar law for the next life, and whether it included more than a dream life, however well and rationally organized, we should have something analogous to perception to determine that progress, if it be only that of telepathy between discarnate minds.

It is quite possible, as already remarked, that both processes may be combined in the spiritual world, as they are in the physical, though the "poetic," creative processes, may have more play in such a world than in this one. We have no way at present to decide this dogmatically. We have only data for stating our problem and it must remain for the future to solve it with any assurance. The facts emphasize mental phenomena more than they do the *quasi*-material, even when they simulate its forms, and it is the mental life which the idealist must emphasize in his scheme of the world. For the practical and ethical mind it makes no difference which view prevails. All progress and happiness depend on the preservation of consciousness and it is not the material world that constitutes this to-day. It

makes no difference to our achievements and happiness whether we treat our mental states as subjective or objective creations. The main point is to keep these mental states or consciousness in existence, and so the nature of the future life is subordinate to that just as the nature of the present life is subordinate to the facts of consciousness.

The acceptance of an ethereal organism for the soul would imply a great deal as to the nature of a "spiritual" world. It would carry with it the probability of an environment after the analogy of the physical world. The communications constantly convey this conception of it also when the details of such a world are reported. But when we have to discount many of them, and possibly all of them, for their relation to the possible method of communicating by mental pictures or telepathic hallucinations from the dead, we would not be sure that our idea of the reality was correct. Apparitions at least superficially support the doctrine of an ethereal organism, only that the reproduction of "spirit clothes" is a difficulty, especially when they are replicas of one's earthly habiliments. But this feature of them is so easily explained by the theory of telepathic hallucinations that the fact of apparitions does not sustain the theory of ethereal organisms when the nature of apparitions is thus analyzed.

The significance of the pictographic or "mental picture" process in communications should perhaps be explained a little more fully. It removes many perplexities from the phenomena and suggests the nature of the activities in the spiritual world. One of the apparent anomalies in mediumship was the represented existence of "spirit clothes," "houses," "cigar manufactories," "whisky sodas," and a general reproduction of the physical life. The communications from the spiritual world or such as claimed this character were often so confused that they suggested an abnormal men-

tal condition of the communicator and Dr. Hodgson and myself long maintained that view of the situation. This meant that we proposed the hypothesis of a sort of trance or dream state for the communicator while communicating, but not necessarily for his normal spiritual life. But the discovery of the pictographic process in communicating very much reduced the evidence for such a view, though it does not wholly remove the supposition of some abnormal mental situation for the communicator. But it is not necessary to discuss the relations of these two views; namely, between a normal and an abnormal state for communicating. They are compatible with each other though the evidence for one or the other of them is modified by the pictographic process of transmission. The important thing here is to know what the pictographic process is and its relation to the problem of the nature of the spiritual life.

I have described the pictographic process as one in which the communicator simply thinks and his thoughts and memories become a panoramic picture to the control and the subconscious of the medium. To the "dreaming" consciousness of the psychic these pictures would most naturally be taken as real, at least until he or she learned they were in fact hallucinatory. Most psychics, not being educated in psychology and, much more, being in a state when the critical faculties of reality are not alert, naturally take these pictures as representing a real world like our own, save that it is not perceptible to normal sense. It was years in my work with Mrs. Chenoweth before her subconscious discovered that what she saw consisted of mental pictures. They had been taken for realities. The thoughts and memories of the communicator appear as actual realities and will be taken as such until the subconscious can learn that they are merely pictures transferred from one mind to another.

The consequence is that, when this has once been settled, the significance for explaining the paradoxes of these phenomena is very great. "Spirit clothes" and spiritual houses will give no more difficulty to our minds. They are, at least in many instances, items in the identification of a spirit, though interpreted by the psychic as realities. We have no longer to interpret them as *quasi*-material. They are mental phenomena masquerading as realities of another kind, but masquerading only because the subconscious of the psychic and the naive minds of listeners misunderstands their nature. All the perplexities of reproducing the material universe are resolved into mental phenomena instead of material ones. On this view of them the whole system of *quasi*-physical realities loses its difficulties for the mind of observers and the Swedenborgian view that the spiritual world consists of *mental states* comes into the foreground and idealism wins a place in the interpretation of things. Swedenborg did not know anything about the subconscious, nor did he know anything about the pictographic process of communicating.

The result was that he did not allow for subconscious modification of messages, and he had no means of distinguishing between the reality and the mental picture of it. The mental picture and the reality were taken to be the same thing or representative of each other. Such a thing as veridical hallucinations he did not dream of, and so the spiritual life partook of the same nature as the material in its form and expression. But his emphasis upon its being mental states implied more of a distinction than he developed in connection with psychology. He did not appreciate the idealistic doctrine as worked out by Hegel afterward, who was practically a spiritualist, as he admitted the whole field of psychic phenomena. But Swedenborg did discover that the spiritual world had to be interpreted in terms

of mind instead of physical reality and it only required that we discover the pictographic process and the creative, or apparently creative, functions of the subconscious to understand his system better and to bring it into harmony with the known phenomena of psychology.

But the important thing to remark in this phantasmal conception of spiritual reality is that it suggests a larger creative function for mind in the spiritual world. We illustrate it in normal life in our dreams and hallucinations, and often in the clear phantasms of hypnosis. It is less manifest in poetry, day dreaming, and reverie. But in subliminal activities it is very noticeable, and it means that we can create our own world, a world of ideals, which if rationalized means that we can make our own happiness or misery as we please. Our world, at least at first, will be what our habits in this life make it, good or bad according to those habits. This creative power may go so far as to enable the mind to act directly on ethereal reality, if such there be in some sense, to produce replicas of the physical universe, the response being more ready and direct than matter to acts of will. Communications represent the process as one of thought creation and whether it be direct action on something more yielding to desire and will than matter or purely a mental creation makes no difference for the idealistic point of view. It emphasizes the creative power of thought and so of the possibility of making our world exactly as we desire.

In our physical life we can act directly by the will upon the body and only indirectly upon matter external to it, but we cannot by any act of will create the body. The mind, however, by slow processes can affect the organism whether for health or disease and that fact signifies at least a limited power over matter by the mind. That power may be extended in the spiritual

world so that desire and will may act more effectively on both the "spiritual" or "astral" body and its external environment to create or mold into form the realities which are reported in mediumistic communications. But I conceded that this view is still in the speculative stage, and if we construe that world as consisting of mental states the resemblance to our present physical world in the communications about it would be explained and the process of creative action made intelligible without invoking any conceptions of the miraculous.

There are just two directions in which we have to look for a solution of the problem. The first is toward some hypothesis of "spiritual substance" or the ether, or a finer form of "matter" than we have been accustomed to suppose. Communications quite generally represent the spiritual world as a finer form of matter, and the tendencies in physical science toward a whole cosmos of transcendental forces at the basis of the sensible world make this claim plausible. The second point of view is the purely idealistic one; namely, that the next life is purely mental. As already remarked the two points of view may be combined and we have discussed briefly the possibility of retaining mental functions after the dissolution of the sensory activities. We shall come to it again.

Physical science suggests a proof of an ethereal world which is not so easily set aside. It has resolved the atoms which have been supposed to be the basis of matter as known by the senses into ions and electrons which are supposed to be ethereal in their nature. Electrical, magnetic, thermal, and luminous phenomena are supposed to be ethereal functions rather than material, and Sir Oliver Lodge insists that all inorganic matter even, as well as the organic, has an ethereal double in support of its existence. Whether this last be true or not, the hypothesis of the ether sets up a world

distinctly analogous to the physical, except that it is supersensible. We may call it a form of "matter" if we like, that will not alter the facts, which are that it is supersensible and shows none of the properties of matter as known to the physical senses.

Besides I appeal to it here only as an *ad hominem* argument whose conclusion coincides with the teaching of real or alleged communications from the dead, and this before the ether hypothesis had any such conceptions and dimensions as it now has. There is nothing in human knowledge to contradict such a view of the world and many facts seem to make it reasonably possible. Hence when we obtain communications through minds wholly unacquainted with scientific theories, communications that assert such a world analogous with the physical but supersensible, we shall have to give them due weight and possibilities, though we suspend judgment until we get proof. This argument from the supersensible forces of physical science is not discountable from the theory of apparitions and telepathic hallucinations, so that as long as the ether hypothesis prevails in physical science it will have its importance. In the field of psychic research we shall have to prosecute experiment until we have determined the limits of telepathic hallucinations.

That there are no absolute breaks in nature would suggest or confirm the idea of an analogous world. This is the law of continuity. We find a beautiful illustration of it in the three conditions of matter, the solid, liquid and gaseous. It seems from our present scientific knowledge that it applies to every known form of matter. Some of the gases have been first liquefied and then solidified and many of the liquids can easily be solidified. Water is the example familiar to all. Mercury, one of the heaviest substances, seems always to remain a liquid, but if the temperature be made low enough it, too, solidifies. It seems that the whole ques-

tion is one of temperature and pressure. Now these several conditions of matter are those which can be tested by normal sense perception. They represent conditions in which the essential properties of matter as known by the senses can easily be tested. But suppose a condition of matter in which one of the so-called essential properties is lost, just as hardness is lost by melting ice into water, or as visibility is lost when water is turned into vapor, and we might have a condition of matter that would not affect the physical senses at all.

For instance, suppose impenetrability be eliminated while gravity was retained. I do not know that this is either possible or a fact, but it is conceivable. If it occurred it might be the real form of matter which we could call spirit. But I neither know nor care whether this is possible or not. The important thing is that the terms by which we name things are not the most essential matter. It is the facts and the differences they express that is the main thing. Whether we shall call spirit a form of matter, ether or anything else makes no difference, provided that the facts require us to suppose that consciousness survives. It is not important to call the subject surviving by the name of "spirit." It may be called anything, on the condition that the term does not carry with it the associations that belonged to something else. Hence I am only showing how we might have conditions of matter which would alter it as much as aqueous vapor is an alteration of ice. It would establish the continuity of nature in a way to suggest possibilities which we do not recognize at first.

Whether the next life is a form of material universe makes no difference to any one. It is only for the sake of clear terms and thinking that we avoid calling it material. Usage has associated certain definite limits to the properties of matter as known to sensation and

physical science. We do not find consciousness a universal property or function of it and so the term "spirit" comes in only to name something that does show these peculiarities and if any form or condition of matter can show them, there will be no objection to so naming the subject of them, provided we understand the conditions under which it is done. The term will be so changed in its wider meaning as not to carry with it the negative implications of the older import. Of course, if the transcendental world were a form of matter we should quite understand that it would not be absolutely distinguished from what we know, and it might help to understand the ethereal organism theory. But whether it be this or not is immaterial for the ethical importance of the fact of survival. It is this last which constitutes the main point of interest.

We must remember, however, that the question must not depend on the tenability of the ether hypothesis. The corpuscular theory of matter which was based upon the discoveries of radium and radio-activities would supplant the hypothesis of ether which had been universally accepted before. The corpuscular theory nevertheless would not alter the general analogies. It more distinctly conceives matter after the analogies of the atomic doctrine and does not assume properties so distinctly opposed to those of matter as does its rival hypothesis. Yet it is always dealing with the supersensible and only the imagination and the language used about it carry the conception of matter as sensibly known, the fact being that corpuscles, especially if you stop to think of their definite affinities in conception with the monads of Leibnitz and Boscovitch, may be described as equally immaterial with the ether, immaterial at least so far as sense perception is concerned, and that would suffice to prevent the ordinary materialism of science from pre-empting the field of speculation.

In no instance, however, can we condition either the fact or the nature of a future life upon the metaphysics of physics. They are merely *ad hominem* appeals to minds familiar only with physical concepts. No conclusion can be more assured than the premises on which it rests. Whatever doubt exists about either the ethereal or the corpuscular theories will be transferred to the conclusions based upon them. What we require is indubitable facts from which conclusions can be drawn, not speculative and metaphysical theories which, whatever their importance, are often nothing more than conceivabilities which too many people use as facts.

A much more hopeful possibility lies in the hypothesis of really or apparently creative mental states, or a rationalized dream life. We have to solve the perplexities of certain details that appear to be nonsense and offer excusable opportunities for ridicule. It is Sir Oliver Lodge's book "*Raymond*" that challenges ridicule and the temptations of both skeptic and laymen must be met.

When we come to read the communications reported of his son, we might be impressed by some of them at least, but our incredulity may be excited by certain apparently preposterous statements about the nature of the life after death. If we cannot give a reasonable explanation and if they seem superficially to have the same credentials as others, or at least associated with the veracity of the communicator, we draw back from them and raise a skeptical query about the whole mass of facts. It has been these apparently absurd statements that have excited so much ridicule among otherwise intelligent people, accustomed as they are to the language of ordinary life and the interpretation of it in accordance with normal experience. But we must remember that we are here dealing supposedly with another world or state of existence. I quite understand the layman's difficulty with such statements as are

made about brick houses and cigar manufactories in a spiritual world, and I would not dissent from his attitude of mind, if I took the same superficial meaning of the terms or statements. But the layman—and also the scientific man who does not get above the view of the layman—totally misunderstands the position of the really scientific man in such cases. The fact is, the layman is governed by assumptions which no really intelligent man would indulge and we have to show him that fact as a condition of obtaining a hearing on such incidents.

Nothing appears more preposterous to intelligent people, or even ordinarily unintelligent people, than talk about houses and cigar manufactories in a spiritual world, and this not because there is a moral revolution against such things, but because they represent it as a material world which should be accessible to sense perception and yet is not so. The internal contradiction involved in such statements suffices to make them absurd and false, at least as most naturally conceived. The literature of spiritualism is full of material analogies in this respect. It always insists that the occupations of the earthly life, and these of whatever kind, are continued after death, our modes of life, manners, dress, behavior, etc., adding difficulty to belief, besides the usual objections of materialism. The spiritual world is always represented as a sort of replica of the material cosmos. All the great works on the subject are full of this and of analogies of material existence. They appear so preposterous that skepticism must not be blamed for withholding belief or for systematic ridicule of the whole thing. It certainly has reason to disturb the easy credulity of the unintelligent man who readily accepts everything in a literal sense that comes to him regarding a transcendental world. No man can safely venture to defend such views in their superficial import.

But it will be no apology for real or apparent absurdities to call attention to certain facts of which physical science makes much in its own theories and conceptions.

1. All physical science, in its speculative causes, has been founded on the idea of a supersensible world which it has characterized in sensible terms, whether for lack of others that would be intelligible or for reasons affecting the very nature of the elements concerned. The atomic doctrine which has prevailed ever since the Epicurean philosophy originated, or even as early as Democritus, has regarded the elements as supersensible and yet with attributes ascribed to sensible matter. It has asked us to believe in a supersensible world like the sensible one in all but the sensibility. It ought to be no more paradoxical to believe in houses and cigars in an ethereal world than it is to believe in atoms or corpuscles. It is only the matter of size that gives offense and that is not a factor of importance in the problem.

2. The advocates of the ether hypothesis ought to have no difficulty in conceiving a like possibility. They regard the ether as the "double" of matter, the "astral" correlate of matter itself, whether organic or inorganic, and hence think and speak of it in terms of space relations in a manner to imply its entire resemblance to matter minus sensibility and the usual properties ascribed to matter. Even some of its advocates adhere to the idea of the same properties, solidity, for instance, though supersensible. Perhaps Sir Oliver Lodge's belief in the ether hypothesis made it easy for him to dismiss the paradoxes of the incidents referred to. The present writer does not find it necessary either to believe or disbelieve in the existence of ether, but he may well use the doctrines of its advocates as *ad hominem* arguments against the necessary impossibility of houses, clothes, cigars, etc., in a transcendental world.

They are no more impossible there than here. *A priori* we should not be able to understand their existence in the physical world, if we knew as little about it as we do about the spiritual world. Put us outside the physical world and we should probably question its existence or its possibility.

3. The whole force of the ridicule heaped on the ideas mentioned in regard to duplicating a *quasi*-material reality in the spiritual world comes from the influence of the Cartesian philosophy which has dominated nearly all modern thought and some ancient systems. It has taught such an antithesis between mind and matter, thought and reality, subjective and objective existence, that a spiritual world has been conceived by many people as wholly without qualities of a material world, even without spatial properties. It is this assumption that makes spirit talk about houses, clothes and other physical realities so preposterous. But the Cartesian philosophy may be only half true. There may be some sort of opposition between mind and matter, thought and reality, subjective and objective existence, but it may be no more than physicists set up between the sensible and the supersensible world in their own realm. It is well known that there are supersensible physical realities, without going to the atoms or corpuscles for them; for instance, the air, many of the gases, X-rays, and perhaps many more known to the laboratory. They are still like and unlike sensible reality, and there is no *a priori* reason why the antithesis between mind and matter should not be resolved in the same way, and to do this would deprive ridicule of many claims in spiritualism of its force.

But I repeat that this is no argument for the naive spiritualism which we meet about us. The readiness to accept literally every paradoxical statement in this work is only a sign of ignorance and it is no escape from difficulties to bow uncritically to really or ap-

parently unbelievable ideas in order to save ourselves the discipline of skepticism. I sympathize too much with doubt in this matter to submit without a fight to doctrines which are not easily defended, and I am conscious also of enough genuineness in the messages to regard absurd statements as a problem rather than as necessary absurdities and to justify seeking an explanation of them. I myself might believe anything before I could give unhesitating allegiance to statements of the kind quoted, taken at their face value. But before we take up such phenomena as those that have suggested the present discussion it is well to understand the facts of normal life and also what the source of difficulty is when asked to consider really or apparently preposterous statements about the other world. I have already discussed at some length the complications involved in the transmission of messages from a transcendental world, when commenting on the work of Mrs. Sidgwick and the nonsense of the supposed Sir Walter Scott. (Cf. *Journal Am. S. P. R.*, Vol. XI, pp. 47-71.) We have similar problems before us here and in addition also the still larger question of the nature of a transcendental world.

(1) Now right in normal experience, psychology has its perplexities regarding the nature of what is transcendental to sensation. Two schools of philosophy have debated this question for many centuries. Some maintain that sense perception properly presents or reflects the nature of reality. Others maintain that stimulus and reaction have no resemblance to each other. It is certain that illusions and hallucinations either favor the latter school or offer certain perplexities to the former. This, however, is no place to thresh out this controversy. I can only call attention to it as a vantage ground to which the spiritualist may return when he has dealt with all other aspects of his problem. It is simply a debated question whether even normal sense

perception interprets the objective world as the naive realist supposes, and if that be true the conclusion will hold all the more for abnormal psychology.

(2) Whatever explanation we assume for hallucinations, dreams, and deliria, it is certain that they simulate objective reality with such clearness and intensity that the mind takes them for an actual objective world, and we cannot even discover the error in most cases while the mind is in an abnormal condition. Subliminal or subconscious action in these forms seems to create reality, as the mind observes the facts when it can get access to them normally. During the obsession by them they are as real as any normal sensory experience, and a thousandfold more so than the ordinary imagery of memory, which we never mistake for objective reality. We have in these phenomena of normal or abnormal experience distinct evidence of a purely mental world unadjusted to the objective world. In them the mind is apparently creative, and certainly not correlated as normally with any supposed stimulus.

We shall return to the ideas just expressed when we have examined some fundamental questions in the problem. The first of these represents the limitations under which we are placed in all attempts to communicate knowledge from one person to another. Usually we assume that this is an easy thing. But there is no more deceptive illusion. Our success in making ourselves understood in normal life depends wholly upon the extent of our common knowledge and experience. The fact is more clearly illustrated in the simple fact that we cannot communicate ideas at all unless we have the same language, though this language may be nothing but mimic signs. Unless we have these we cannot make our ideas intelligible at all to another than ourselves. This is a truism, but most people forget it when they come to the consideration of intercommunication with transcendental beings. The same truth is

illustrated in another way by the fact that we can never prove any fact or truth to another mind unless that mind has the capacity or experience to *see* or perceive the truth we endeavor to present. You cannot demonstrate the *pons asinorum* to an idiot. He is not capable of seeing its truth. Insight is as indispensable as the language by which we communicate, in fact more so, and indeed language is worthless unless our neighbor has the experience and insight to interpret it or to perceive the truth it conveys. The general law is then that the mind must furnish its own machinery for knowledge. Its own action even in normal life is the condition of seeing or knowing, and that extends to such a degree that sensation itself represents the mind's own reaction against stimulus and even though it correctly represents the nature of objective reality it is not this itself. You furnish the conditions yourselves for perceiving any truth whatever and have to interpret sensory experiences according to the extent of your knowledge, and this depends on the kind and amount of experience that you have.

All this means that we do not *transfer* ideas from one to another. We see truth for ourselves. We must have experience to have knowledge. Nothing is transmitted. Any one can test this for himself by attempting to present any knowledge that he may have to one who has not had the same experience. He will have to choose terms suitable to the experience of the other person. The ideas to be transmitted, to use that expression, must be embodied in sensory terms in some way and that will depend on the measure of experience that the other person has. We constantly feel the inadequacy of language to express our ideas and this is only because we know that our mental conceptions are not fully embodied in sensory pictures and these are all that we can use to communicate with others. The ideas must be expressed in terms of their experi-

ence, and they will even then fail to get our ideas unless they can interpret those pictures in the same way. All depends on their insight and ability to construct or perceive their meaning.

All this means to call attention to the law of knowledge which is personal experience, not conveyance of it from one mind to another. We do not communicate ideas right here in the physical world by transmission or conveyance in any such sense as that in which we convey mechanical effects. (Vibrations are transmitted, but knowledge never.) Whatever knowledge we have is the result of sensation, experience. Thus even in normal life and in the physical world we can form no ideas of reality except through personal experience. We forget all this in the use of language. The real process which makes language useful we forget or ignore, and this is the part played by personal experience and sensation. Language does not communicate ideas bodily. It is only a symbol of common experience and this experience is the basis of its meaning. Beyond that we can no more communicate ideas than we could without language. What we know we know by sensation and interpretation. We do not see the earth go around the sun, for instance, but interpret the significance of certain observations at different times. It is the same with all our knowledge.

All this is perhaps truistic. But I have had to emphasize the limits of knowledge and its transmission. These I must summarize in the following manner: (1) All our normal knowledge is based upon personal experience, reaction on the stimulus of the external world. (2) No conveyance or communication of this is possible bodily even in our normal life in the physical world. Both these propositions must constantly be kept in mind when dealing with statements about transcendental world.

It ought now to be clear where the difficulty is in

any communications about a spiritual world. If we cannot convey direct information about the physical world in which we normally live, it certainly would be more difficult to communicate about one in which we do not live. If personal experience is the condition of acquiring knowledge, the absence of this about a spiritual world would assure us that we would have no direct means either of ascertaining its nature or of talking intelligently about it. In normal life we rely upon the uniformity of coexistence and sequence to obtain any basis for talking about even physical reality, and not having this for the transcendental world we are still more disabled from communicating intelligently about it. Then, added to this, the evident difference between the two worlds would make another difficulty in the communication between them. The experience of the discarnate may have no equivalent in our physical world to enable them to make themselves understood. There might be superficial analogies between the two worlds, but it would be easy to misunderstand these. When it is impossible right in our own field of experience to express visual experience in auditory terms, or *vice versa*, it ought to be clear how impossible it is to present any clear and direct conceptions about a spiritual world to minds limited to sense data or experience for the vehicle of communication. A supersensible world is not directly expressible in sensory terms. This is as true of physics as of spiritualism or any other doctrine of transcendental reality.

These generalizations ought to make clear the limitations to be imposed upon any statement transmitted about a spiritual world. The value of incidents proving the existence of supernormal knowledge lies wholly in their verification by the living and in the ignorance of the facts by the medium through whom they come.

They are memories or facts verifiable as such in a physical life and do not attest anything whatever about

the nature of a spiritual world. If they were neither verifiable as memories by other living persons nor provably unknown to the psychic they would be worthless for any scientific or evidential purposes. It is not their testimony to the nature of reality beyond that is important, but merely to the existence of a beyond still to have its nature determined. All other statements have to be verified before they can have value and if they relate only to a transcendental world they are either not verifiable at all or will have to be proved by another than the ordinary means of verification. We shall have to apply the same general principles which are used in science to ascertain the nature of physical reality not directly revealed by individual sensations or isolated experiences. We do not see the rotundity of the earth, for instance, but infer it from certain observed facts which imply it.

With these clear and unquestionable limitations on knowledge, or on direct and presentative knowledge of things even in normal experiences, we may summarize the situation for our knowledge of a transcendental world. (1) We have no direct sensory knowledge of the supersensible world, whether physical or spiritual. (2) The first stage of our knowledge about the spiritual world would have to be expressed in negative terms. This means that it would *not* be physical in sensory conceptions of it. We might get personal identity established by communication with it, but this would not convey any conception of its nature. (3) Communications about its nature could not be sensibly conveyed to us directly or in bodily terms and at the same time rightly represent it.

This indicates that we have no resource in sensory experience for expressing the nature of a spiritual world. What means, then, have we for forming any conception of it whatever? We cannot do it in physical terms and we have no normal transcendental experience

for appeal. The average man and woman interprets statements about such a world in the usual terms and conceptions. It is assumed that statements convey information, when the fact is they do not. We have to form our ideas of their meaning entirely from what we can verify in ordinary experience, even the supernormal which proves personal identity, and because we find this true, we are too apt to carry the same assumptions over to unverifiable statements.

But if we cannot interpret statements as they appear superficially, what can we do?

Suppose that we conceive the spiritual world after the analogy of our own *mental* world or states. We have as direct access to these as we have to the physical world. Indeed many would claim that it is more direct and that we are better assured of these than we are of the nature of an external physical world. Our knowledge of our own mental states is certainly more direct, even though we do not know all about them. But they represent a group of facts quite different from sensory experience as we usually conceive it. They are direct experience, however, and may afford the clue to at least one aspect of a spiritual life. (Assuming that survival of personal identity has been proved, as we do here, death means only the extinction of sensory phenomena, the reactions of the bodily side of our being on the physical world.) The inner life of consciousness goes on without bodily and sensory responses to stimuli. Whether there is more than this is not the issue. There may be more, but if we are to have any data for forming a conception of it in terms of experience they must come from inner experience, from our mental states apart from sensation. A future life is at least this with our memories, whatever else it may be. The existence of memories that prove personal identity is proof of that much. The stream of consciousness with its memories may go on and de-

termine the nature of a spiritual world to the same extent to which it exhibits the spiritual side of the physical embodiment.

The next analogy is quite as important. It remains by the phenomena of the inner life. I refer to subliminal or subconscious activities. We have objective proof that subconscious phenomena go on and then subjective proof in dreams, hallucinations and deliria, as well as the visions and hallucinations of the insane, which are more or less objective evidence. In all these the subconscious activities of the mind reproduce apparent reality. They may be said to be creative in as much as they represent as vivid conceptions of reality as sensation itself. Ideas or thoughts are "projected," so to speak, as if real. The mind apparently creates its own world in them, and their normal representative is in abstraction, reverie, and day dreaming, which differ only in being less objective in appearance. In some cases they may actually reach this apparent reality. But usually they represent only more than the usual concentration and abstraction in ordinary memory. But in dreams, hallucinations, and deliria the reality is as apparent as in sensory experience. Thoughts seem to be as real as the physical world in such conditions.

Now we have only to conceive the continuance or extension of these subconscious functions to the spiritual life to construe its nature to that extent and to explain a number of phenomena. The pictographic process in at least one type of communication confirms what goes on there and with this we may understand many of the paradoxes in the communications as well as the representations of that world. Assume it to be a mental world with the power to represent thoughts in the form of apparent reality and you have a clue both to the interpretation of a spiritual world in terms of normal experience, inner mental experience, and to

resolve many of the perplexities in the whole problem of that world. But for the retention of memory we should lose our sense of personal identity, and hence for a time after death this memory is concentrated on the earthly experiences until adjustment to new conditions can be made. The subliminal functions act to produce apparent reality and then when the subject of them gets into contact with a psychic, the communication of these images or pictures conveys the idea that you are dealing with a *quasi*-material world. The dream state of the psychic's trance leaves the interpreting powers intact and, just as we deem dream pictures real when asleep, the psychic understands the pictographic images as representing a real world until he or she comes to learn that they are but mental symbols of a reality not accurately or fully expressed in the pictures. Until thus adjusted to the spiritual world, the dreaming spirit would be what we call earthbound. This would mean preoccupation with memory pictures either of the past or of ideal construction, and life would be a creative one, so to speak. The spiritual life would be a dream life, irrational until the earthbound condition had been overcome, and rational when the adjustment of the mind had been affected for both the dreaming functions and the responses to an objective environment.

Let us apply this to certain types of statement about the spiritual life. I have myself seen various assertions about it. I shall not vouch for their being genuinely supernormal communications. About that I do not care. We have to judge of the statements often apart from their supernormal character. They simply claim to have that character and to be revelations of the other world. I have seen a few instances in which the general life of people in the physical world was simply duplicated. For instance, one case in which the alleged communicator asserted that spirits lived in houses and

carried on all the functions of housekeeping as in the physical world. Another went no farther than to assert that he lived in a house like his former physical home, though it was "more dreamlike." Another asserted that they live in houses only for awhile and get rid of them after their need for them has passed. Another said that she did not live in a house, but had all the flowers she wanted. Another denied that spirits live in houses at all, and some state that they cannot describe the spiritual world to us at all and that we can form no conception of it until we come to it.

Now there are contradictions enough in all this, and one has only to read many books about the alleged matter to discover similar and numerous contradictions, or at least statements apparently so preposterous as to make belief impossible in all that is said about the spiritual world, if interpreted superficially and as we interpret ordinary language. But if we look at these statements and contradictions with the facts outlined above we may find a clue out of the labyrinth. Even all these contradictions may find a unity in themselves and be perfectly consistent with each other from the purely mental point of view.

Suppose the earthbound point of view for many spirits. Their earthly memories might dominate life for a time, at least until adequately adjusted, and they would thus mentally construct their own world as in dreams and hallucinations or deliria. Each person would give it a character according to his own terrestrial habits and tastes. And all this might be a mere marginal incident in the process of development, and even casually and involuntarily communicated at times. The pictographic process going on in their minds might involve a larger panorama of past and present mental states than we ordinarily suppose, so that earthly memories would fuse with transcendental mental states in all sorts of ways. Or there might

be many cases where earthly memories would so obsess the mind as to make reaction against a spiritual world impossible or to make even the realization of death impossible. As illustration of this take the article published in the *Journal* about the frequent effects of being suddenly killed in battle (Vol. IX, pp. 256-281), and statements made in the Report on another case (*Proceedings Am. S. P. R.*, Vol. VIII, pp. 502-506, 522, 530, 612, 633, 638, 739, 755). The existence of hallucinations is affirmed in these instances and to the extent of not knowing that they are dead. Such a condition would account for much in the statements about that life, when interpreted in terms of mental experience as we know it.

Let me take two illustrations in my own dream life. I have twice in my experience awakened up in a dream. That is, I continued my dream as hypnogogic illusions though I knew I was awake. In the first instance, I was on a mountain top looking at a small lake surrounded by summer cottages. I took the scene for real and became perplexed only when I saw long fissures opening in the rocks under my feet and in a moment the whole scene vanished and I was in bed instead of being on a mountain top. In another instance, I awakened and found myself in the old bedroom in Ohio and was puzzled by the fact that there was paper on the walls, because I knew there was no wall-paper on the walls of the room in which I slept as a boy. While I was trying to solve the puzzle, the scene vanished and I was in my bed in New York.

In both these instances I was actually awake; that is, self-conscious, but the visual picture of the scene and the room so obsessed my mind that I could not perceive where I actually was, until the obsessing image disappeared. My world was my visual picture created by fancy or subliminal action. The same phenomena may be frequent with the discarnate. The memory of

earthly life or imagination of it may so obsess the mind as to shut out all realization of death or a spiritual world in its proper form, and thus repeat over the simulacra of a physical world, even taking them to be real when they are not. When these activities become systematized and rational, they may consist of the adjustment of memory to a transcendental world so as to present little or no confusion in communications about it. But in the condition transitional to this or in conditions when the mind cannot control or separate memories from mental states more rational about the other life, all sorts of mental pictures may be transmitted about it, especially when the pictographic process is the method of communication, so that they are misrepresentative of its real nature, or are misinterpreted by the mind through which the messages are delivered.

I think Swedenborg is a case in point. Though he was well aware of the symbolic character of much that he received, the absence of all knowledge at his time of the subliminal and the ignorance of the pictographic process as a means of intercommunication, prevented the realization of exactly what his work meant, though he carefully and emphatically defined the spiritual world as essentially consisting of mental states. If readers of his work will keep this idea in mind they will observe in it a gigantic piece of evidence for the hypothesis here presented. We to-day are only getting scattered evidence of the same view, and this scattered evidence is all the stronger because it comes without the intention of proving the fact. It is represented in mental pictures proving the identity of the communicator when we cannot assume that the objects so presented are real, they are only phantasms produced by the thoughts of the dead.

With these preliminary observations we are able to take up some statements made in the last work of Sir

Oliver Lodge, to portions of which we have already alluded, and to which the papers called attention with much ridicule. I wish to show that such papers do not know what they are talking about, even though their perplexity is excusable. Let me quote the passages which I have in mind, and this time there will be no newspaper garbling of the records. The first passage of interest came in answer to a question whether the communicator, Sir Oliver Lodge's son, remembered a sitting at home when he had said he "had a lot to tell" his father.

"Yes. What he principally wanted to say was about the place he is in. He could not *spell* it all out—too laborious. (Probably referring to the method of table tipping.) He felt rather upset at first. You do not feel so real as people do where he is, and walls appear transparent to him now. The great thing that made him reconciled to his new surroundings was—that things appear so solid and substantial. The first idea upon waking up was, I suppose, of what they call 'passing over.' It was only for a second or two as you count time, (that it seemed a) shadowy vague place, everything vapory and vague. He had that feeling about it.

"The first person to meet him was Grandfather. And others then, some of whom he had only heard about. They all appeared to be so solid, that he could scarcely believe that he had passed over.

"He lives in a house—a house built of bricks—and there are trees and flowers, and the ground is solid. And if you kneel down in the mud, apparently you get your clothes soiled. The thing I don't understand yet is that the night doesn't follow the day here, as it did on the earth plane. It seems to get dark sometimes, when he would like it to be dark, but the time in between light and dark is not always the same. I don't know if you think all this is a bore.

"What I am worrying round about is, how it's made, of what it is composed. I have not found out yet, but I've got a theory. It is not an original idea of my own; I was helped to it by words let drop here and there.

"People who think that everything is created by thought are wrong. I thought that for a little time, that one's thoughts formed the buildings and the flowers and trees and solid ground; but there is more than that.

"He says something of this sort:—There is something always rising from the earth plane—something chemical in form. As it rises to ours, it goes through various changes and solidifies on our plane. Of course I am only speaking of where I am now.

"He feels sure that it is something given off from the earth, that makes the solid trees and flowers, etc., etc.

"He does not know any more. He is making a study of this, but it takes a good long time."

Before making any comments on this passage I shall quote the others and they will together make the subject of detailed discussion. He admitted that he did not know anything more than when on earth. But in a later passage he made some curious statements about his clothes.

"Lady Lodge: We were interested in hearing about his clothes and things; we can't think how he gets them! (The reference is to a second sitting of Lionel, not available for publication.)

"They are all man-u-fac-tured. (Fedra, the control, stumbling over long words.) Can you fancy seeing me in white robes? Mind I didn't care for them at first, and I wouldn't wear them. Just like a fellow gone to a country where there is a hot climate—an ignorant fellow, not knowing what he is going to; it's just like that. He may make up his mind to wear his own

clothes a little while, but he will soon be dressing like the natives. He was allowed to have earth clothes here until he got acclimatised; they let him; they didn't force him. I don't think I will ever be able to make the boys see me in white robes."

This last passage is not especially important for any light that it may throw on the doctrine of "spirit clothes," but it is another version of the general theme. The next passage is the one about the "cigar manufactory" and contains much more of interest besides.

"He says he doesn't want to eat now. But he sees some who do; he says they have to be given something which has all the appearance of an earth food. People here try to provide everything that is wanted. A chap came over the other day, (who) *would* have a cigar. 'That's finished them,' he thought. He means he thought they would never be able to provide that. But there are laboratories over here, and they manufacture all sorts of things in them. Not like you do, out of solid matter, but out of essences, and ethers, and gases. It is not the same as on the earth plane, but they were able to manufacture what looked like a cigar. He didn't try one himself, because he didn't care to; you know he wouldn't want to. But the other chap jumped at it. But when he began to smoke it, he didn't think so much of it; he had four altogether, and now he doesn't look at one. They don't seem to get the same satisfaction out of it, so gradually it seems to drop from them. But when they first come they do want things. Some want meat, and some strong drink; they call for whisky sodas. Don't think I am stretching it, and I tell you that they can manufacture even that. But when they have had one or two, they don't seem to want it so much—not those that are near here. He has heard of drunkards who want it for months and years over here, but he hasn't seen any. Those I have seen, he says, don't want it any more—

like himself with his suit, he could dispense with it under the new conditions."

The communicator was then asked a question about the house said to have been built of bricks and a long passage in answer to the query came which was substantially the same as before, only more detailed as to the exhalations from which they were made and then the passage ended with the following interesting statement.

"Some people here won't take this in even yet about the material cause of all these things. They go talking about spiritual robes made of light, built by the thoughts on the earth plane. I don't believe it. They go about thinking that it is a thought robe that they're wearing, resulting from the spiritual life they led; and when we try to tell them it is manufactured out of materials, they don't believe it. They say, 'No, no, it's a robe of light and brightness which I manufactured by thought.' So we just leave it. But I don't say that they won't get robes quicker when they have led spiritual lives down there; I think they do, and that's what makes them think that they made the robes by their lives."

These are the most important passages in the book, important for the indications of paradoxical statements likely to awaken suspicion or ridicule. The first explanation of them that offers itself is that of subliminal dreaming by the medium, and I shall not refuse critics the claim that such influences occur in these and similar phenomena. I admit such influences even in the evidential matter where we can positively verify the facts, and where we cannot verify them the skeptic enjoys much impunity for his statements, though the fact that the supernormal cannot be accounted for in that way to some extent establishes a presumption for transcendental influences in the non-evidential matter. But I am not going to refuse skeptics the influence of

the subconscious in such instances, and it will be worth while to quote Sir Oliver Lodge on the same point in vindication of his admission of the facts to his record, a circumstance not generally noticed by his critics. He says:

“A few other portions, not about the photograph, are included in the record of this sitting, some of a very non-evidential and perhaps ridiculous kind, but I do not feel inclined to suppress them. For reasons see Chapter XII. Some of them are rather amusing. Unverifiable statements have hitherto been generally suppressed, in reporting Piper and other sittings; but here, in deference partly to the opinion of Professor Bergson—who when he was in England urged that statements about life on the other side, properly studied, like travelers’ tales, might ultimately furnish proof more logically cogent than was possible from mere access to earth memories—they are for the most part reproduced. I should think myself that they are of very varying degrees of value, and peculiarly liable to unintentional sophistication by the medium. They cannot be really satisfactory, as we have no means of bringing them to book. The difficulty is that Feda (the control) encounters many sitters, and though the majority are just inquirers, taking what comes and saying very little, one or two may be themselves full of theories, and may either intentionally or unconsciously convey them to the ‘control’ (the subconscious as Sir Oliver probably means) who may thereafter retail them as actual information, without perhaps being sure whence they were derived.”*

*In measuring the importance of certain statements in the record it is important, as most readers recognize, to know what previous and normal information the psychic may have had in regard to the point at issue. The statements about the nature of the other world might be the reproduction of the medium’s previous reading or conversation with others. Hence I wrote to Sir Oliver Lodge for information as to the psychic’s condition

With this I cordially agree and I may even go farther and say that I have no objection, so far as the present exposition will be concerned, to regarding the non-evidential matter, especially the real or apparent nonsense, as altogether subliminal padding My

and knowledge of the subject, especially asking if she had read Swedenborg. His reply to me is as follows:

"The medium is in a trance when she gives her messages, and usually apparently a deep one. I have never seen any sign of memory of what has been given in trance, though she may occasionally hear things from other sitters to whom Feda (the control) has perhaps chattered a little.

"Concerning what she has read, she tells me that she has not read Swedenborg, but she has undoubtedly been under the influence of Mr. Hewat McKenzie, whose book called 'Spirit Inter-course' she no doubt knows, since he has been a friend of hers for some time, and had sittings with her once or even twice a week for many months.

"The medium, or the control, seems to get the messages sometimes pictorially, sometimes audibly. There is no one method to the exclusion of others.

"I have challenged Feda that she has got the unverifiable kind of things from sitters; but she insists that she has given it to them, not received it from them. Though I think she would admit that sometimes she uses their language in describing things which she says anyone could see who was about with them on that side. She seems to agree with the descriptions that Raymond has given and to regard it as a sort of common knowledge up there.

"I agree with you that all this puzzling matter is instructive when properly recorded, and I did not feel at all justified in excluding it from my book. Ridicule is always so cheap that a little more or less does not matter."

Sir Oliver Lodge then goes on in his letter at some length to give his own theory of our normal interpretation of physical objects and regards it even here as a "mental one," a view taken by the idealists generally, but the sense in which this is true would require too much space to discuss here and I only refer to it as involving a presumption of just what I have discussed in this paper, and I allude to Sir Oliver Lodge's statement of it only to indicate that it explains why he would include the apparent nonsense in the records.

There is nothing in Hewat McKenzie's book which would give rise to the idealistic interpretation of the other side and hence it is not likely that the medium in this instance would derive the ideas discussed from that source. As she had not read Swedenborg she was not drawing from that authority.

construction of it here will not depend on its being genuine spiritistic communication. All that I shall do will be to show that it is consistent with a spiritistic world as a mental one, whether it has any *quasi*-material nature or not. It is quite possible that the apparent nonsense is not all subliminal creation. Most subliminals would hardly be so absurd as to forfeit the right to consideration by talking palpable nonsense. The very fact of the nonsense is of a character to make one pause, even though he has no temptations to believe the superficial meaning of the data. A really scientific man will demand an explanation of the facts, whether he believes them or not. That is what I wish to undertake here.

It is the quotation of statements about living in brick houses or having cigar manufactories in the spiritual world out of their context and without explanation of either their environment, or the actual views of the author, that creates all the trouble with the public, both with believers and with skeptics, neither of which class will take the trouble critically to read the facts. Let me take the first passage, about the brick house, and estimate it in the light of the hypothesis that the spiritual world may be a mental one and not to be measured by the conceptions of sense perception and their flavor of physical reality.

Careful readers of the passage in which the assertion about brick houses is made will find associated statements which qualify its superficial import. The communicator frequently speaks of "the place where he is now" and evidently does not always, if ever, mean by it merely the other world as distinct from the present physical world. There are intimations that he recognizes difference of conditions or "planes" in the spiritual world in which appearances or realities are different. Readers will note that he indicates his confusion at first on the other side and that in the

physical world the walls of physical houses appear transparent to him now and that things in the transcendental world appear so solid and substantial, evidently reflecting a stage of opinion there in which he thought it otherwise. Indeed he even says that things appeared vague and shadowy at first, showing the influence of subjective limitations then.

The allusion to mud on his clothes shows a stage of reflection in which such things appeared false. He had evidently speculated on it, and his perplexity about night and day is more than interesting. He lets drop statements in reference to it which show that the alternations are due to his own mind and not to external reality, as with us. Then immediately he mentions only to reject the "thought theory" as explaining the appearances to him. He here shows familiarity with the dream theory of reality in that world and implies that it is held by others. But he is not satisfied with it, though his perplexity about night and day would be solved by it. Moreover the theory that brick houses are mental phantasms would appear more rational than the *quasi*-physical theory which he advances, especially the reference to "essences," etc. It is even admitted that the "thought theory" is not his own, but one suggested to him. Being a physicist in life, he would naturally enough revert to material causation for explanation even as an act of memory and would be puzzled by any idealistic doctrine that appeared to contradict this view. A similar phenomenon occurred in the experience of Mrs. Elsa Barker, in her *Letters from a Living Dead Man*. The communicator there also thought his experiences on the other side at first were hallucinations and investigated them, coming to the conclusion that they were not such. In my own opinion his conclusion was wrong and his earlier impression about them was more nearly correct. It is

probably the same here with Sir Oliver Lodge's communicator.

It is curious to note also that the same question is raised in the passage about "spirit clothes." The theory is directly advanced that they were thought productions, subjective creations of the mind as based on the ideas of earthly life. The communicator disbelieved it, but may have been partly or wholly wrong about that, though conceivably right in the suspicion that this was not all. What else such things may be remains to be determined.

The cigar manufactory incident is more complicated, but still more in favor of the idealistic explanation. It should be noted that it is qualified by allusion to appearances which the ordinary Philistine does not stress in his ridicule. Note first that he distinguishes between those who continue to want sensory satisfaction and those who do not, placing himself among the latter. Those who continue to desire earthly pleasures are earthbound and have to be cured, so to speak. The indispensable condition of their progress is the eradication of sensory longings or desires. As long as these obsess the mind the clear and true realization of a spiritual world would not be present, any more than it is with sensuous people among the living. It is clear also from the context that the man who asked for a cigar had had his perplexities about the other world when he got there and he had some sense of humor in demanding a cigar in thinking that this could not be supplied to him, though other things could.

Take the case as one in which suggestion is used to cure the subject of his illusions or hallucinations. An earthbound spirit is haunted with the desire to smoke as a memory of his terrestrial life and finding others apparently satisfied with the production of thought realities he ventures to ask for what he thinks is impossible. But those who wish to exorcise his hallucina-

tion or sensuous appetite may have tried by suggestion to create the hallucination in him of a cigar with all the machinery that such a suggestion might arouse, and he might find in the effort to get satisfaction that he could not do it and the desire would atrophy or disappear. Readers will find that the whole situation is clearly like what I have indicated, and it is the same with the "whisky sodas." The processes are idealistic. The mind creates its own world and transmits the pictures to others and, as the sensory satisfaction does not come, the sensory desire must diminish and disappear.

An incident of importance also is the fact that the communicator alluded to the cigar as something which only *appeared* to be such. The casual reader and the newspaper reporter think and speak of it as a real fact, but the record shows that the communicator was debating the reality of the affair in his own mind. There is evidence also that he had a keen sense of humor in the selection of his objects, a cigar and whisky sodas, making them as paradoxical and amusing as he could, and then tells the matter with a touch of humor that is quite natural. Careful readers will note that there is evidence of debating the question with each other on the spiritual side of life with some realization of the situation in certain persons there whose hallucinations have to be corrected. The expression "That's finished them" tells a world of meaning. The individual had realized certain impossibilities and believed that he had found something that could not be done in this world of wonders, but he was disappointed and the thing was done, with the acknowledgment that it *appeared* to be a cigar, and the trial showed that the expected satisfaction did not come. This state of affairs is exactly what comes of suggestion in the living when curing a vicious habit. In a world where thought is more creative than it is with us, suggestion ought

to work more effectively than with us, where it may even accomplish wonders.

Moreover it is evident that the communications reveal only a part of what went on in such connections. The messages are fragmentary and the subject is changed suddenly, though the incidents remain in the same class and involve the same explanation of their nature. Whatever modifying influence the subconscious of the medium may have, the incidents have a verisimilitude to the state of affairs imagined and perhaps only the coloring of objective reality to them is added by her own mind. Mrs. Chenoweth for a long time believed, in the subliminal stage of her trance, that what she saw was real and objective, and only by apparent accident did she one time discover that what she saw was merely a mental picture. The influence of her subconscious to give the appearance of reality to the mental pictures was so strong that I had to get evidence apart from her discovery that the phenomena were pictographic and not real. It is the same in nearly all of our dreams. We seldom suspect the unreality of what we see or feel in them. The medium in the present instance may have been the cause of concealing the sense of unreality in the communicator, though she evidently did not eliminate characteristics which still betrayed the mental nature of the phenomena independently of her own. No doubt the result is more or less a medley, even though the subconscious of the medium actively adds little or nothing to the contents. It may add interpretation or omit elements that affect interpretation without greatly distorting impressions. But with all the modification it leaves evidence of fragmentary character in the communications and one familiar with the hypothesis of a spiritual world in terms of mental states will easily discover an intelligible and rational unity in the phe-

nomena, with allowances for subliminal coloring by the medium.

There is one statement in the book purporting to come through the control which apparently reflects more or less unconsciously the nature of that existence and it directly uses the analogy of the dream life. I quote the passage. Speaking of the importance of knowing about the future life beforehand the communicator says, through the control:

“He wants to impress this on those that you will be writing for: that it makes it so much easier for them if they and their friends know about it beforehand. It’s awful when they have passed over and won’t believe it for weeks—they just think they’re dreaming. And they don’t realize things at all sometimes.”

It would be a mistake to suppose from this that the “dream” state is a perpetual one. It is what we may call the earthbound condition and statements immediately following this tend to prove this fact. The allusion to the “dream” state, in its manner, clearly indicates that it refers to the immediate period after death. What takes place later is not intimated in the context. But at other times there is the intimation that the mind or consciousness has the power to create things which it had not when living. But we have no special analogies for this in any *immediate* action of thought. What we create we do indirectly through action on the organism. Such a thing as creating by the direct action of the will is not familiar to normal life and there is constant intimation in the literature of this subject that thought is creative on the other side in a manner not clearly intelligible to us here. Recently one of the controls in the Chenoweth case spontaneously remarked that I had a “theory that the other life was a mental world” and went on to say that consciousness there was creative. Its significance lay in the fact that I have never made a single remark

to Mrs. Chenoweth either in her normal or trance state, that I held such a theory. The remark was not in any way due to anything that I had previously said, so that it was supernormal in so far as it reflected what was actually in my mind. But while we may well conceive the other life as a mental world, a rationalized dream life, it may be more, and the earthbound condition immediately after death is merely a foretaste of the rationalized form of the "dream" life. What else it may be remains to be determined.

This whole matter was briefly outlined in my first report on the Piper case in 1901. Cf. *Proceedings Eng. S. P. R.*, Vol. XVI, pp. 259-262. I did this with much less data on the matter than we now have. It was only a natural implication of the idealistic theory of mind.

The importance of all this lies in the corroboration of the idealistic point of view in the interpretation of the problem. Nor do we first discover this point of view in mediumistic phenomena. It is as old as the distinction between sensory and intellectual activities. In normal life the internal activities of the mind have their own existence and meaning apart from sensory experience, though condemned to work upon it. There is in them the beginning of a spiritual life, the foreshadowing of an independent existence, if I may express it so, and death only liberates the inner life from the shackles of sensation and enhances its creative power. Just postulate this tendency with modifying influences of the subconsciousness of the psychic and the difficulties of transmitting messages of any kind, and you will have a clear explanation of the paradoxes and perplexities of these phenomena.

No doubt there are complications. These may be connected with an objective existence as well as a subjective one on the other side. But that is probably less communicable than the memories of the earthly

life or the inner states of the mind. In the first stages of life there, the memories will probably dominate and ideas of that world must slowly accumulate as with an infant just after birth. The infant cannot have the slightest understanding of its experiences, even though its mental development might be considerable before birth. Time is required to understand the new experience, and it may be the same in a new objective world after death. It has to be adjusted to the physical memories in order to be intelligently discussed in communications and it may even then be impossible to employ more than remote analogies to talk about it. At first the momentum of earthly conceptions may prevail; add to this the marginal character of many messages, the modifying influence of the mind through which the messages come, the necessarily symbolic nature of the pictographic process, and the selective liabilities of the mind delivering the messages: these may all give us the result that seems so perplexing. But the hypothesis of a mental world removes the apparent absurdity of a *quasi*-material reality for a part of that existence and we can await further investigation for some conception of the objective world implied in many of the communications.

CHAPTER X

SEQUELS OF PSYCHIC RESEARCH

IT is exceedingly improbable that the phenomena of psychic research should stop with the mere proof of spiritual existence. The processes involved in communication or the transmission of evidence of identity could easily be used for any other purpose, and we might expect any type of invasion imaginable after finding that a discarnate world impinged at all upon the physical. There is a whole field of phenomena that has not been as yet resolved except in the most perfunctory way by scientific men. They have been content with description instead of explanation and hence have neglected the plainest dictates of prudence in regard to the implication of such phenomena as telepathy and spiritistic communications, which imply some sort of causal influence on the mind independently of normal sense perception and motor action. Secondary personality is the doctor's Irish stew. He does not know what it is. In antiquity it was "demoniac obsession." At a later period it was "witchcraft." To-day we call it such things as "split consciousness" and think we have solved the problem, when, in fact, we have only thrown dust in people's eyes. We have become so accustomed to paradoxes in human knowledge that almost any impossible combination of terms will receive respectful attention, the more impossible the better. What is split consciousness? We can split wood, iron, pumpkins, political parties; but split consciousness, however convenient a term for describing

an apparent situation, is a term for our ignorance—a most happy term, to confound a group of people who refer every anomalous thing in the universe to spirits, and to make it unnecessary to inquire minutely into the anomalies of personality.

Since the rise of modern science, the one thing that has saved the thinking of most people from the hasty interpretation of mental anomalies, has been the general belief that science has exorcised the “supernatural” from the order of the world, though scarcely anybody knew what the supernatural meant. During all this period secondary personality was unknown, or its apparent significance not appreciated, as a means of reducing the claims of the supernatural. The echoes of witchcraft still remained in the popular consciousness. But the words secondary personality, and their associates, “subliminal,” “subconscious,” and “hysteria,” redeemed the situation, and became an open sesame for the scientific conjurer. Spirits disappeared into the limbo of illusion and mythology.

Ansel Bourne disappeared from home in Providence, R. I., and was given up as lost or the victim of an unknown death; but he suddenly awakened to his normal condition eight weeks afterward in Norristown, Pa., with no memory of the eight weeks interval. Professor James and Dr. Richard Hodgson hypnotized him and traced the events of this period, which he told under hypnosis, and found them true.

Charles Brewin disappeared from his home in Burlington, N. J., and between New York City and Plainfield, N. J., he spent four years in a secondary state, undiscovered by his friends, and ignorant of his own identity; but at last he awakened from his Rip Van Winkle sleep to know nothing about it, and was restored to his family.

Dr. Morton Prince had a case, which he calls Sally Beauchamp, who appeared to be four different per-

sons. One of them was a mischievous imp and played all sorts of tricks on the other personalities. She would entice one of them to ride out into the country on the last car, and then awaken her. The poor victim had to walk home exhausted from the trip. Sally would put toads and spiders into a box and leave them on the bureau so that the normal self would go into hysterics when she opened the box. These and similar tricks and escapades it required a volume to tell and explain. Split consciousness, or multiple personality, was the charmed word that was supposed to clear up the mystery. The supernaturalist's theory of spirits was waved aside, and justly enough, for lack of evidence. There were no credentials in the phenomena for such an explanation.

But some years ago I happened upon a case which offered the opportunity for proper investigation and experiment. It was one that had fallen into the hands of a clergyman, also by the name of Dr. Walter F. Prince, for care and cure. After visiting it, I resolved to try an experiment as soon as the condition of the patient permitted. This resolution could not be put into effect for several years.

A child, whom we shall call Doris, when three and a half years of age, was picked up by her drunken father and thrown violently upon the floor. The shock stunned the child, but at the time no more serious effects followed; the next day or so, however, it was found that something had happened. The mother did not understand it, though informed that it was the consequence of a contusion at the base of the brain. From that time on, the case was one of alternating personalities. The chief of these was called Margaret, and events proved that there was another which manifested itself only in the girl's sleep, and was called Sleeping Margaret. But this one was after the mother's death. The normal and primary state was called Real

Doris. All that the mother knew anything about was Real Doris and Margaret. The death of the mother, however, when the child was 17 years of age, caused the appearance of another personality, which was called Sick Doris, because in this condition or personality the girl was always ill, though she would seem to recover a perfectly healthy condition in an instant upon the return of Margaret or Real Doris.

From the time that her father had so brutally thrown her down, she had imbibed a mortal fear of him, made more intense by his constantly brutal treatment of her. The pastor of the family had accused the child of lying, because he did not understand her changes, and the result was that ever afterward she refused to attend his Sunday school. One Sunday she casually went into Dr. Prince's church, and Mrs. Prince became interested in her, without knowing anything about the real condition of things, except that she was something of an invalid. Finally Dr. Prince's attention was aroused by the psychological interest of the case, as well as its need of charity and care. He found that Doris could probably never get well as long as she stayed with her father, who still brutally abused her. He then resolved to adopt her into his family, and proceeded to study her and to attempt a cure. First he began to dissolve the personality of Sick Doris, and after his success with her, he eliminated Margaret; but he did not undertake to remove Sleeping Margaret, as this personality had been helpful in the dissipation of the other personalities, and claimed to be a "spirit," as did Sally in the Beauchamp case.

The primary personality, Real Doris, was apparently a well-behaved and normal person, and at no time were there any signs of physical lesion or degeneration, except in the personality of Sick Doris, when nausea and other abnormal symptoms manifested themselves. But Margaret was a perfect imp and personi-

fication of mischief. She would take horses from a livery stable and ride about the city or country to her heart's content, much to the annoyance of the owners, though she always returned the horses. She would go down to the ferries and try to ride across the river, sitting on the edge of the boat; but if the men would try to put her off, she would kick up her heels and throw herself backward into the water, frightening everybody. But she was an expert swimmer, and never suffered any real danger. She would take objects from places where she worked, and hide them in a drawer. When the normal self was accused of stealing, she naturally and honestly enough denied the accusation. She would write notes to the normal self, as the only way of reaching it.

Sick Doris, the result of the mother's death, was a very stupid personality. She did not know what death was, and did not understand the funeral or the mourning of friends, though Real Doris had prepared the mother's body for burial. Sick Doris did not know the names for the objects about her, and could not speak a word. Margaret had to set about teaching her the names of things, and how to talk intelligently. In the course of this, Margaret imbibed a bitter hostility to Sick Doris, and used to play every imaginable trick on her, as bad as those played by Sally on the other personalities in the Beauchamp case.

The death of the mother threw the household work on Doris, and this made matters worse, especially when the cruelties of the father were added. Let me quote from the account of Dr. Walter F. Prince.

"Overwork, together with the baleful influences of the home, chiefly militated against the primary personality. Upon the girl fell the major expenses of the household. Margaret knew that something must be done, and dinned it into the mind of Sick Doris that she must earn more money, by working at night. Sick Doris learned the lesson all too well. As Margaret afterwards ruefully expressed it, 'She began to work like fury and then

she made me work.' By a process of abstraction, particularly when sewing, she could gradually enchain the will and entire consciousness of Margaret, so that both consciousness coöperated, intent upon the task. Everything but the needle and stitches faded away, the eyes never wandered from the work, color fled from the countenance, the fingers flew with magic speed, and hours passed before the spell was broken. An instance occurred of the definitely proved execution of an elaborate piece of embroidery in less than a quarter of the time that the most conservative judges estimated as necessary. In this instance the abnormal work went on more than twelve hours at a time, absolutely without rest except such as was furnished by seizures of catalepsy, when the needle paused midway in the air, the body became immobile and the eyes fixed, for ten minutes or half an hour, whereon the arrested movement was completed and the task went on, Sick Doris not being aware that she had passed more than a second. When the task was ended Margaret would come out and dance a wild dance of joy. But one of the evil consequences was that she became malevolent against Sick Doris and entered upon a long series of revenges. With a malice that seems almost fiendish, she scratched Sick Doris with her nails, although she herself got the worst of it after the numbing effect of rage was over, in that she was less anæsthetic than her colleague. Many times she tore out whole strands of her hair, several times she actually grubbed out nails. She caused in Sick Doris sensations of nausea and various pains, destroyed her work and her possessions, thwarted her plans, threatened, teased, taunted her. And yet at times she pitied and comforted the harrassed creature, and often came to her relief in emergencies."

Between the combats of these two personalities the normal personality would appear five or ten minutes at a time, and sometimes longer. But Sick Doris and Margaret controlled most of the life of the girl for five years directly under the observation of Dr. Prince, the foster-father. All the while Sleeping Margaret was in the background, and appeared only in the girl's slumber, though conscious all the time of what was going on in both personalities, and the source of much that Dr. Prince learned about the girl's experiences before she came to him. Besides, she directed the management of the case for its cure in many of its features. At first she laid no claim to being a "spirit," but finally, whether due to suggestion or not, this not being determinable, she set up the claim that she was a "spirit,"

though she could remember no past life on this earth or elsewhere. Margaret apparently knew nothing about this Sleeping Margaret, while the latter knew all about the former, as well as about Sick Doris. Gradually Sick Doris was dissipated, and then Margaret, leaving Sleeping Margaret in the castle. It requires two volumes to record all the facts, including the exciting experiences of the different personalities and the disagreeable incidents of the curing process. But the final outcome was a normal and healthy woman, with no signs of dissociation. The only thing that a keen observer would note would be the immaturity of the girl mentally, which is quite explicable by the fact that the abnormal personalities had occupied the chief part of her life, and their experiences and education were not transferred to the normal self, except a part of those of Sick Doris.

So far there is nothing in the case that either proves or suggests anything more than what is already known as dissociation or multiple personality. The consciousness of the girl would be described as "split," whatever that phrase really means. In fact, it can mean nothing more than that amnesia occurs between the various personalities. But this is not true in its complete sense. There was intercognition between them, more or less, and sometimes a co-consciousness, while Sleeping Margaret seems to have a memory of the experiences of all of them. But, as said, there was often the usual dissociation or amnesia between the various personalities, so that this can be the only provable meaning of the term "split consciousness." Occasionally in the Margaret personality there occurred a few incidents suggestive of mind-reading, but not sufficient in quantity or quality to afford scientific proof. But there were no traces of the phenomena which pass for communication with the dead, and nothing that would suggest to the psychologist anything like demoniac obsession, in

so far as the standards of evidence for such a doctrine are concerned. The various forms of hysteria and dissociation would be the only diagnosis that any reputable physician or psychiatrist would propose for it.

The next step in the investigation was a most important one. I had come across three other cases which would be or had already been diagnosed by physicians or psychologists as paranoia or hysteria, and I should have myself given the same explanation of the facts, had it not occurred to me that the method of "cross reference" might bring out some facts which would throw light upon the perplexities of dissociation and multiple personality. The facts that brought me to this were in three cases of it that had come under my notice.

A young man who had never before painted got to painting pictures so well that they were sold for good prices on their artistic merits alone, and buyers who did not know how they were produced thought the man was copying pictures of Robert Swain Gifford, who was dead. The young man did his painting after Gifford's death, and seven months before he learned of that artist's demise. Another subject, a lady this time, was writing stories purporting to come from the late Frank R. Stockton, so characteristic that Henry Alden, the editor of *Harper's Monthly*, and another gentleman who had made a study of Stockton, thought them quite characteristic. Another lady, who had no education in singing, was doing this and automatic writing, both of which purported to be influenced by the late Emma Abbott. Three other cases had similar experiences, and in addition half a dozen cases diagnosed as paranoia or other form of insanity were put to the same investigation, and yielded the same result.

It was the Thompson-Gifford case that suggested the method of experiment. After an interview of two hours with the young man, I came to the conclusion which

the doctors reached in their examination, namely, that the case was one of dissociation or the disintegration of personality. But it flashed into my mind that there was no obligation to wait until an autopsy was performed in order to find out if the diagnosis was correct; and that, if I took the subject to a psychic, I might learn something about the situation. I did this under the strictest conditions possible, making my own record of the facts. The dead Gifford appeared to prove his identity from his childhood up, through two separate psychics, and gave some evidence through two others. This suggested the type of experiment for the other cases, and they yielded the same result: that deceased persons purported to accept responsibility for the phenomena that had occurred in the various subjects. These phenomena in the subjects themselves afforded no credentials of a supernormal source until they were repeated by cross reference through a psychic that knew absolutely nothing about the person brought to her. What appeared to be merely secondary personality on its own credentials proved, by cross reference, to have come from foreign inspiration. Gifford appeared to be back of the painting, Stockton of the story-writing, and Emma Abbott of the singing; and in the other instances we found similar transcendental sources for the arts which the subjects were engaged in, or for the abnormal phenomena which caused medical men to speak of insanity.

The method which thus proved so successful was applied to the Doris case with the hope that we should find light thrown upon its personalities. The case had never been mentioned publicly. Doris lived the first part of her life in western Pennsylvania and afterward in California. I therefore had an exceptionally good opportunity to try the experiment under the best conditions that would conceal all the facts from the psychic. I brought the girl from California and kept

her outside of the city in which the experiments were to be made. I admitted her to the psychic only after I had put the psychic in a trance, and at no time did I allow the psychic to see her, either in the normal or in the trance state. Indeed, she could not have seen her had she, the psychic, been in her normal state, as I kept the subject behind her, and had the subject leave the room before the trance was over. At this time the girl was perfectly normal, as healthy a piece of humanity as anyone could expect. The following was the result recorded in automatic writing by the psychic, and it summarizes a volume of data of more interest than any epitome can give:

I asked no questions, and made no suggestions for information. I allowed the controls to take their own course. The first communicator was the girl's mother, who had died about eight years before. She called her daughter by her pet name, and the name which represented the last words of the dying parent. She soon showed knowledge of the girl's malady and improvement, and then went on to prove her identity by many little incidents in their common lives, in fact, pouring out these incidents until the foster-father was astonished at their abundance and pertinence. I knew nothing of them, and the foster-father was living three thousand miles from the place where the sittings were being held.

After this had been done, a remarkable incident occurred. Dr. Richard Hodgson, who had died in 1905 and who since then had ostensibly been a frequent communicator through this psychic, purported to communicate, and compared the case with that of Sally Beauchamp, with which he said he had experimented. This was true, and he also named Dr. Morton Prince as the person who had had charge of it. Though the psychic had read Dr. Morton Prince's book on that case, she had not even seen the present subject, and

had not heard a word about it. I had brought this case to the psychic because I knew its affinities with that of Sally Beauchamp. But the most important incident, as the sequel proved, was the allusion to a child about the girl with whom we should have to reckon. I was told that one of the controls of the psychic had discovered the child, and presently I was further told that this child was an Indian. There had not been any indication in the life and phenomena of Doris that such a personality was connected with her. But evidence of it came plentifully enough later.

Then, following this episode, came one of the girl's guides. After Margaret and Sick Doris had been eliminated, the girl began to develop automatic writing, and this was alluded to through the present psychic, and the person said to be responsible for the development of Doris as an automatist was a French lady. Through the psychic some French was used, and a number of incidents given which had been given through the planchette by Doris. This confirmed the process that had been employed to correct the conditions prevailing in the girl. It was a substitution of better for worse controls.

Following the revelation of the little Indian, who was called Minnehaha or Laughing Water, came an allusion to the trouble with the girl as a case of spirit obsession. This was exactly what I had suspected when arranging for my experiments. But I was told that Minnehaha was not the personality responsible for it. She was very cautious about telling me incidents to prove her identity, because she was afraid of inculcating herself and of being exorcised. As soon as I had calmed her fears, allusion was made to another personality. At first I had suspected that Minnehaha was Margaret. The incidents told justified this inference. But it soon developed that it was wrong.

Minnehaha insisted that she was not a "devil," and threw the responsibility on some one else.

In the meantime I was curious to test the claims of Sleeping Margaret. She insisted on being regarded as a spirit. But not a trace of her came in the communications of the first series of sittings. I then left the subject, Doris, in New York, and held some sittings on her behalf in Boston, during her absence. In my experiments with Sleeping Margaret in New York, she excused her failure to communicate in Boston by saying she had to give way to others present and pleaded in defense of her failure to come when Doris was not present at the sittings, that she could not leave Doris, of whom she claimed to be the chief "guard" or guide. But she promised to try to communicate, if I took Doris back to Boston. I did so for further sittings, but not a trace of Sleeping Margaret came. No impersonation of her was even attempted.

I, therefore, tried another device. Remembering that it was one of the controls of the psychic that was said to have discovered Minnehaha, I made arrangements to have a sitting for this special control. I had to conceal both my object and the sitter from my psychic, while I also had to arrange to have Sleeping Margaret "out": that is, manifesting. This could only be during the sleep of Doris, the subject. Consequently I arranged with the normal psychic to give a sitting at the house of a friend of mine in the evening. I purposely left the impression, by telling the name of the family, that it might be for some one in the house. In the meantime, I had arranged with my friend to keep Doris all night. I first saw that Doris was sent to bed at 9 o'clock. After this I went to meet the psychic, and brought her to the house, where I left her in the room below until I had seen that Doris was asleep and covered her up so that she could not even be seen. No part of her body or face was visible. I

then brought the psychic into the room, and soon after the trance came on she saw the same little Indian that had been seen about Doris in the regular sittings, and tried to give her name. She got it correctly in symbols, but not the exact name as I have given it. She saw *water* and *laughing*, but did not connect them as a name. She went on, mentioning a large number of incidents that had been mentioned in the deeper trance at the regular sittings, and finally, when I asked her to talk to the sleeping girl, she did so, and I then asked her to tell me with whom she was talking. She said, and adhered to the assertion, that it was "The spirit of the girl herself; half out and half in, and that, if she would only go out farther she could communicate with 'spirits'."

Assuming this to be correct, it meant that the girl's development as a medium was not yet adequate, and the situation explained readily enough why I had not heard from Sleeping Margaret. The next day at the regular sittings the matter was taken up, and in the course of several sittings I was told that there were two Margarets in the case, and one of them was said to be the Margaret that appeared in sleep, and that she was not a discarnate spirit, but the "spirit of the girl herself." Here again we had the explanation of her failure to communicate as a discarnate reality. Later I made an inquiry to know why Sleeping Margaret claimed to be a spirit; and Edmund Gurney, of whom I made the inquiry, and who had died in 1888 in England, his existence and death being wholly unknown to the psychic, purporting to communicate, replied that, just as many spirits suffered from the illusion that they were still living and in contact with the physical world, so Sleeping Margaret, the subconscious of Doris, had a similar illusion about being a spirit, because she was not in a deep enough trance to realize the real situation. This view exactly confirmed the

theory that other cases had suggested to me, and was consistent with the general attitude taken about Sleeping Margaret. Moreover, we must remember that Sleeping Margaret had never claimed to have existed before, and Doris had such negative ideas of what a spirit was, that she had not thought she saw a spirit when she had an apparition of her mother after the latter's death. She thought it was her mother, not a spirit.

With the nature of Sleeping Margaret cleared up, the next task was to decide the status of Margaret. That had already been hinted at, in saying that she was a discarnate spirit. The controls with Minnehaha then appeared too, brought Margaret, and made her confess to having influenced Doris in the Margaret state to do many of the things which would have made people of common sense, who did not reckon with the real cause, blame her for all sorts of lying and stealing. Margaret confessed that she had done so, and stated some of the things she had made the girl do. The facts were verified by the testimony of Dr. Walter Prince, Doris's foster-father.

As soon as this result was effected, the controls seized the occasion for extending the meaning of the conclusion which would be drawn from the proof that Margaret was a spirit and an obsessing agent in the life of the girl. They were not content with proving that a spirit was at the bottom of the Margaret personality, but took up the task of showing that she was but a mere tool of a group that was more important than she was, and that the case was (1) an instance in which an organized band of evil influences was trying to determine the girl's life for evil, and (2) that the conditions manifested in this instance were only an illustration of what was going on in thousands of cases which were treated as insane, but were perfectly curable, if the medical world would but open its mind to the situation.

Very early in the work of revealing what was going on around the girl, the controls, who professed to be the Imperator group that had directed the labors of Dr. Hodgson when living, indicated that there was an important historical personality at the head of the organization which had been guilty of influencing the girl for evil. They enticed him into the witness box, apparently to make him unconsciously give himself away, and I undertook to play the game as tactfully and shrewdly as I could. I managed as soon as possible to elicit the name, much against the will of the rascal, and it came out Count Cagliostro, the celebrated adventurer of the 18th century connected with the French court and Revolution in the Diamond Necklace affair. When he found himself trapped, he was rather angry, but, after trying to commit violence on the medium by twisting her to pieces, was cajoled by the controls into further communications. He was finally persuaded to give up the life he was leading, and to abandon the organization of which he was the head. One after another of these disorder spirits was brought to the bar for confession, and shown their evil ways. Some were willing and desirous of escaping the hell they were in, but a few were very obstinate. They yielded, however, in most cases after much effort and pressure. The removal of Count Cagliostro made them leaderless, and they were utterly unable to carry out their plans without his help. He was finally induced to go into a monastery or "hospital" in charge of Anselm, the Archbishop of Canterbury, who had lived in the 11th Century!

Much to my surprise, I learned that the psychic had never heard of Count Cagliostro or the Diamond Necklace affair, and this was plausible enough when I further learned that she had never read anything about the French Revolution, except in Carlyle, and this only in deference to the tastes of a friend. In this work,

Carlyle does not say anything about the Diamond Necklace affair, save merely to refer to it, giving Cagliostro's name. He had discussed it in his essays, but she never saw them. Besides, I obtained Cagliostro's real name, Joseph Balsamo, even to the pronunciation of it, which was not given in any authority but an old Webster, and various episodes in his life, especially the name of his brother-in-law, which was obtainable only in a French work which was hard to secure, the psychic, moreover, not being able to read French.

Throughout all this revelation of the agencies at work, the controls displayed their higher objects in such work, and outlined the method of treating such cases, which was to thwart the purposes of the evil "spirits" in any special instance, to extort confession of their deeds, and then to remove them from contact with the living victim. They asserted the doctrine of obsession with all emphasis, and endeavored to give the facts which proved it. In the case of Margaret and Minnehaha they proved it beyond question: for the personal identity of these two agents was proved by their knowledge of the necessary incidents in the life of the girl. Later I also got a reference to Sick Doris, but not as a single personality. It was stated that many spirits had influenced her in that state, and reference was made to the embroidery which had characterized the girl's work as that personality. But evidence for the reality of Margaret and Minnehaha being overwhelming, the probabilities are that the controls were correct in their statements about Count Cagliostro, which were backed up by good evidence of his personal identity, not known by the psychic. The other obsessing personalities could not prove their identity. But this made no difference, as the avowed purpose of the controls was to show the wide extent of the obsession, and to remove the leaders of it.

Having effected this object, they took up the develop-

ment of the girl, who had returned to California, and endeavored to establish cross-references with my work in Boston. Minnehaha was put at the task of telling what was going on out there, in the life of the girl, while the controls endeavored to indicate who was doing the work on development. Minnehaha succeeded in giving a large number of detailed incidents in the normal life of Doris, and also gave the full name of Dr. Prince, and the former name of Doris, which was a very unusual name—one that I had never heard before, even pronouncing it as the girl and her relatives had done, though this was not as it was spelled. Hundreds of such facts were told, but there is no space here even to summarize the simplest of them.

Here is a case of dissociation caused by a parent's brutal act that results in a form of multiple personality which the physicians regard as incurable and certain to terminate in the insane asylum and death. It was variously diagnosed as paranoia and dementia precox, but under the patience and care of a clergyman was cured, and the girl made a perfectly healthy person, capable of carrying on a large poultry business, and serving as vice-president of a poultry association in the county where she lived, presiding over its meetings with intelligence and coolness. Then when she was cured, experiments with a psychic appear to show that it was a case of spirit obsession, with the identity of the parties affecting her proved. Mediumship begins its development as a means of preventing the recurrence of the evil obsession. This mediumship proceeds along with a normal and healthy life.

I have asserted that the explanation of the case is obsession, spirit or demoniac obsession, as it was called in the New Testament. *Before accepting such a doctrine, I fought against it for ten years after I was convinced that survival after death was proved.* But the several cases referred to above forced upon me the

consideration of the question, and the present instance only confirms overwhelmingly the hypothesis suggested by other experiences.

What is obsession? It is the supernormal influence of a foreign consciousness on the mind and organism of a sensitive person. It may be good or bad, though we are not accustomed to think and speak of it as being good. But the process is the same in both types, though we may prefer to reserve the term for the abnormal cases. Any man, however, who believes in telepathy or mind-reading, cannot escape the *possibility* of obsession. Accepting such a phenomenon, he assumes the influence of an external consciousness on another mind. Hence, if you once grant the existence of discarnate spirits, the same process, namely, telepathy from discarnate minds, might exercise and have an influence, either sensory or motor, on the minds of the living, provided they are psychically receptive to such influences. It is only a question of evidence for the fact. I regard the existence of discarnate spirits as scientifically proved, and I no longer refer to the skeptic as having any right to speak on the subject. Any man who does not accept the existence of discarnate spirits and the proof of it is either ignorant or a moral coward. I give him short shrift, and do not propose any longer to argue with him on the supposition that he knows anything about the subject. Consequently, I am in a situation to investigate and weigh facts that suggest obsession.

What the doctrine involves is a reinterpretation of secondary and multiple personality. It does not set the doctrine aside, as most critics will be disposed to think. Obsession is simply superposed upon secondary personality or dissociation, or interfused with it, but it is not necessarily substituted for it. Secondary personality is the medium or instrument for its expression, and will color or modify the influences acting on it. It

should be noticed that this very view of it is admitted or asserted by the controls in the case under consideration. They do not deny the existence of secondary personality, where we might naturally suppose that the prejudices of the psychic were inclined to apply foreign influences to the explanation of everything. Foreign influences will follow the lines of least resistance, and, where they may overcome the subconscious altogether, they will dominate the ideas and impulses of the subject. They may never be transmitted intact, unless at odd moments, but may usually be nothing more than instigative, like a match setting off an explosion. The match is not the cause of the effect, but is the occasional cause for releasing the pent-up energy of the subject exploding. You may stimulate a man's mind by alcohol or other stimulant, but we do not think of referring the action of the mind affected to the transmissive power of the alcohol. Utter a sentence to a man, and it may recall many associations which are not transmitted to his mind by the sound, or by the ideas of the man who utters the sentence. A man dreamed of walking in his bare feet on the ice of the north pole, to awaken and find that his feet were not under the bedclothes on a cold night. There was no correlation between the stimulus and the sensation in respect of kind, which was the sensible effect of interpretation and imagination, not of tactual reaction to the real cause. The same law may act in spiritistic stimulus. It may only incite action of the mind affected, as in a dream, and not transmit to it the exact thought or impulse in the mind of the foreign agent. In some cases, of course, we find the ideas and impulses transmitted more or less intact, and in such cases we may find the evidence for the obsession in the personal identity of the agent. But in cases of dissociation which distinctly represent subconscious factors, the only evidence for the obsession can come

by the method of cross-reference. Such is the case before us. There was no evidence whatever for foreign invasion in the girl's experiences, cross-reference yielded this evidence in abundance.

The chief interest in such cases is their revolutionary effect in the field of medicine. The present case shows clearly what should have been done with Sally Beauchamp, and, in fact, plays havoc with the usual interpretations of that case, without setting aside the secondary or multiple personality there. *It is probable that thousands of cases diagnosed as paranoia would yield to this sort of investigation and treatment. It is high time for the medical world to wake up and learn something.* It is so saturated with dogmatic materialism that it will require some medical Luther or Kant to arouse it. This everlasting talk about secondary personality, which is very useful for hiding one's ignorance or merely describing the facts, should no longer prevent investigation. *It is very easy to find out what is the matter if you will only accept the method which has thrown so much light upon such cases. Nor will the method stop with dissociation. It will extend to many functional troubles which now baffle the physician. There is too much silly fear of the "supernatural," and reverence for the "natural" which has quite as much lost its significance as has the "supernatural."* Spirits, as we may, at least for convenience, call certain aggregations of phenomena, are no more mysterious things than is consciousness and, one could add, no more mysterious than atoms or electrons. Perhaps they are less so. They are certainly as legitimate objects of interest as drugs and pills or similar means of experiment.

CHAPTER XI

GENERAL QUESTIONS AND VALUES

I HAVE discussed the whole problem of a future life human interests as an argument or an influence for purely as a scientific question. I have not invoked determining conviction. I have appealed strictly to the nature of the problem and the facts which are relevant to its solution. Human interests often affect the convictions of the individual on this subject as well as many or all others, but it is the purpose of the scientific spirit to eliminate emotional influences from the solution of all questions of fact. It is hard, of course, to dissociate our interests from any problem, and though we have to deprecate their undue influence on conviction, there is always a reason for recognizing that they have a place in final meaning of any fact. The pragmatic philosophy is founded on the recognition of this place for the emotions, and religion has been affected by them more perhaps than any other body of beliefs. The "will to believe" has all along been a powerful factor in determining the direction in which belief goes, and the skeptical, usually also the scientific man, deprecates this, but the will to disbelieve is just as much the danger of the skeptic as the "will to believe" is of the believer. One class is as much tarred and feathered with the use of the will in its problems as the other. It is the duty of both, while they admit a place for the will in both belief and disbelief, to adjust it to the facts, and that is true scientific method.

There is also a bias in previous opinions affecting

the challenge to change our ideas at any stage of our development and that bias may consist in fixed ideas or a fixed attitude of will, both perhaps being always associated together in greater or less degree of one or the other factor. But an intellectual bias is more easily conquered than an emotional and volitional one. Facts offer the mind no chance to escape their cogency, and we can only deceive ourselves by equivocating when asked to revise beliefs, if we do not wish to run up against stone walls. Scientific men and skeptics do not always escape this bias. The unsophisticated believer in any doctrine is less affected by this bias than the educated man. He may refuse, often rightly enough, to allow the sophisticated scientist to make a football of his beliefs, but this is because he rightly enough clings to practical problems which are for him the meaning of the intellectual ones, and he does not separate the two fields as does the scientific man and philosopher. With such we have no dispute. They do not require to unravel paradoxes.

When it comes to the belief in survival after death, which is convertible with the belief in the existence of discarnate spirits, there are two superficial difficulties which most believers have to face in the matter, difficulties which the sophisticated man always urges against the belief. They are (1) the illusion about the distinction between the natural and the supernatural, and (2) the conflict between the cultured and the uncultured man in the interpretation of the world. Each of these must be examined.

The first impulse of most scientific men is to oppose the belief in spirits because they seem to be a restoration of the idea of the supernatural. For more than three centuries the supernatural has been excluded from scientific recognition of any kind, and with most men of that class it is like a red rag to a bull. In the present age, however, there is no excuse for this hostility.

There was a time when the opposition between the "natural" and the "supernatural" had a meaning of some importance, but it has none any more. The conception of the "natural" has so changed that it either includes all that had formerly been denominated by the "supernatural" or it does not prevent the "supernatural" from existing alongside of it. The antithesis between the two ideas has changed from age to age and as a result one term has altered its import as much as the other. The first meaning of the term "natural" was the *physical*. This served to define the "supernatural" as the *spiritual*. Christianity asserted the opposition most clearly, as it set up the theistic system with the idea of spirit as wholly unphysical. In Greek thought the "supernatural," if we could use the term at all in it, was the supersensible physical world and mind or spirit was only a kind of matter more refined than the coarser type affecting the senses. But Christianity assigned none of the material attributes to spirit, and thus altered the conception both of the "natural" and the "supernatural."

When the scientific spirit arose, however, it relegated metaphysics, including the physical speculations of philosophers, to the limbo of the imagination and the "natural" became the uniform, whether in matter or mind. Before this, mind was essentially "supernatural," but now that the uniformities of mind were recognized as like those of matter, it was not so easy to confine the "natural" to matter and the phenomena of mind were no longer regarded as "supernatural." As in the miracles the "supernatural" became convertible with the capricious or lawless; that is, irregular and unpredictable. The antithesis was no longer between the physical and the spiritual, but between the uniform and the capricious, and the scientific man denied that there was any caprice in "nature." This meant that there was no "supernatural" at all, and as he reduced

the phenomena of mind to functions of the organism, it had no place for the "supernatural" in his scheme.

The fact is, however, that both terms are relative. That is, they are relative to the definitions which you may give of them. If the "natural" is made convertible with the "physical" as material *substance*, then space, time, ether, electricity, magnetism are "supernatural." If it be made convertible with the "physical" as including physical *phenomena and activities*, then ether, mind, space and time are "supernatural." If it be made convertible with the uniform or fixed order, then it actually includes nearly all that had formerly been expressed by the "supernatural" and the latter is left to denote the capricious and lawless events of the world, which has been the tendency of its meaning. But if the capricious and lawless be admitted as a fact we should have the "supernatural" without question and set off from the "natural." But you can exclude the "supernatural" only by including the capricious within the territory of the fixed and uniform, and by thus extending the term "natural" you would not only include all that had once been expressed by the "supernatural," but you would not be able to draw the inferences or insist on the implications which had depended on the formerly narrower import of the "natural."

However, that is the last thing the advocate of the "natural" will do. He never thinks of the fact that the extension of the "natural" to include the "supernatural" of the earlier period implies the very existence of all the facts on which the older "supernatural" depended and that spirit becomes a part of the scheme of things. He is equivocating with the term. He is trying to remain by the implications of the older "natural" while he extends its meaning to exclude those implications. In fact the distinction to-day between the "natural" and the "supernatural" no longer has any controversial value. We have only proved that

spirit exists as a fact, or that we have facts which will not permit any other explanation of them than the fact of their existence, and you may call them either "natural" or "supernatural," physical or spiritual. I for one shall not stickle at the terms of the case. It is a question of fact and evidence, and not of preserving the usage of terms that have wholly outlived their usefulness. I refuse to discuss the question in its terms. The man who insists on it has not done clear thinking.

After the fear of science that the "supernatural" would be restored to power, if the existence of spirit be proved, there is an influence against it quite as strong or stronger. But it cannot be so easily argued with. It is a matter of taste. This however, would not affect it so much were it not that the Spiritualists have been mostly to blame for the possibility of invoking scientific blemishes to support ridicule on other grounds. Throughout all history, beginning among savages, Spiritualism has invited the contempt of intelligent and refined people. A large part of the conflict between the primitive Spiritualists, fetish worshippers, followers of incantations and the oracles, totem worshipers, the practise of sorcery, and all superstitious ritualism, and the philosophers, was based upon the everlasting opposition between intelligence and ignorance.

Confucious founded his system of ethics entirely upon secular and social principles. He admitted the existence of spirits, the discarnate, but he advised letting them alone and ignored their existence as much as the Epicureans did their gods. The Buddhists denied the existence of spirits, but made concessions in practical politics to the superstitions of the common people by sugar coating their philosophy with reincarnation, though that had no interest for those who really understood it. Judaism in its monotheistic impulse was mortally opposed to idolatry and the naive fetishism of

its time. Its intelligent people strove to destroy every vestige of it. The Greek philosophers even of the materialistic type believed in spirits, as we have seen above, but they made no use of them in their cosmic theories. The early Greek philosophy was exclusively occupied with material causes, the "stuff" out of which things were made, and almost wholly neglected efficient or creative causes par excellence. When the schools of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics came they could ignore Spiritualism altogether and gave knowledge that degree of refinement and association with æsthetics, the latter being more important to the race than ethics, that Spiritualism had neither to be considered nor respected. In the course of time Christianity cultivated some harmony of the intellectual with the æsthetic until its present chief antagonism to Spiritualism in which it was founded is based upon æsthetic reasons alone. Throughout it all, intelligence has been arrayed against ignorance and has associated with it the antagonism between refinement and vulgarity, a conflict far more irreconcilable than the conflict between science and religion.

The chief hostility of the academic man to-day against psychic research is based upon his dislike of the vulgarity of spiritualistic performances and the triviality of its incidents. The intellectual man of to-day has inherited the Greco-Roman aristocratic feelings in regard to knowledge and has added to it, unconsciously perhaps, the Christian ideals of what a spiritual world would be, if it exists at all, and with these standards revolts against the puerilities of the phenomena as he characterizes them. He has forgotten his science in his devotion to the æsthetic life and intellectual and literary refinements. He thinks no good can come out of Nazareth. The attack of the Pharisees and Sadducees upon Christ and his apostles was based upon their plebeian character, not upon the untrue

nature of their facts. This sort of snobbery has perpetuated itself and the academic world is the inheritor of its antagonisms. This class of self-appointed authorities arrogates every right to regulate human thinking, and when it cannot achieve its purpose by reason, it appeals to ridicule, and has never learned that all the great ethical movements of history have originated and sustained themselves among the common people. It is their duty to lead, not to despise them. But they dispense contempt of those they were appointed to teach and then wonder why their self-arrogated wisdom is not respected!

The Christian Church also shares in this hostility to the whole subject more than it should. It is true that just at this time it cannot be reproached as much for antagonism as it could a generation ago. Then it maintained the attitude of æstheticism as much as the academic world. But its own decline of power and the shame that an institution which was founded on the immortality of the soul should cultivate ridicule for scientific proof of what it already believed and always taught has become too great to find any excuse for its continuance. Its own crying needs for certitude that may justify its claims are too strong for it to resist any longer and the dawn is beginning to show on the horizon of its vision. But it is too slow and too cowardly in many instances to seize the reins of power which it once enjoyed and to be at the front of this contest with materialism. It has been too thoroughly saturated with the æsthetic view of life. It has imbibed the spirit of intellectual aristocracy and has too often become the inheritor of the Phariseism and Sadduceism of its first enemies to see the way of redemption. Snobbery in high places helps to blind its vision of the truth. No wise man can disregard the facts of nature whatever their unbidding appearance. Professor James once wrote that a scientific man—and the

scientific man is first a lover of truth—would investigate in a dunghill to study a new fungus and thereby find laws of nature that might be discovered nowhere else. But the academic and religious æsthete prefers artistic comfort and environment to the truth.

Too many seek first beauty and truth and goodness afterward. In fact they too often make beauty convertible with the good and never find the real ethics at which nature aims. Nothing but the cold truth, divested of the illusions that hover around material art and refinement, can ever awaken man to the correct sense of duty. Knowledge may be obscured often by the life of ease and materialistic culture, but the Nemesis is always near to disturb that inglorious peace. The fishermen of Galilee were the conquerors of the world. They did not wear ermine or live in luxury. They had no fine carpets or paintings to adorn the walls of their homes. They did not talk in philosophic terms that no one could understand but themselves. If philosophy is to have any legitimate function in the world it must be convertible into the language of common life at some point of its meaning. No doubt it has its esoteric aspects and that it cannot be understood as a whole by every one. But it is not a true philosophy unless it touches life in some general doctrine or belief. But between religion and philosophy survival after death has been either an object of faith or of ridicule. In an age where certitude is demanded for every belief, faith will have difficulty in maintaining itself. In an age which seeks the assurance that science can give faith and æsthetics will not save the church and the multitude will turn to any method that offers it a refuge from despair. They are never nice about the form of truth. If it be the truth, they will sacrifice the elegancies of polite society to it. No doubt some concessions are needed to good taste, but this will no

more save a decaying creed than vulgarity will destroy a true one.

The Spiritualists have been too slow to appreciate the value of culture in the protection of truth among those who value that commodity more than the accuracy of their intellectual formulas. While abandoning the church and its creeds and appealing to facts, they have neglected scientific method as well as the ethical impulses of religion and the influence of good taste. Demanding the favor of both science and religion they despise the method of one and the ethical ideals of the other. No wonder the word Spiritualism has become a byword among intelligent people, and no redemption can come from calling themselves by a respectable name while their performances have no respectability in them.

If Spiritualism had long ago abandoned its evidential methods to science and joined in the ethical and spiritual work of the world it might have won its victory fifty years ago. Christianity was founded on psychic phenomena, and it neglected miracles in the interest of moral teaching, especially when it could no longer reproduce the healing of its founder. Its primary impulse was ethical teaching and not a vaudeville show. When Spiritualism has as much passion for morals as it has morbid curiosity for communication with the dead, it may hope for success, but not until then. The intelligent man, whether in the church or the college, will stay his interest until he is safe from the gibes of his friends for sympathy with the twaddle and unscientific discourse of the average psychic. But if the respectable classes know their duty they will organize the inquiry and combine truth and good taste with scientific method to revive the dying embers of religious and ethical passion. No intelligent person would allow the truth to perish because it is not clothed in

the majesty of art or the beauty of literary expression.

Spiritualism had one merit. It looked at the facts. The scientific man and the church cannot claim that defense in their objections to it. They allowed their æsthetics to influence judgments that should have subordinated taste to truth. But whatever apology can be made for Spiritualism in this one respect, it forfeited consideration because it did not and does not organize its position into an ethical and spiritual force for the redemption of individual and social life. It concentrated interest on communication with the dead and came to the facts only to witness "miracles." Christ complained that many of his followers were interested in his work only for the loaves and fishes, or for the spectacular part of it. The regeneration of their lives was secondary. St. Paul entered a similar complaint against the Athenians for being interested only in some new thing, not in the eternal truths in which salvation was found, no matter in what form you conceived that salvation. Communication with the dead has no primary interest in our problem. It is but a mere means to the establishment of certain truths which have a pivotal importance in the protection of an ethical interpretation of nature. To congregate only to see the chasm bridged between two worlds has no importance compared with other objects to be attained by it. We do not dig tunnels or build bridges just for the sake of the amusement. We have an ulterior object of connecting places and resources which have an intimate part in the economic and social structure. Communication with the dead is not to take the place of a theater or the movie, but to find a principle which shall be a means of starting an ethical inspiration, or of protecting the claims of those who have discovered the real meaning of nature.

I can understand the impression created by the

triviality of the facts in the communications, but I can hardly respect the minds that do not see why this is the case, or that suppose they are in the least testimony to the nature of the future life in their superficial interpretation. The inexcusable habit of many minds is to suppose that spirits are occupied in that life with the trivial matters communicated, and as our own spiritual life is much superior to any such conception as that, these people unfavorably compare the two worlds. They picture to themselves a world given over to thought and conversation about the little articles of household interest or of the past physical life; and having, under the tutelage of various religions, formed the conception that the next life is idyllic and paradisaic, even though they have in most cases construed this in materialistic terms and conceptions, they revolt against occupation with the trivialities of life. They do not take offense at pearly gates and golden streets, or a sublimated monarchy and its accompaniments, or at an intellectual banquet of literati, or anything except preoccupation with a duplication of the physical. But there is no reason to interpret the messages as either representing a physical life or as evidence of what the general life is like.

The problem, as we have shown, is one of personal identity and that requires trivial facts for its proof and assurance in regard to the supernormal character of the knowledge. The more elevated and inspiring communications are not evidence and have to be minimized in the treatment of the subject. Living men, when asked to prove their personal identity over a telegraph line or the phonograph, resort naturally to just such trivialities to effect their end, and they are not proof of their character or their general life. No one would think for a moment to ridicule them for such communications or use them to determine the general nature of their lives and occupations.

There are paradoxes and perplexities enough in certain communications, but they are such only for those who use materialistic categories or standards of judgment when interpreting them. Construe them as indicating a mental world, such a spiritual life as we denominate by that term right among ourselves in the physical life, as involving larger creating powers of consciousness than we now enjoy, and perhaps more direct creative powers, and we should have no trouble in displacing the sensuous ideas formed from the language employed in the communications. If we were not so materialistic now, we should not be so much astonished or offended at certain types of messages. But, supposing certain statements to be used as we would use them in describing the physical life as we know it, we receive from the language the effect of an absolute contradiction of our experience or else the statement of an impossibility which appears just as preposterous. But it appears so only because we try the case by the standards of sensory life which do not apply to a purely mental life, though their pictorial character may mislead us into mistakes and illusions.

However, once recognize the supersensible nature of that life; the inadequacy of sensory standards and conceptions of it, and the creative possibilities of thought as in dreams and other subconscious activities, and we may find all the paradoxes resolve themselves into casual proofs of the nature of a spiritual life. The process of communication between the two worlds is so fragmentary and confused that it may well suggest a chaotic and disordered world to those who do not know or recognize the fragmentary and confused nature of the process. But make this characteristic of it clear once for all, and we can build up a whole as science has enabled those who know to reconstruct an extinct animal from the fragments of skeleton which has lain for ages in the rocks.

Another important consideration in behalf of the spiritistic theory is its pivotal character. By this I mean its support to other truths which are independently believed to have value, or may even have their whole integrity determined by it. The same principle rules in other questions. For instance, the whole theory of Mechanics is dependent on the fact and law of inertia. If inertia were not true we should have Biology instead of Mechanics. We could not depend on the stability of our manufacturing processes but for inertia. The same is true of impenetrability and gravity. Again the law of gravitation is necessary to our construction of astronomical theories. We could not simplify our ideas of the cosmos without it. We might invent supporting theories as in the Ptolemaic system, but we should find confusion ever increasing with their invention and multiplication. But gravitation reduces the cosmos to a perfectly simple and intelligible conception. The law of supply and demand is necessary for understanding economics. It is pivotal to its structure. The rotundity of the earth was necessary to enable Columbus to make a reasonable plea for the means of discovering America.

It is similar with survival after death. It is the key to certain ideals and conceptions of life. It puts a value on personality which materialism must distinctly deny or weaken. Materialism cannot perpetuate any of the values which it recognizes. It can never reproduce anything but a succession of individuals with transient mental states. Sensation and copies of sensation in memory and imagination are all it can secure and these only for a short time. The individual personality is snuffed out of existence. But the instinct for self-preservation creates a tendency to prolong consciousness and to make this prolongation the standard of ethics in this life. The hostility to suicide, whether opposing the act in others or ourselves, is more or

less testimony to this view, and certainly the supreme value which we place upon personality, the stream of consciousness, is unescapable evidence of what human nature values as the highest object of interest and preservation. Without it, all the ethical impulses dependent upon it must shrivel and decay.

Materialism cannot sustain any other view than that consciousness is a function of the brain, and if it or any other view of the cosmos admitted or contended that organic life was the limit of its intelligence and purpose, then sensuous experience with accompanying mental states for a brief period would be the only meaning of life. All the higher achievements of the mental life would be sacrificed to the sensuous existence. But once concede that the inner stream of consciousness, with all the sanctities which it values and maintains, can exist after death, then you will have clear indication that the sensible life is secondary and that personality is the thing that nature specially conserves, and you will have a situation in which the infinities felt in normal consciousness will have some meaning. Otherwise they would be mere bubbles on an ocean of illusion. Survival shows that nature values personality above all else and that it does not snuff this out when it dissolves the physical organism and its sensory phenomena. With that survival you have a standard of values, not merely for the next life, but for this one also, a standard which we have instinctively employed in all our systems of education, whether of the intellect, the feelings or the will; that is, science, art and ethics.

It is the permanent that philosophers have always placed at the base and the goal of reality, and that permanence always has its eye on the future as well as the past and the present. Our present life would have no rationality but for the constants in it, for the thread of unity that runs through it, the permanent element in spite of change. Our development, whether

physical or spiritual, depends on the possibility of pursuing one aim in a world chaos, so to speak. Habit is the condition of rational life and habit represents the persistence of certain thoughts and modes of activity. Their meaning would be lost unless the subject of them can persist. Hence the constants or uniformities of life are the condition of whatever achievements we have attained in our evolution.

It is the future that determines the full meaning of life, not the past or the present. All thought and action, especially action, has reference to the future, whatever relation they may have to the past and present. In fact the pragmatic philosopher has made this future the fundamental meaning of his truth. There is no disputing this fact in all ethical questions. For ethics pertains to the realization of an end in the future, not to thinking about the past which is mere history. With this essential characteristic of all ethical ideas and ideals, you may well ask if nature is strictly ethical to implant so fixed and necessary an element in human nature and then cut it short at the grave without the fruition which is a part of its very being. There is no reason whatever for drawing the line of meaning for life at the grave except the supposed fact that death ends all. The essence of ethics involves the future, even though it terminates for the individual at death, and we should have to be Stoics about its extension, if facts proved that life or personality ended at the dissolution of the body. But how much less nature would mean for us when it establishes an opposition between the ideals which it implants and the opportunities to realize them?

Immanuel Kant felt this so keenly that he regarded immortality as the necessary consequence of a rational world. He assumed, however, that the world was rational, but the scientific point of view suspends its judgment on that rationality until it has proved the

fact of survival. This technical question of accuracy or inaccuracy of Kant's view aside, however, it is certain that the proof of survival would establish a complete consonance between the instincts affecting our ideals and conduct, and the facts of nature. The value of personality as we view it in ethical and social life would be vindicated by scientific evidence and the melancholy outlook which death offers to the materialist would be changed into a rainbow of promise, the dawn of another morning.

It is thus apparent that immortality has ethical implications when other theories of consciousness and its destiny have none. All theories either directly or indirectly favoring materialism or its equivalent, whether called idealism or not, do not satisfy ethical postulates in regard to the values placed upon personality or the ethical impulses in our very conceptions of morality as it requires the future for the realization of its ideals. Man will always place ethics above everything else. Knowledge and art have their value, their utilitarian meaning, determined by their relation to the ends which ethics serve. Any theory which does not imply or conserve these will have difficulty in vindicating itself at the bar of intelligence.

Materialism can sustain no ethics beyond present satisfaction, and if our highest ideals are found in the greater depths of internal personality, while materialism offers no time for their realization, the belief in survival reconciles the imperative of conscience with the limitations under which the fulfilment of it can be attained in this life. Survival gives us time where materialism does not, and the conflict between duty and our limited possibilities here is fully satisfied in the continuance of our chances for achievement.

I have said immortality is a pivotal belief; that is, supporting in some way a number of other beliefs or maxims of life and conduct. Besides an influence on

the individual life it also has a great significance for social ethics. The interest in it may be largely an egoistic one. It is not always so, for I often meet with those who care little for it for themselves, but they passionately desire it for their friends or those they love. It thus becomes an altruistic instinct. But it probably affects the majority of the race as an egoistic instinct connected with the same general impulse of self-preservation and the prolongation of consciousness. Hence the greater interest of men and women in survival than in the other phenomena of psychic research.

The mysteries of nature evoke less interest than the possibility that life looks into eternity. Assure men of this, and they will listen to its gospel. But its ethical implications do not stop with individual interest. Survival establishes that view of personality which enables us to concentrate emphasis upon the rights of others in the struggle for existence. On the materialistic theory which has only matter and force to determine its ideals personality independent of sense has no existence or value, and the individual would be tempted to sacrifice all other personality to his own. But once establish the fact that personality is permanent and we have the eternal value of our neighbor fixed upon as secure a basis as our own. We may have a center of social interest in others, as well as a position which offers larger hopes to the process of evolution. Man need not stop with the pursuit of self-interest, but will find his salvation in the social affections, precisely as taught in primitive Christianity, and as is more uniformly insisted on in spiritistic communications than any other fact. The contradictions about the nature of the next life are numerous enough to make one pause in accepting anything about it. But there is no variation on the theme of social service and the value of altruistic interests and conduct. The permanence of

personality protects this ideal and offers a stable basis for all social ethics. But it does so, not because of any direct indication of this effect, but because it serves as a standard of value for every individual and enables the ethical teacher to enforce maxims of conduct which would be less effective without survival than with it. All progress by education and reasoning depends upon premises that can force a proper conclusion. The educational influences of the world can do nothing without resorting to reason or discipline. Reason is an appeal to a man's intellect; discipline appeals to his will. Education by reason depends on argument; education by discipline depends on restraints or punishment. Where there is no universal recognition of ethical postulates whatever morality we get—and this is objective morality—depends on the force which the ruler can apply to extort obedience to the law. But where each man recognizes the moral law restraint and discipline may be abolished. In the one system power is the authority and in the other it is reason. The latter represents the minimum of social friction.

Now the establishment of the value of personality in the scheme of nature will offer the rational man a leverage on social instincts, if not to create them, certainly to encourage their proper exercise and to protect them by showing that they are a part of the scheme aiming at the permanence of the individual and the eternal place they have in the evolution of man. It is not that we can directly infer the system of social ethics from survival or the permanence of personality, but that we can more easily connect this ethics with a stable basis and reinforce them by the fact of that permanence. The brotherhood of man will have a new sanction, one of the sanctions it received in its earlier association in Christianity with the immortality of the soul. Its natural synthesis is that association.

The next matter of interest is the relation of a

future life to the problem of Theism. The present writer thinks that Theism cannot have a basis of any importance without first proving survival after death. The usual course of theologians is to proceed in the reverse order. They try to prove the existence of God and then argue regressively to survival from his character. But I regard this procedure as unfounded and such a change of venue as to create rather than to lay skepticism. Let me make this clear.

It is most interesting to remark that primitive Christianity had no foundation whatever in a philosophy or a theology. The existence of God was not made the logical basis of survival. The New Testament writers did not argue from the intelligence and goodness of God to immortality, but asserted the latter on the ground of certain alleged facts embodied in the story of the resurrection and other psychic experiences. The New Testament is one record of psychic experiences including spiritual healing. Christ taught no system of philosophic theism. He probably emphasized immortality in his teaching much less than ethics. If what was said about it before the story of the resurrection was interpolated by the apostles and disciples, he made as little of it until the end of his life as Confucius. But whether this possibility be true or not, it is certain that belief in the existence of God was not made the condition of believing in survival after death. The ground for this latter belief was a scientific one; namely, an appeal to facts, real or alleged, and theism crept into the system after the age of "miracles" had disappeared and they found a need to protect the doctrine by a comprehensive scheme of the cosmos. When they could not rely any longer on psychic phenomena, they constructed a philosophy which required the existence of a Divine intelligence to explain the cosmos. They applied finally the argument from design to prove the existence of God and then reasoned regressively

to the conclusion that this Divine intelligence would preserve its creatures.

But the circumstance that made this method precarious was the disparity between the conception of God which they held and the evidence for him as defined. God had to be a being of infinite intelligence and power and character to serve as a basis of either certitude or hope about the spiritual outcome for man. But the actual facts of nature gave no assured evidence of this character. All that nature manifested was an interest in organic beings, so far as normal and scientific experience went. The intelligence revealed in such beings was decidedly finite and the character of this divine being, if reflected in the frightfully ugly spectacle of nature, offered no encouraging prospect for benevolence. Nature seemed a shambles, and one hesitated to worship the author of such a system. There was no definite assurance in normal experience that personality survived; and unless it did survive, the Divine seemed to be a mockery. There was no superficial evidence that this Divine existed. Nature did not reflect the ideals of theism.

But if it could be proved that nature as a fact actually preserved personality, this showed an order superior to the creation of organic life, and its meaning had to be found in some supersensible or transcendental existence. Find that personality is the permanent fact of human existence and the circumstance will offer a retrogressive argument as to the character of the basis of nature. If it actually sustains what the supposed rationality of the world meant, it would be natural to suppose that this continuity of personal consciousness was some evidence of the tendency of things and reflecting the nature of the process which brought us hither. Theism thus becomes an inference or consequence of immortality rather than immortality a deductive inference from the idea of God.

If our religious minds could have the courage to frankly abandon purely deductive methods, to make their peace with scientific method and to follow inductive methods, they would soon find their way out of the wilderness. They have everything to gain and nothing to lose by the appeal to facts instead of *a priori* definitions and deduction from premises including more than their evidence supplies. Prove immortality scientifically and theism is most likely to follow as a natural consequence. Let the human mind see that nature is rational in the preservation of personality, and there will be no need to start with an *a priori* ideal and argue from it in an equally *a priori* manner to conclusions that cannot be any better established than the premise they are made to rest upon. But any conclusion resting on proved facts will have nothing to contend with but the ordinary liabilities to fallacy. The facts will be assured and the psychological reaction from assurance of survival will be an easier acceptance of intelligence in the cosmos at least equal to the protection of survival. The risks of skepticism will be less, because the main outlook and demand upon our instincts will have been settled scientifically and we can feel less anxiety about theistic problems, while we shape life to realize ideals which will themselves constitute the best evidence for the Divine.

I have not appealed to the consolations of survival after death, because it is a scientific question, so far as this work is concerned. We require always to maintain as much of an impersonal interest in it as possible, not because the personal is wrong, but because we escape illusion about the subject more readily in that way. But for the bias that might lead us astray the personal interest might be emphasized. But apart from this the scientific man must recognize that he has the belief always to consider in his practical life. The intensity of the desire to live and enjoy, especially in

young life, offers a way to all sorts of idealism, influenced partly by the joys of living and partly by the want of wide experience with nature. This may even grow with this experience and the will to live becomes a passion which no practical man can ignore.

We have only to look at the ancient ethics and philosophies in the orient which were conceived either in neglect of, or in antagonism to barbaric religions founded on animism and fetishism, and to note how these philosophies and ethics had to compromise with the religions in social and political matters, in order to find that the practical man to-day must reckon with the belief in survival in whatever he does. It has been so bound up with ideals of the better kind that even the skeptic has often to send his children to religious institutions to be assured that morality will be a part of the environment of his offspring. No man's education is complete until he at least understands religion and its springs. He may think what he pleases, but he must understand it, and immortality has been the atmosphere in which thousands of generations have been bred and cultured. Whatever modification, or even denial it undergoes, must be accompanied by some constructive theory of things that will save the ideals that have sprung from it.

But how shall we save any high ethics without protecting the value of personality exactly as nature does it, if survival be a fact? We have before us the two conceptions of nature. One, the materialistic, is that nature cares only for physical organisms and the transient joys which they offer. No ideal that we may value can have any hope of realization beyond either the phenomenal life or beyond the possibilities which a badly conducted cosmos or social system will allow. Duty and the best, even in this life, require some sacrifices to attain them. And we are often not allowed the time or opportunity to realize what we are bound to

pursue, if we respect the best impulses in ourselves. But if we can believe that nature preserves personality and still offers beyond the grave a chance to redeem our natures or to realize the right ideals, the ugly aspect of nature is less disheartening and we can more readily act on the maxim that "all is well that ends well," even while we have to protest against the process. The second view of nature which is based upon survival instead of the annihilation of personality offers this opportunity and it protects ideals which an ephemeral existence can never favor adequately.

It is all very well to tell mankind that duty requires us to act either without reward or without making reward the primary condition of virtue, but this language will not stimulate the will to action which instincts do not favor. It is true enough that my duties lie right in this world, and that I must not always be dreaming of the after life and what it offers to the hopes and imagination, either in correction of the evils here or in opportunity to redeem character. I should vie with any one in emphasizing the place of salvation in the present and that looking to the future will not do it, if we do not cultivate the ideals and habits of redemption in the present. But all action looks to ends, and there is no reason for drawing the line of redemption and realization at the grave, if nature does not do this. I am quite as much entitled to put the time of realization at a thousand or ten thousand years as at three score and ten, if nature does this.

It is a question of facts and what the cosmos intends, and we should find that immortality will conserve more ethics than any materialistic scheme that we can contrive. It is usually men who have been bred in a Christian environment and its ethical ideals that preserve them after they have adopted a cosmic theory which does not reckon with them. Ethical ideals die more slowly than intellectual convictions. The pressure of

environment keeps a man in a strait-jacket, unless he is willing to be a martyr, long after he has abandoned the views which serve those ethical ideals. We cannot change our conduct safely over night, as we can often change our intellectual beliefs. Time is always in favor of the dissolution of the ethics founded on beliefs that are dead, only the process in one is more gradual than in the other. We have only to look at history to see this, and it is one of the most patent things in the world that our ethical ideals are decaying. There is much that is going which should go, and it is unfortunate that the disappearance of error and distorted morals should carry with them the best conquests of the ages. If we can save the good while we dispel error by proving survival after death, the intelligent man and the moral idealist might be expected to discriminate between the use and the abuse of any belief.

The established fact that nature values personality more than it does mere organism ought to suffice to give intelligent men a leverage on the passions of men, whether man conceives his ethics in terms of rewards or obedience to an abstract duty. All ethics are based upon hope and this because no action of the will whatever is rational without an end which always requires the future for the realization of it, and we must be assured that the law of nature allows of that fulfillment. Hope is therefore as much a part of the cosmic scheme as is any interest in the past or the present. No science or philosophy is complete without taking it into account. Nothing but absolute assurance that death annihilates us can justify the limitation of ethical conduct to the attainments of the physical life. Any reasonable probability or scientific proof of survival will justify the cultivation of an ethics which takes into account the remote future while it does not sacrifice the present to it. That is the function and the value of the belief in immortality.

But there is in addition to all this the social problem. I have discussed the question as if it were entirely an individual interest. But the social fabric is as much interested in it as the individual. This may be only for the reason that the social system is a plurality of individuals existing in certain ethical relations which have to be maintained to save us from perpetual war. But whatever the reason, it is certain that the belief in survival will help us in the solution of our social problems. I do not need to state its value in this connection as one of inducing the individual to sacrifice something in this life to gain more in the next, nor make him contented with evil and suffering here with the prospect of escaping it beyond the grave. While that is nothing more than what we demand of every ethical individual in the ethics of the present life, when we ask him not to be a glutton if he expects to escape the gout, there has grown up a Stoical ethics which demands that we should not seek rewards in the future. This is well enough to prevent men from maximizing the future and minimizing the present, but it is usually only the counsel of not crying over spilled milk and requires a nature already well developed ethically to follow it.

Logical consistency and obstinacy are often as much the impulses that take to this maxim as any love of virtue. Moreover Stoicism has never conquered the world and when it makes a Simon Stylites of each of us, it does not redeem civilization. It smacks of the idea of courage, but its defender is usually careful to limit its application. Throwing aside formal systems like this and those who do not adequately recognize the utilities of life, we may insist that social systems will be determined by the ideals which the majority of its members have formed. In the present age those ideals are materialistic in every sense of the term. That is both sensational and philosophical materialism prevail,

the first among the unintelligent and the latter among the scientific classes.

It is said that 300,000 copies of Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe*, a materialistic work, were sold among the laboring classes alone in England in four years. I understand that it was this fact which instigated Sir Oliver Lodge to start his propaganda for the purpose of arousing the religious classes from their lethargy and stupidity in the situation. The poor had waited in all the ages for a better world. They could put up with suffering, if only happiness came at the end. But to cut off the prospect of ultimate happiness was only to enthrone the forces of the French Revolution again—and they have come!

The historians and economists have talked about the economic interpretation of history and now they are reaping the fruits of their teaching. Their doctrine is coming home to plague them. The unsuccessful in the struggle for existence are demanding and fighting for their "share in the hog's wash." They have the throat of Ophiucus and the conscience of a bear. Their oppressors may have been no better, but there has been a remnant of idealists who have tried to defend the spiritual meaning of history, but they had been unfortunate enough to link their doctrine with indefensible traditions and have gone down before physical science and the influence of economics. Men have become practical materialists as well as philosophical ones, and often practical materialists where they are not philosophical ones. Physical science has achieved so much that it has secured all the worshippers; and the spiritual interpretation of life, in default of evidence for its truth, must retire into the limbo of illusions. You are not going to save civilization without that interpretation of the meaning of nature which puts personality as the basis of its interest. Physical science with all its conquests has done

nothing more than to support a larger population than could be sustained without its discoveries and inventions. It has done nothing for the spiritual life of man.

It is true enough that a man must have his physical necessities satisfied before he can seek and attain any other ends, and it is just as true that he will form his conception of the divine which the satisfaction of his appetites will favor. (But at the same time, it is as true that you may supply his physical wants as much as you please, and there is no guarantee that he will conceive God to be anything more than a stomach filler.) Happiness is not always the same thing. With one it is, as Carlyle has said, merely enough of "hog's wash" and with another it is some more spiritual attainment. Man does not live by bread alone, even when bread is necessary, though too many are willing to stop with it, and the misfortune is that the poverty problem involves a paradox or a hopeless riddle. You cannot expect a man to pursue the spiritual unless he has satisfied the material needs of his nature and when you have satisfied these you have no assurance that he will seek the spiritual. The solution has to be left to nature or Providence and every effort we make only seems to land us in perplexities.

If, however, we can saturate the human mind with the belief in survival after death and the fact that it is the higher aspects of his personality that nature values, you will have the same fulcrum for the moving of its attention that you have now in Copernican astronomy, Newtonian gravitation and Darwinian Evolution, or any other belief which is pivotal for the interpretation of nature. Let it be as definitely assured as any scientific doctrine and it must enter into the calculations of conduct in the same way. It will color history with the ideals which it is capable of instigating. The brotherhood of man may be scientifically defended

again as well as ethically. The center of gravity for ethics will not be placed in sensory happiness alone, but will be pushed into the intellectual or inner life of higher knowledge and emotions, and carry with it the proper depreciation of sensuous enjoyment as having less value and less right to dominate the springs of conduct. Nor is it a fatal fault that it may sometimes divert motives into wrong channels. That is true of any idea with the spiritually undeveloped.

The belief in immortality may not be an unmixed good, because man will abuse any truth you can teach him, until he learns to see it in the right light. But the educational forces of the world need the stabilizing power of such a truth to arouse some sort of reflection that may take the place of war to civilize man. We can influence a man in only two ways, by reason or by force. When we cannot reason with him we have to fight with him. The school and the police are our alternatives. The school can be useful only where it has certified truth for its major premise. (You cannot inculcate spiritual ideas unless you have a spiritual philosophy or scientifically proved truth.) This is an engine of power to convey belief or to stabilize the direction of evolution, to force the mind to recognize the fact that nature respects personality more than it does organic forms, and to establish beyond question that it is the inner life of the mind, both for personal satisfaction and the attainment of social ideals, that triumphs over the sensuous enjoyments of the world. In all ages the belief in a future life, if it existed at all in the political organism, has been able to make itself felt in the social structure, even when that structure was governed by the disbeliever.

The French Revolutionists found that they had to compromise with the religious instincts and set up the Goddess of Reason. Skepticism would not see the social organism perish, as that is also self destruction, and

it would beg for tolerance to save that structure, though the doctrine that saves it is regarded as an illusion! Even materialism tried to save the ideals that have originated in another philosophy, but the poor balk at no consequences when they see the logical meaning of what they have been taught. With the economic interpretation of history in their minds and no knowledge of other ideals than food and physical luxury, they put materialism into practise and sacrifice what the intellectuals would preserve, though their philosophy has no tendency to protect it. It will devolve on a spiritual view of nature to lead the world out of the wilderness of Sinai.

There is one very important thing to be overcome by proving survival after death. It is the fear of death. I do not mean any special craven fear, for it is probable that this is rarer than we often think. The healthy man has no time to think about it and the ill man does not care. But all prefer to prolong consciousness as much as possible. In that sense the fear of death characterizes all persons, even though we have the courage to sacrifice life in behalf of a moral cause. In a materialistic age, however, there is sure to be a large number of persons who will value life above all else. This instinct was probably at the basis of pacifism in most instances. If we cannot count on continuing consciousness we shall make the most of that which we have, whether for one kind of enjoyment or another, and endeavor to prolong it to the utmost. This is the secret of the development of medicine which combines a philanthropic vocation with the exploitation of the sick and in many cases avails to save a man from the consequences of his sins, less to correct his sins. The saving of his soul was left to the priest and of his body to the physician. The priest saved his soul without charges while the physician could exploit him and his fear of death to his heart's content. With

the growth of materialism the desire not to die increased and the physician has complete command of the desires which will sacrifice all to the prolongation of consciousness. The individual physician may often live above this situation and so it is only the system or the practical outcome of the medical life that I have in mind here. It is based upon the desire to escape death and to prolong life.

Now what we require to learn is a simple law of nature. It is the equal universality of death with life, or the dissolution of all compounds, organic and inorganic, unless something interferes to prevent it. Death is as much a fixed policy of nature as life is, and if we can only assure ourselves of its place in the economy of the world as a mere transitional process to new environment, we shall have the same attitude toward it that we do toward life. We shall recognize it as a part of an ethical dispensation, a part of a scheme for helping in spiritual development, not terminating it. There is no reason why we should endeavor to prolong life except to meet the responsibilities of it and to develop spiritual ideals, and when the physical aspect of it begins to decay, we might even be glad to die and learn to rejoice at it as we do at a birth.

Indeed death is but a second birth just as birth is our first death. We know at least two stages of our life, the prenatal and the postnatal, and communication with the dead proves the *post mortem* life, thus giving us an idea of three stages of our development with possibilities yet to be learned. But we have reason to treat death as a benevolent event in the process of evolution, and the sooner we come to regard it so, the stress and suffering of life will be less. We shall prepare and wait for it as we would for an assured happiness. There is nothing to hinder thus looking at it, except the philosophy of materialism. That view of nature

out of the way would find us rejoicing at the prospect of a transition to new environment and death might be regarded as an equally happy event with living.

Sunset and evening star,
And one clear call for me!
And may there be no moaning of the bar,
When I put out to sea,

But such a tide as moving seems asleep,
Too full for sound and foam,
When that which drew from out the boundless deep
Turns again home.

Twilight and evening bell,
And after that the dark!
And may there be no sadness of farewell,
When I embark;

For tho' from out our bourne of Time and Place
The flood may bear me far,
I hope to see my Pilot face to face
When I have crost the bar.

Tennyson had caught in this poetic glimpse the spirit of inspiration that breaks out "from the circumambient eternity to color with its own hues man's little islet of time."

THE END

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY

Los Angeles

This book is DUE on the last date stamped below.

DEC 17 1965
REC'D LD-URL JAN 13 1968
JAN 1 1966
REC'D LD-URL JUL 7 1965
JUN 30 1969
LD URL MAR 9 1977
RENEWAL REC'D LD-URL LD-URL MAY 22 1978
DEC 3 1979
JAN 14 1980
JUL 14 1987
AUG 22 1980
JUL 27 1980

Form L9-39,050-8,'65 (F6234s8) 4939

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY



AA 000 506 235 1

60



3 1158 00300 8538

200

THE
WHITE HOUSE
SAN FRANCISCO



BOOKS

